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## **Southeast Asia Report**

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22 August 1983

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No. 1327

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# PREMIERS BACK HAWKE AGAINST EXPANSIONISTS

Canberra THE WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN in English 2-3 Jul 83 p 3

[Article by Robert Bowden]

[Text]

THE Prime Minister, Mr Hawke, has secured an important weapon in his battle with expansionist elements of the Labor Party in receiving from the premiers a unanimous endorsement for a Budget deficit of no more than \$8500 million for 1983-84.

The approval for a \$8500 billion Budget deficit was contained in a communique issued by the heads of the Commonwealth and the six State Governments following yesterday's premiers' conference.

However, endorsement of the Commonwealth's Budget strategy was obtained only after the Federal Government provided a special "once only" payment of \$155 million to the States to help them overcome their own fiscal problems.

The special recession payment was well short of the \$500 million demanded by the premiers on Thursday but was sufficient to secure from the States a mandate for the Commonwealth's proposed Budget strategy.

The communique stated that an \$8500 million deficit would provide "a significant fiscal stimulus to promote recovery while avoiding excessive strain on financial markets".

"They agreed that any deficit significantly above this figure would bring into question the durability of recovery through its possible effects in raising interest rates," the communique read.

The mandate for an \$8500 million deficit represents a significant victory over sections of the Labor Caucus calling for a deficit as high as \$10,000 million.

It also points to a dramatic change of heart from some of the Labor States — notably NSW and Victoria, which earlier in the week urged a much more expansionist approach from the Commonwealth.

The \$155 million payment was part of an overall package to the States which included an expansion of borrowing, a lift in overseas borrowings and the abolition of all terms and conditions on borrowings of "larger" authorities.

## Generous

Although the premiers welcomed the more generous handouts, most left Canberra warning of higher charges, increased taxes and even cuts in Public Service staff numbers.

The Acting Premier of NSW, Mr Ferguson, said Public Service ceilings and the Government's services could be cut as a result of the conference.

The only alternative to this would be higher taxes and charges, but this was unlikely.

Asked whether he was happy with the Federal Government's new offer, Mr Ferguson replied: "When you are looking down the barrel, what option have you got?"

The Premier of South Australia, Mr Eanson, said even



before leaving Canberra that his Government had announced rises in charges to help offset the tighter budgetary position.

The West Australian Premier, Mr Burke, said the offer was not as generous as he had hoped but was a significant improvement on the initial offer.

The additional \$155 million was split on a pro rata basis between the States but would not be counted in future years in determining tax-sharing grants.

This means that total capital and recurrent payments to the States will rise by 13.3 per cent in 1983-84, a real increase of 5.8 per cent.

Capital and recurrent grants to NSW will increase by 14 per cent, Victoria by 12.9 per cent, Queensland by 14 per cent, South Australia 11.5 per cent, Western Australia 13.8 per cent and Tasmania 9.9 per cent.

In addition, the Commonwealth has lifted borrowing programs for larger non-electricity authorities by 15 per cent to \$1202 million and placed a limit on total overseas borrowings of \$800 million.

When total grants and borrowings are taken together, the overall handout to the States will increase by 13.4 per cent.

In return for this, the States must undertake to limit borrowings by their electricity authorities to stated estimates and to embark on no new projects under the infrastructure program.

The Commonwealth's aim is to provide the States with sufficient cash to allow them to embark on their own economic expansion without squeezing financial markets and placing pressure on inflation and interest rates.

The Labor States particularly have been concerned at what they believe was the far too moderate economic stance

being adopted by Mr Hawke and the Treasurer, Mr Keating, in relation to the size of the fiscal stimulus.

Mr Burke went as far as to suggest before the conference began that Mr Hawke's policies were more like those of his conservative predecessor, Mr Malcolm Fraser.

In overall terms, the size of Commonwealth outlays leaves little room to cry poor with the latest offerings representing the biggest real increase in payments since 1975-76.

Total payments and borrowings to the States are up 13.4 per cent in spite of an expected drop of 20 per cent in Commonwealth receipts for 1983-84.

Total payments and borrowings to NSW are up 14.5 per cent to \$6100 million, to Victoria up 13.1 per cent to \$4576 million, Queensland 13 per cent to \$3266 million, South Australia 12.9 per cent to \$1919 million, Western Australia 12.6 per cent to \$1943 million and Tasmania up 11.1 per cent to \$779 million.

But the size of the payments also enabled the Commonwealth to point out additional budgetary constraints and raise the question of possible increases in some taxes.

## Expansion

The communique noted the severe budgetary environment in both the States and the Commonwealth and stressed that substantial increases in the real value of transfers from the Commonwealth to the States would require "reductions in other Commonwealth outlays or increases in Commonwealth revenues or some combination of the two".

Mr Hawke refused to expand on this section of the communique during a press conference and would not isolate areas in which taxes might have to increase.

Both Mr Hawke and Mr Keating stressed the magnitude of the expansion contained within the \$8500 million deficit projection and rejected claims that their economic approach was too conservative.

Mr Keating said that the direct fiscal stimulus contained within the \$8500 million target was in the order of \$3000 million.

Mr Hawke said the Commonwealth had not approached the Premiers' Conference with the aim of receiving a mandate, but admitted that it was a useful document for the Government in disseminating its economic message.

Mr Hawke said it was a rare and historic development which highlighted the unanimous endorsement by the States of the correct course the Government was taking in the area of economic management.

## Consultation

The communique also agreed for the need to review by 1984-85 the arrangements for compensation of the States for Medicare and agreed there should be further consultations with Queensland on the level of compensation.

The heads of government also agreed on a working group of Commonwealth, State and Northern Territory Treasury officers to examine longer-term issues of the distribution of taxation powers between the Commonwealth and the States.

It would advise by the end of October on terms of reference for a review by February 1985 of the distribution of the tax sharing and identified health grants.

The communique also welcomed the "spirit of co-operation" in which the Premiers' Conference and Loan Council had been held.

# MODERATES MOBILIZE AGAINST LEFT GAINS

Canberra THE WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN in English 2-3 Jul 83 p 2

[Article by Russell Schneider]

[Text]

THE moderate forces in the ALP are gearing up for an all-out bid to regain effective control of the party's national executive.

The initial battlegrounds are Tasmania and Queensland. But ultimately the battle will spread to all States.

It will be resolved at the 1984 national conference, when the party will consider moves to expand the executive — Labor's governing body.

The need for a moderate counter-attack was highlighted at last week's national executive meeting.

On the one hand, the outcome confirmed the fears of some moderates over the creeping moves of the Left to expand its influence on party decision-making.

Nevertheless, although the moderates were aware of recent left-wing gains, they were still surprised at the closeness of several important votes.

Labor's left wing is a substantial minority in the federal Caucus as a result of the sweeping electoral victory of the Prime Minister, Mr Hawke, which resulted in more moderates coming into Parliament than leftists.

This reduced proportionate left-wing strength, and resulted in the Left winning few of the ministerial portfolios.

But the electoral victory did not affect the composition of the national executive. During the past year the Left's gains on this body, low-key though they may have been at the time, have been as spectacular as the election result.

The initial scenario for a moderate revival now involves:

**BREAKING** the Left's strength in Tasmania and reducing its influence on the executive from that State.

**FORGING** a tighter alliance among the non-socialist-Left forces in Queensland, opening the way for moderates to win the two executive positions from that State.

**ULTIMATELY** widening the composition of the national executive, possibly by giving State secretaries — the party's "apparatchik" — automatic places on the executive by virtue of their office rather than forcing them to seek election as individual delegates.

At the moment the executive comprises the four federal parliamentary leaders — Mr Hawke, the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Bowen, the Leader of the Government in the Senate, Senator Button, and the deputy Senate leader, Senator Grimes — plus two delegates from each State and

one from each of the territories.

The State delegates are elected under a system of proportional representation, which gives the Left a good chance of electing one delegate from each State.

During the past 12 months the Left, using this system, has eroded moderate strength on the executive, first by ousting Mr Mick Young as a South Australian delegate and then Mr John Dawkins from Western Australia. In the ACT recently Mrs Joan Taggart was also defeated by a leftist.

The fine balance means the four parliamentary leaders are, ironically, in a fairly strong position — provided they stick as a solid voting bloc. That could be expected to give moderate forces a 10-8 majority.

But it became clear that that majority is not as strong as moderates might have expected.

Their suspicion, after the meeting, was that one of the parliamentary leaders had, in effect, "raided" on them.

The situation was illustrated in a ballot for the senior vice-presidency of the party.

Usually, the occupancy of that position might not be all that vital. The presi-

dent. Mr Neville Wran, gives the executive a distinctly moderate and popular face.

But Mr Wran's standing aside as NSW premier pending the findings of the Street royal commission, even though it has not affected his position as party president (he was unanimously re-elected unopposed last week), illustrates how nothing is certain in politics.

The post of senior vice-president was contested by two men — the Minister for Veterans Affairs, Senator Gietzelt (NSW), recognised as one of the leaders of the Left in the federal Caucus, and the secretary of the South Australian branch, Mr Chris Schacht, a moderate.

The first vote was tied nine all. At that stage Mr Bowen suggested a draw from a hat.

That was when the moderates made a mistake. They argued the rules required two ballots before the hat-draw was taken. They believed that, once the closeness of the vote was shown, one delegate would swing back their way. This seemed better than the 50-50 chance involved in a draw.

But it worked the other way. Instead of switching to Mr Schacht, one delegate swung to Senator Gietzelt. He was elected by 10 votes to eight.

Subsequent ballots also showed the executive balanced on a knife edge. Mr Schacht did secure one of the two junior vice-presidencies. But a left-winger, Senator Pat Oiles (WA), tied the vote nine all with her own State secretary, Mr Michael Behan. She won the draw from the hat.

The composition of the executive — and its officers — was more important than the actual debate on Mr Hawke's attitudes to uranium, East Timor, Vietnam, and the economy.

The executive did reject — on the voices — a proposal from a South Australian left-winger, Mr Peter Duncan, which would have called on Caucus to push for consideration of State conference decisions.

But the reason for the rejection was more important than its sentiments — with which the executive tacitly agreed.

The argument against its endorsement, made by Mr Hawke, the Queensland secretary, Mr Peter Beattie, and others, was that it would be interpreted as directly critical of the Government, a move which no one saw as good politics at this stage.

Instead, the executive endorsed a broader motion put by the national secretary, Mr Bob McMullan, which was nevertheless a moderate rebuke — though wide enough to avoid direct criticism of the Government.

While the executive backed off specifically interpreting party policy, it reaffirmed its "rights and responsibilities".

That was a clear-cut warning to the Government that although the executive was prepared to avoid a clash at this stage, it might in the future be forced to carry out its own "responsibilities".

For this reason it is clearly quite important for the moderates to control the executive.

One of the first moves in reassertion of moderate-Right influence will come in Tasmania, where federal intervention is due to end in October. At that time

the moderates hope to replace at least one of the present Tasmanian delegates with someone they believe they can rely on.

The second move is in Queensland, where the party is still divided into four factions — the centre-Left, the Old Guard, the Australian Workers Union, and the socialist-Left.

The centre-Left and the AWU are now talking about moving even closer together. And there is still the possibility that, despite considerable tensions, the Old Guard may move closer to the other two.

If this could be engineered the non-socialist factions in Queensland would control about 68 per cent of the State conference, giving them a chance of electing both delegates to the executive and changing the power balance totally.

A final proposition, still needing refinement, would provide for State secretaries to be delegates in their own right.

At the moment the secretaries may attend the executive, but cannot vote unless they have been formally elected as delegates. Any moderate secretary who seeks election as a delegate effectively rules out another moderate from the organisation.

But if the executive was widened and secretaries automatically became full delegates, the moderates' strength would be considerably increased.

The Left is not, of course, going to sit back and let this happen.

Between now and the next national conference all factions will be doing the best they can behind the scenes to ensure their strength is maximised firstly at the State conferences and then the national conference in moves which will determine the direction Labor takes before the next election.

COLUMN EXAMINES TIES WITH PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Melbourne THE AGE in English 1 Jul 83 p 13

[Article by David Broadbent]

[Text]

**T**HE Papua New Guinea Government's faith in Australia as a reliable ally and financial supporter has soared following closely timed visits by the Prime Minister, Mr Hawke, the Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr Hayden, and the Defence Minister, Mr Scholes.

The visits brought immediate increases in Australian aid as well as a promise to consider substantially increased defence assistance. A senior Minister in the Somare Government says "the feelings" between the two countries have never been better.

Nevertheless, the anti-Indonesia lobby's increasingly strident criticism of PNG's giant neighbor is heightening paranoia in our former colony and complicating the already difficult problems of the common Irian Jaya border.

By asserting that Indonesia has military ambitions in PNG, the anti-Indonesia lobby is creating fear in PNG while having no noticeable impact on the Indonesian regime.

At the same time, the lobby is corroding the "special relationship" between PNG and Australia through its assertion that Australia would do nothing to help PNG if it were invaded by Indonesia.

One of PNG's most senior defence officials told me he believed some Indonesian critics cared somewhat less about the future of PNG than about attacking Indonesia.

He believed anti-Indonesian feeling had reached the level in some parts of Australia where some people would be happy only when Indonesia did attack PNG so the rest of the world could see how bad the Indonesians really were.

Then, in an unconscious personal display of the way in which Australia's special relationship with PNG is altering, the official said he was increasingly worried that some of the Australian experts and academics on which his country still relied, were more interested in becoming expert in Indonesian matters than in PNG's problems.

"I don't think it helps to spend as much time telling our university students about the dangers of Indonesia as they do telling them how to help solve PNG's problems," he said.

That PNG does have serious border problems with Indonesia and that the people of PNG have good reason to be jittery is not in dispute. The discovery that a major road being built along the Irian Jaya border clearly and grossly violated PNG territory at several points was just the most recent of a long series of casual discourtesies by Indonesia.

The road intrudes into PNG over about six kilometres and while argument continues over whether the border crossings were accidental, deliberate or simply contemptuous carelessness, the intrusions all occurred when the road went around extremely difficult terrain.

The Indonesian Government has now officially apologised for the bombings saying they were accidental and that the offending sections will be closed and re-built well inside Irian Jaya.

Mr Scholes described the apology as "significant and probably unprecedented". Indonesia has certainly shown no interest in apologising for border incursions in the past.

Last year, incursions by Indonesian military officers were recorded virtually every month. By the end of July last year, there had been eight incursions in seven weeks, all of which were disclaimed by Indonesia as "unconfirmable".

The incursions, which included apparent buzzing of a PNG mission by an Indonesian military helicopter, heightened fears of Indonesia and had officials and academics asking exactly what Australia would do if Indonesia attacked PNG.

The refusal of the Fraser Government and of the Hawke Government to give an absolute iron-clad guarantee, of the sort once written into treaties, that Australia would automatically come to PNG's defence, gave impetus to the line that we would do nothing.

At a time when the special relationship with PNG is already being altered by the exodus of Australians and the arrival of many Philippine, New Zealand and British expatriates, the assertion is potentially damaging.

Few of the new wave of expatriates have or want long-term commitments to the country or know or care about Australia's story in PNG.

Some are actually anti-Australian and object in principle to the influential role of a white power in a Third World country.

This group has no trouble accepting the line that Australia is a worthless ally.

Formally, Australia's position has not changed since 1977 when the then Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr Street, said we were committed to opening immediate consultations with PNG if it were attacked.

Mr Scholes told defence officials Australia would never permit PNG to be "subjugated" by any power. Later, at a Press conference, he said that the statement did not, in principle, go beyond the 1977 Street commitment but he said that a treaty or any firmer guarantees were unnecessary.

Mr Scholes said he could not make foreign policy "on the run". There was not a treaty between the countries because one had never been requested. "But I think the depth of Australia's on-going support for Papua New Guinea is fairly well known.

"But decisions of that nature would have to be taken at the time, under the circumstances of the time, by the Government of the day."

The PNG Defence Minister, Mr Tito, said the people of PNG knew "in our hearts" that if they called on Australia for assistance it would be given.

Mr Tito said his belief was shared by all of the PNG Government and by other governments in the region. The only people who still need to be convinced, it seems, are members of the anti-Indonesia lobby.



# PREMIERS AGREE ON DEFICIT

Sydney THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD in English 2 Jul 83 p 8

[Article by John Short]

[Text]

**CANBERRA.**—The Prime Minister, Mr Hawke, won agreement at the Premiers' Conference yesterday on the need to hold the 1983-84 Budget deficit at \$8,500 million — with the Commonwealth and States — publicly acknowledging that this could lead to an increase in taxes.

The agreement was reached after a marathon horse-trading exercise between the Commonwealth and the States yesterday saw the Federal Government give the Premiers an extra \$270 million in cash grants and loan approvals.

As a result the States will receive \$155 million as a one-off grant to help relieve their budgetary problems, an extra \$46 million for capital works and increased loan borrowing approvals of \$70 million.

Of the \$155 million grant, New South Wales will receive \$47.1 million, Victoria \$34.8 million, Queensland \$31 million, South Australia \$17.23 million, Western Australia \$18.2 million and Tasmania \$7.2 million.

But this is well below the extra \$500 million the States said they needed to help cover the severe budgetary problems they face in 1983-84 because of the recession.

The State leaders said after the completion of the two-day Premiers' Conference that they would now be forced to look at increasing their charges and cutting back services.

The major decisions taken at the Premiers' Conference were:

- An increase in Commonwealth

payments to the six States of 13.3 per cent — from \$15,346 million to \$17,381 million. New South Wales's share for 1983-84 is \$5,632 million, an increase of 14 per cent.

- A rise in approved borrowings of semi-government authorities such as State Water Boards of 15.1 per cent — from \$1,045 million last year to \$1,203 million in 1983-84. New South Wales's share is \$468 million, an increase of 20 per cent.

- A jump in the proportion of the approved loan program State Government authorities can borrow — from \$540 million in 1982-83 to \$800 million this year.

- The establishment of a Commonwealth-State group to examine Victoria's call for the States to be given greater powers to raise taxes — particularly excise duties.

- The creation of a Commonwealth-State working party to draw up terms of reference for a new grant commission inquiry into how tax sharing and health grants from the Commonwealth to the States should be carved up after 1984-85.

- To give the Commonwealth blanket approval to sell indexed bonds — although the Prime Minister later made it clear that it would be some time before the Government did introduce such securities.

In a major departure from the practice followed by earlier governments, the Prime Minister yesterday proposed to the States that they should agree to the release of a communique on the decision reached at the two-day conference. (See below.)



The communique effectively locks the Labor Premiers into accepting the Federal Government's budgetary strategy.

It also locks the Hawke Ministry and the Labor Caucus into accepting a deficit of \$8,500 million in 1983-84--even though a number of ministers and Labor back-benchers want to see a bigger deficit.

The Prime Minister must now grapple with the problem of cutting the ballooning deficit back to this target. The effect of the Premiers' Conference has been to push the starting point for the deficit out to \$10,000 million.

CSO: 4200/738

# GOVERNMENT FORCED TO CUT CRUDE PRICE

Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN in English 30 Jun 83 p 10

[Article by Don Kirkwood]

[Text] THE Federal Government today is expected to announce a 65c fall in the domestic crude oil price from \$36.90 to \$36.25 a barrel for Bass Strait crude.

This will probably mean a fall of about \$65 million in Federal Government receipts from its oil levy in 1983-84, a relatively small sum in view of the \$3200 million it expects to glean from this source.

For the man in the street, the fall will mean very little: when the Australian price was cut by \$1.79 in March, the reduction in the price of a litre of petrol was about one cent.

The price is determined in accordance with world oil price movements, international currency rates, and freight rates.

Some aspects of the complicated formula have been changed since the ALP won office in March, but they will not have a very great bearing on future price determinations.

Meanwhile, Australian oil refineries could easily absorb all of Bass Strait's oil production, the chief executive of BHP's oil and gas division, Mr Russell Fynmore, confirmed yesterday.

Australia's oil consumption is declining from a peak of 660,000 barrels a day three years ago to an estimated 577,000 barrels in this year; that is, back to 1977 levels, when consumption amounted to 566,000 barrels a day.

Of that total, 410,000 barrels a day came from Bass Strait,

and Mr Fynmore contends, the refiners could still cope easily with Bass Strait production at that level.

## Capacity

There has been no significant change in the capacity of Australia's oil refineries in that time, nor has there been an important change in their ability to treat Bass Strait oil — if anything, that has been enhanced.

Just as significantly, there has been a strong swing in demand away from heavy crude oil to light crude oil.

In 1977, heavy crude demand amounted to 28 per cent of total consumption. This year it is expected heavy crude will amount to only 18 per cent of the total.

Heavy crude oil has to be imported since Australia's output is purely of lighter fractions that do not produce fuel oil and bituminous products, to name two of the important derivatives of heavy crude.

But the Australian refineries have claimed they cannot absorb a high proportion of Bass Strait crude.

Indeed, demand has fallen to as little as 220,000 barrels a day in the past 18 months, and the reason is apparently a matter of economics.

It has been cheaper to import crude oil during the glut, than it has been to take the Australian product at a price fixed every six months by the Federal Government.

Recently, refiners have lifted their intake to some 370,000 barrels a day from Bass Strait,

still significantly less than BHP claims its fields can produce.

On average, Bass Strait could supply a consistent 400,000 barrels a day and the revenue lost by the Federal Government from the 30,000 barrels a day not taken by the refiners amounts to \$300 million a year.

Such a figure cannot be sneezed at by a Government facing a huge budget deficit.

Australian demand is expected to grow very slowly during the rest of the 1980s, but it is also clear that light crude oil demand is going to run at a minimum of some 430,000 barrels a day.

Other Australian fields — Barrow Island, Cooper Basin, Jackson, Canning Basin and Surat Basin — will probably produce a maximum of 60,000 barrels a day.

In addition, the Cooper Basin will produce significant quantities of condensate, as will the North West Shelf natural gas project.

It is entirely possible that there could be a surplus of 30,000 barrels of oil a day by 1985, assuming no growth in the market and no decline in existing production.

But it would appear such a surplus could be exported: if so, it would find a ready market, and proceeds would offset the cost of importing large quantities of fuel oil.

There is, of course, a chance that consumption of oil would rise if the US recovery extends to the rest of the world.

## FIJI FACING SLUMP AS SUGAR CANE CROP FAILS

Auckland THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD in English 6 Jul 83 p 3

[Text] Suva--Fiji is facing serious economic repercussions from the worst drought in 80 years.

The sugar cane crop, which earns 60 to 70 per cent of the country's foreign exchange, is expected to slump by about \$F90 million this year--about a quarter to one third of annual export earnings.

As the drought worsens, worries are increasing about the harvest next year, which is now being planted.

### Seed Cane

The Government is rushing in irrigation equipment by air from Australia to boost production of seed cane on nursery farms.

The Fiji Sugar Corporation says 120,000 tonnes of cane is needed if next year's crop is to attain the 1982 level of four million tonnes of cane.

But its staff say they will be lucky to raise two-thirds of the amount required.

### Output

In some areas of western Viti Levu the drought has killed the standing crop or stunted it so badly that it is hardly worth harvesting.

Estimates now put output at under 300,000 tonnes of raw sugar, compared with 487,000 last year.

The estimates are declining daily as the drought continues.

CSO: 4200/736

## BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON INDONESIAN PERSONALITIES

[Unless otherwise noted, the following information on Indonesian personalities has been extracted from Indonesian language sources published in Jakarta]

DR HASYIM DJALAL--The Canadian Government has agreed to the appointment of Dr Hasyim Djalal as Indonesian ambassador to Canada, replacing Ambassador Widodo Budidarmo, who has completed his tour of duty. Ambassador Hasyim Djalal was born in Bukittinggi [West Sumatra] on 25 February 1934. He obtained an M.A. degree at the University of Virginia in the United States. In 1960 he obtained a doctoral degree in the field of international relations from the same university and attended the National Defense Institute in 1971 in the fourth class. Since 1964 he has served at various Indonesian embassies and has been chairman of the Indonesian delegation to a number of international and regional conferences, particularly on the law of the sea, including meetings sponsored by ASEAN, the AALOC [expansion unknown], and the United Nations. [Text] [Jakarta MERDEKA in Indonesian 23 Jun 83 p 1] 5170

ILEN SURIANEGARA--The Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria has agreed to the appointment of Ilen Surianegara as Indonesian ambassador to that country. Ilen Surianegara, who was born on 29 December 1924, is a senior diplomat. He began his diplomatic career in 1954 as a third secretary in the Indonesian Embassy in Paris. His most recent assignment abroad was as Indonesian ambassador to the Republic of Tunisia (1977-80). Before his appointment as ambassador to Tunisia Ilen Surianegara was director of social and cultural relations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ilen Surianegara has served at a number of Indonesian embassies abroad. He served in the Indonesian Embassy in Tokyo as counselor in 1962. In 1964 he was transferred to the Indonesian Embassy in Algiers. In 1970 he was appointed minister counselor in the Indonesian Embassy in Paris. From 1971 to 1975 he was assigned to the Indonesian Embassy in Bonn, successively as minister counselor, minister, and finally as deputy chief of mission. His most recent post in Indonesia was that of deputy governor of the National Defense Institute. Ambassador Ilen Surianegara, who completed his studies at the Institute d'Etudes Politiques of the University of Paris in 1952-53, is married; he and his wife have three children. [Text] [Jakarta MERDEKA in Indonesian 27 Jun 83 p 9] 5170

**COL H. SOEWANDI**--During a working trip to East Kalimantan which ended yesterday [26 June] Minister of Home Affairs Roestam Supardjo installed Col (Retired) H. Soewandi in office as governor of East Kalimantan, replacing Brig Gen (Retired) Ery Soepardjan. Governor Soewandi was born on 24 October 1927 in Surabaya. Together with Jonosewojo (chairman of the central office of the Indonesian Lawn Tennis Association) he joined the BKR [People's Security Body] guerrilla group and took part in the 10 November affair [clash between Indonesian guerrillas and British Indian troops in Surabaya in 1945]. When the war for independence was over, Soewandi entered the military service and was assigned to Battalion 32/Abdulmanan in Infantry Brigade 2 in Malang. In 1965 he was assistant for operations in Military Section 083 in Malang. From 1966-69 he was commander of the Military District in Malang. From 1969-73 he was commander of the Military District in Lumajang [East Java]. Later on he was appointed regent of Lumajang, a position in which he served until 1983. In addition to the Guerrilla Star Medal this retired, middle-ranking Indonesian Armed Forces officer, who has 9 children, holds 11 other service medals and decorations. In reply to a question from a KOMPAS representative, Soewandi promised to do a good job, to visit lower echelons of government frequently, and to be close to the people at all times. He declared: "By being close to the people we get to know their problems!" [Excerpt] [Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 27 Jun 83 p 12] 5170

**PROF DR A. AMIRUDDIN**--In Letter of Decision No 135/M/1983 of 18 June 1983 President Soeharto appointed Prof Dr Achmad Amiruddin as governor of South Sulawesi, replacing Brig Gen Andi Ondang, who had completed his tour of duty. Amiruddin's installation in office as governor will be witnessed by Minister of Home Affairs Roestam Soepardjo, in the name of the president, at a plenary session of the South Sulawesi Provincial Council in Ujungpandang on 22 June 1983. Prof Achmad Amiruddin was elected governor by the Provincial Council recently, receiving 22 votes, while two other candidates, Dr M. Parawansah and Dr Andi Bangsawan each received 10 votes. Professor Amiruddin was born in Sengkang, South Sulawesi, on 25 July 1932. Before his appointment as governor he had been deputy chairman of the BPPT (Technology Transfer and Application Body), with special emphasis on applications of basic science. He had been rector of Hasanuddin University in Ujungpandang from 1973-82. He is a graduate of the University of Indonesia, where he majored in chemistry. He also attended the Graduate School of the University of Kentucky in the United States. He is married and has four children. Honors he has received include the Wirakarya Medal (1971) and the degree of Doctor of Science Honoris Causa from the University Kebangsaan Malaysia (1976). [Text] [Jakarta HARIAN UMUM AB in Indonesian 22 Jun 83 p 8] 5170

**COMMODORE EMIR H. MANGAWEANG**--On 17 June, in the presence of the commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces [Gen Benny Moerdani] the position of chief of the Information Center of the Ministry of Defense and Security was transferred from Brigadier General Entjoeng to Commodore Emir H. Mangaweang. Brigadier General Entjoeng will retire from the armed forces. Commodore Emir was previously chief of the Navy Information Service. [Text] [Jakarta HARIAN UMUM AB in Indonesian 21 Jun 83 p 2] 5170



DOCTOR MACHMUD--In carrying out a phased Indonesianization program in the oil operations sector Atlantic Richfield Indonesia Inc (ARII), a United States company and a production sharing contractor with PERTAMINA [State Oil and Gas Corp], has appointed Dr Machmud, an Indonesian citizen, to hold the highest position in ARII as president and resident manager, with effect from the month of June 1983. His last previous position with the company was that of vice president for finance and administration, a post which he had held since 15 September 1980. Machmud, who was born in the Netherlands on 1 March 1935, graduated from an HBS(B) [Dutch high school in the colonial period] in Medan. He continued his studies in the Faculty of Law of the University of Indonesia and graduated with a bachelor of law degree in 1958. In 1958 he began work for BPM/Shell [Batavian Petroleum Company/Shell] at Plaju [South Sumatra] as a junior lawyer. In 1961 he was transferred to the BPM/Shell office in Surabaya as chief of the legal section. In 1962 he became a senior lawyer at the central office of PT Shell Indonesia. In 1963 he received additional duties as secretary of the Board of Directors of the company. In 1966 he became legal counsel of IIAPCO [Independent Indonesia America Petroleum Company], and in 1967 he became legal counsel of Sinclair Exploration Company when Sinclair continued IIAPCO operations in the Java Sea. In 1968 he became legal counsel for ARII when Sinclair merged with ARCO [Atlantic Richfield Oil Company]. In 1972 he became assistant resident manager of ARII and in 1977 became manager for administration of ARII. He was manager for administration of ARII until 1978, when he was sent to advanced studies. In 1979 he graduated from the Sloan School of Management at Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in the United States, with the degree of master of science in management. [Text] [Jakarta HARIAN UMUM AB in Indonesian 15 Jun 83 p 3] 5170

DR JORGA IBRAHIM--Dr Jorga Ibrahim, a staff instructor in astronomy at Bandung Technological Institute (ITB) and a staff expert on the staff of the assistant rector for academic affairs of this institution of higher education, on Tuesday [21 June] was made an "Officer de l'Ordre National du Merite" [officer of the National Order of Merit] by the French Government. The award was conveyed to him by Ambassador Jean Soulier. Dr Jorga Ibrahim had studied in France at the University of Paris from 1970 to 1974, where he obtained the degree of doctor of science cum laude. His specialty is mathematical cosmology. [Excerpts] [Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 23 Jun 83 p 12] 5170

CSO: 4213/80



# FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES INCREASE

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 29 Jun 83 p 1

[Excerpt] Jakarta, KOMPAS--Indonesian foreign exchange reserves have been increasing since April. Before the devaluation of the rupiah foreign exchange reserves steadily declined by \$400 million to \$1 billion per month until, by the time of the devaluation on 30 March 1983, there remained only \$3.1 billion. However, since April 1983, they have begun to increase again, first to \$3.4 billion and then to \$3.7 billion by the end of May.

According to Dr Arifin M. Siregar, governor of Bank Indonesia, speaking to reporters outside the Bina Graha offices on Tuesday [28 June] the \$3.7 billion in foreign exchange reserves is held by the Central Bank. The foreign exchange held by the foreign exchange banks amounts to about \$3.5 billion. Therefore, total foreign exchange reserves in Indonesia amount to \$7.2 billion.

Arifin Siregar made this statement after he had reported on current monetary developments in Indonesia to President Soeharto. He was accompanied by Minister of Finance Radius Prawiro. Their report covered monetary developments since the devaluation of 30 March 1983.

Siregar said that the situation in the foreign exchange market at present is rather clam. Speculative activity is no longer going on as it did before the devaluation. Whereas prior to devaluation--and even for some time after the devaluation--foreign exchange dealers more usually sold foreign exchange to the public in the form of paper money, now, according to Arifin Siregar, a different tendency can be observed. In general, the foreign exchange dealers are more usually buying now than selling.

Prior to devaluation foreign exchange merchants experienced shortages in foreign paper currency and asked Bank Indonesia for additional supplies. Now Bank Indonesia practically never sells foreign currency to the exchange merchants, because they are able to buy enough for their needs from the public. He said: "Therefore, things are back in balance. What they buy is the same as what they sell." According to the governor of Bank Indonesia, this tendency became noticeable about 6 to 8 weeks ago.

## Continue Vigilant

Although the situation has begun to improve, according to Minister of Finance Radius Prawiro, Indonesia still needs to remain vigilant and must continue to follow carefully everything that is going on. The use of foreign exchange should continue to be earmarked for the consumption of goods which cannot yet be produced in Indonesia. In that way no opportunity will be missed in creating new opportunities for jobs.

Meanwhile, according to Arifin Siregar, the Central Bank will continue to follow and keep in touch with government and private banks on the implementation of the devaluation policy. For one of the essential elements of the 1 June monetary policy is freedom for the government banks to determine their own rates of interest. That is, both rates of interest on deposits and rates of interest on loans.

Because this is the first time the government banks have been free to do this since the New Order came into effect [since 1967], according to Arifin Siregar they need time and experience to get used to the practice. In this connection they need guidance from the Central Bank. "For this reason close contact is being maintained between the Central Bank and the government banks," he added.

If the government sees that the government banks are moving in a direction which the government does not agree with, the government will try to redirect them in the desired directions. He added: "We still have to continue doing this by means of close consultations."

Meanwhile, the private Indonesian banks and foreign banks, according to Arifin Siregar, are used to operating freely in determining their rates of interest. Although this is the case, the Central Bank will also maintain close contact with these banks, and particularly with the Indonesian private banks.

5170

CSO: 4213/81

TRIAL OF NII SUBVERSION CASE PROCEEDS

Surabaya SURABAYA POST in Indonesian 21 May 83 p 2

[Text] MS, the accused, had sworn to uphold the religion of Allah and obey the leaders of the Mujahedin, Suro, vice chairman of the regional NII [Indonesian Islamic State] in East Java, explained this Saturday before a panel of judges of the Surabaya State Court in the NII subversion case. MS was accompanied by his three legal advisors, Pamoedji, A. Thalip, and Soewandi.

When asked about the Mujahedin, the witness, Suro, who was sentenced to 14 years in prison for robbery and murder in Probolinggo, said that Mujahedin is an Islamic organization that exists in the Koran. But he admitted he did not know what the Mujahedin really is.

According to the witness, he heard of plans to found an Indonesian Islamic state when he and Parto Ali took the oath in Bandung. Asked about the Indonesian Islamic state that was to be established in Indonesia, the witness thought a contradiction existed, in light of the fact that Indonesia is a country of Pancasila. "Islam and Pancasila are the same. But the states are different," he stressed.

"I Was Influenced"

Concerning the way in which the concept of the Mujahedin and the Indonesian Islamic state was implanted in MS, a Barata employee, the accused, Suro admitted he did not know. "I myself was influenced. So I joined, just because others did," Suro added.

"If you just followed suit, why did you agree to take the oath?" the prosecutor asked.

"I don't know. The thing was, when I swore, not only did I take a religious oath three times and pray, I also had to swear allegiance to my commandant."

As far as Suro remembers, he and Parto Ali visited MS three times before MS took this oath in August 1980.

During the third court session, three witnesses were to be heard: Suro, Parto Ali and Yulianto. But at the time of this writing, the other two had not yet been called to testify.

MS is accused of being a cadre for the Mujahedin of the NII in East Java besides recruiting his colleagues at work to join the Mujahedin group.

EAST JAVA LEGISLATIVE OFFICIAL SPEAKS OUT ON SHOOTING CRIMINALS

Surabaya SURABAYA POST in Indonesian 25 May 83 p 2

[Text] The recent frequent shootings of repeat offenders obviously represent unlawful action and cannot be justified by anyone, the head of the DPRD (Regional Legislature) in East Java, Blegoh Soemarto, said.

But he quickly reminded that we need to differentiate between firm action on the part of the law enforcement officials against crimes which are considered intolerable and treatment of criminals outside the law. Blegoh fully supports the former mode of action considering that crime has reached a point that worries all of us.

He cited as an example that to obtain just 1,000 or 2,000 rupiahs criminals were willing to kill their victims. Even more cruel, besides taking the victims' possessions, they raped wives in front of their husbands.

Speaking in his office this Wednesday morning, Blegoh went on to say that illegal action against criminals, if they can be proved to be wrongdoing on the part of the law enforcement officials, must be corrected without detracting from the good intentions of the anticrime action.

But if the killing results from resistance by the criminals, it can be tolerated, according to Blegoh Soemarto.

In conclusion, we must not treat good intentions and incidental wrongdoings as one, particularly not to the point where those good aims become blurred.

12405

CSO: 4213/525

## LOSSES FROM CORRUPTION IN EAST JAVA UNCOVERED

Surabaya SURABAYA POST in Indonesia 31 May 83 p 1

[Text] Losses to the state as a result of corruption in East Java at this time amount to 2.6 billion rupiahs. This sum is from just four cases which have been handled by the Office of the District Attorney of East Java since the end of 1982.

Besides these four cases, during May, the district attorney of East Java has dealt with eight other cases of corruption in various fields.

That sum of 2.6 billion rupiahs resulted from corruption at the Surabaya branch of Pacific Bank in the amount of 117 billion rupiahs, at the Wonocolo Puswetma [expansion unknown] in the amount of 688 million rupiahs, at the Pausuruan Reforestation Program in the amount of 214 million rupiahs and from contributions of 69 million rupiahs of state funds during the implementation of Prona [National Agrarian Program] in Bojonegoro. In addition, the district attorney of East Java is now in the process of handling a manipulation case concerning corn supplies to BM, Inc in the amount of 5 billion rupiahs, as well as the construction of S.D. Inpres [Elementary Schools Built by Presidential Instruction] in Trenggalek which is estimated to be 1.3 billion rupiahs. There is also a suspicion of manipulation at PDAM [Regional Potable Water Company] Surabaya over the collection of money owed by water customers and for the provision of supplies for the Ngagel III division which is said to amount to more than 3.1 billion rupiahs.

Not Yet Estimated

The district attorney of East Java, Soesandi, explained to the SURABAYA POST last Monday in his office that his office is now trying to recover those state funds that have been misused. But at this moment the amount that has been recovered cannot be calculated. "We haven't estimated it completely. I think the amount will change as the cases are still in progress," he stressed.

In the case of Bojonegoro Prona, for example, his office has confiscated a Mercedes automobile, a luxury house on Yuwono Street, Surabaya, a Vespa motor scooter and a house in Bojonegoro with its contents. In the Pasuruan Reforestation case, in addition to 44 hectares of land, various items of real property were confiscated as well.



In the case of Wonocolo Pusvetma, a house, car and some furniture were seized while in the case of Pacific Bank, only a small sum was seized as the money is thought to have been sent out of the country by the suspects.

Of the four cases mentioned, one (the Pacific Bank case) has been brought to trial. In another case, Bojonegoro Prona, only the file has been submitted to the court. The files of the other two cases, Pusvetma Wonocolo and Pasuran Reforestation, are ready to be submitted to the court.

#### PERUMNAS [National Housing Agency]

The PERUMNAS case consists of two parts, the case of NS and company, and of Engineer IS. These cases are still under examination by a team from the district attorney's office of East Java. Both are cases transferred from Opstibpas (Central Anticorruption Operation).

Soesandi also explained that since the exposure of illegal collection in Bojonegoro Prona, his office has investigated similar cases in other parts of East Java. It turned out that methods in the Bojonegoro case were also used in Magetan, Tulungagung and Jombang. Last Monday accusations were brought in a similar complaint in Jember.

Misuse of funds has also been found at Puskud [Center for Village Cooperatives] in Tulungagung and Ponorogo. The head of Tulungagung Puskid has been in hiding since May and is being sought. The head of Ponorogo Puskid, EP, has been in custody since 20 May. At this time in Trenggalek, besides the misuse of funds at S.D. Inpres, misuse has been found in the petty traders credit system.

#### Helping Other District Attorneys

He added that the district attorney of East Java, besides investigating manipulation of funds and corruption, is at this time also aiding other district attorney's offices and the attorney general to investigate smuggling and corruption in other areas.

According to the district attorney of East Java, his office, in cooperation with the attorney general, is aiding in the investigations at Tanjung Perak concerning the smuggling of video tapes and other electronic equipment hidden in potted plants. In conjunction with the district attorney of South Sulawesi, the office aided in summoning Drs SM, an official at the district office of the Department of Finance of East Java, who is suspected of corruption in Ujung Pandang to the amount of 1.4 billion rupiahs, helped to arrest a suspect in Batu in a reforestation corruption case in North Sulawesi, aided in the confiscation of evidence in a case of transmigration corruption in Southeast Sulawesi and is now aiding the district attorney of East Timor who is investigating corruption concerning medical supplies whose prices have been raised 1,500 percent over market price.

12405

CSO: 4213/525



## INDONESIA

### MINING OFFICIAL DISCUSSES ENERGY SOURCES, PEAT RESERVES

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 24 Jun 83 p 2

[Article: "Indonesia Has Large Reserves of Peat for Energy Purposes"]

[Excerpt] Jakarta, KOMPAS--It is estimated that Indonesia has the fourth largest peat reserve in the world, and this can be turned into a source of energy. Peat deposits cover 17 million hectares distributed among 4 of the largest islands in Indonesia. These are Java, with 25,000 hectares; Sumatra, with 6,781,000 hectares; Kalimantan, with 6,469,000 hectares; and Irian Jaya, with 3,625,000 hectares.

This was stated by Katili, director general of general mining affairs, in the working paper which he presented before those attending the Indo Energi-83 Conference in Jakarta on Thursday [23 June].

Katili thinks that most of the energy which has been developed in Indonesia has required large amounts of capital, high technology, and industries which don't employ many workers. Peat can be developed in the same way. However, it can also be handled on a small scale, at limited cost, and in the service of industries which use a low level of technology and a large number of workers.

The director general of general mining affairs said that in the past there was a tendency to consider peat land as of little use, and it was often set aside for the transmigration program. However, when peat can be removed from a given area, in addition to using the peat as a source of energy, the land can be used for transmigration purposes.

The advantage of peat as a fuel, compared to petroleum, natural gas, and coal, is that its development can employ a great deal of labor, providing job opportunities for many people. For example, Ireland, which is producing peat in a fully mechanized way, still finds it necessary to allocate about 65 percent of mining expenditures to labor costs. Peat can also be produced simply, with a low investment cost, and this kind of mining does not require expensive and complicated equipment. Beside that, the area which has been stripped of peat can be reclaimed and used for agricultural or forestry purposes. If peat is used as a substitute for petroleum, natural gas, or coal, foreign exchange can be earned by selling these other sources of energy on the world market.

According to Katili, the largest Indonesian peat-bearing areas are in East Sumatra and South Kalimantan. However, the demand for cheap fuels as replacements for firewood and kerosene is mainly in Java, the area where the population is concentrated.

Peat is most effectively processed on the spot and used to generate electricity, because interisland transportation charges are very high. However, recently processes have been discovered for turning peat into briquets, pellets, or charcoal, which would facilitate transportation of these products.

At the beginning of his speech Katili reviewed at some length Indonesian reserves of coal, which are estimated to range between 750 million and 1 billion metric tons. There are from 200 to 300 million metric tons of coal in West and Central Sumatra; 200 to 250 million metric tons in South Sumatra; 100 to 150 million metric tons in northeast Kalimantan; 100 to 150 million metric tons in East Kalimantan; and about 150 million metric tons in South Kalimantan, including Pulau Laut.

5170

CSO: 4213/81

FARMERS' INCOME DOES NOT MATCH INCREASE IN SUGAR PRODUCTION

Surabaya SURABAYA POST in Indonesian 20 May 83 p 2

[Text] Nationally, sugar production is rising, but the targeted increase in the income of farmer-landlords has not yet been achieved. The government is not yet considering raising the price of sugar in order to increase farmers' income because this would affect consumers.

The solution lies in making technical and nontechnical improvements. On the technical side, the sugar mill's duty will be to provide prime quality seed and to guide cane farmers in cultivating the land more intensively.

The minister of agriculture, Engineer Achmad Affandi, accompanied by the vice minister for increased production of perennial crops, Engineering H. Hasjruul Harahap, stated the above Thursday afternoon after chairing a meeting with the Bupatis [regents], sugar mill administrators and with members of the Department of Agriculture and BIMAS [agricultural mass guidance program] officials of East Java.

Integration

According to the minister, this meeting discussed ways to bring about agreement and take concerted action, and did not discuss how to increase sugar production. National sugar production has been increasing by 1.6 to 1.7 million tons per year.

But production per hectare has fallen sharply. In 1976 one hectare produced 9.1 tons of crystal sugar; in 1982 production fell to 6.3 tons per hectare. This drop has to be checked.

So, the main aim now is not just to maintain national sugar production which at this time is rising, but more important, to increase production per hectare in order to boost farmers' income, the minister said.

In East Java sugar production does seem to be booming. In 1 year, 1 million tons may be produced while East Java needs only 300,000 tons for its own consumption. The rest goes to other provinces. The problem in East Java now is the procurement of warehouses. Existing warehouses can hold only 600,000 tons.

## It Can Be Done

Concerning an increase in sugar production without increasing the area of plantation, the governor is certain East Java can do it.

But the governor still sees three factors that will require the concerted action of all parties. They are: improvement of seed quality, improvement of land quality and improvement of cultivation and fertilization so that every hectare can produce more. There are other nontechnical factors that are considered as obstacles in the field. All this must be corrected, the governor explained.

## Concerted Action

The shipment of sugar from East Java to other provinces is being done in a concerted manner by the agencies concerned with transportation. DOLOG [Logistics Depot] which handles the shipment has held regular meetings with the agencies mentioned above.

It came out in a meeting on 17 May that 1,605,746 bags of sugar, or 3/4 of the 2,350,000 bags that East Java must send to other provinces, had been shipped as of 17 May.

According to the head of the DOLOG, R. A. Djaffar, because the sugar shipment has been smooth, it is hoped that the total amount will have been sent by the end of May. In this way, East Java's warehouses can be used to store the sugar that will be produced in the future.

12405

CSO: 4213/525

CONTAMINATED SHRIMP DISCOVERED, DESTROYED

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 24 Jun 83 p 2

[Article: Director General of Fisheries Affairs Orders Inspection After Exported Shrimp Found To Have Cholera Germs"]

[Excerpts] Jakarta, KOMPAS—In the near future the Directorate General of Fisheries Affairs will undertake a microbiological test of the water, equipment, and health of the workers at the firm PT Misaya Mitra of Samarinda [East Kalimantan]. This is because the company was proved to have exported 465 tons of shrimp to Japan on 3 June, of which 25 tons were found to contain cholera germs.

The Directorate General of Fisheries Affairs will also tighten up on regulations covering the issuance of cleanliness in processing certificates. This will be done by requiring that a sample of the last batch produced be tested in the local laboratory of the Fish Product Development and Quality Testing Service.

In addition, every area affected by gastroenteritis must be inspected, and fish product quality inspections must be handled thoroughly.

This was stated by the subdirector of quality development in the Directorate General of Fisheries Affairs to a KOMPAS reporter in Jakarta on Thursday [23 June]. The subdirector was commenting at some length on a reported published in KOMPAS on 14 June which stated that Japanese quarantine inspectors had destroyed 25 tons of Indonesian shrimp because the shipment was found to contain cholera germs.

The subdirector of quality development said that the presence of cholera germs was possibly due to several circumstances. The first possibility might have been contamination during handling and processing. This could include the fishermen or a worker suffering from cholera. Because the processing of the shrimp took place in April and May, it would be difficult to determine whether the shipment had been contaminated.

The second possibility lies in the fact that during those months in the Samarinda area [East Kalimantan] there are drought conditions and some cases



of gastroenteritis. There may have been workers involved in shrimp processing who drank water from the river and were affected by the disease. The final possibility is that the contamination occurred during the time the shrimp was being transported to Japan. However, to be certain of this, the source of the contamination must still be identified.

Meanwhile, in Indonesia the quality inspection of fish products is based on a joint regulation issued by the ministers of health and agriculture in 1975. The regulation in principle asks every fish product processing unit to follow "good processing procedures."

Before shrimp are exported, they must be inspected by the Fisheries Service of East Kalimantan, using the A Q L 6.5 method. This method is 95 percent reliable.

5170

CSO: 4213/81

# SQUADRON 12 REACTIVATED, INCREASES AIR FORCE STRENGTH

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 18 Jun 83 p 12

[Excerpts] Madiun, KOMPAS--Indonesian Air Force Squadron 12 was reactivated on Friday [17 June] by Air Marshal Sukardi, air force chief of staff, at Iswahyudi Air Force Base in Madiun [East Java].

Squadron 12 is equipped with A-4 Skyhawk fighter bombers. This aircraft has the capability of performing tasks such as air escorting, air combat, aerial bombing, ground support, air defense and aerial observation.

Lt Col Irawan Saleh, a pilot and a 1968 graduate of the Air Force Section of the Indonesian Armed Forces Academy [AKABRI], has been appointed commander of Squadron 12.

Air Marshal Sukardi, in his speech on the occasion, said that at the beginning of the 1960's the Indonesian Air Force was one of the strongest in Southeast Asia. At that time the Air Force had three fighter-bomber squadrons and a number of radar and guided missile units for air defense duties.

He added that the Air Force also had two squadrons of strategic bombers, one squadron of tactical bombers, and one strategic transport squadron. However, changes in conditions and in the situation toward the end of the 1960's and a shortage of spare parts caused the operational capabilities of the Air Force to decline quickly, so that it was difficult to continue with the development of Air Force capabilities.

After the government under the New Order [after 1967] succeeded in consolidating the situation, the Air Force began to rebuild its strength. With the reactivation of Squadron 12, the strength of Operational Wing 300 at present consists of Squadron 14, with F-5E Tigers; Squadron 11 and Squadron 12, with A-4 Skyhawks; and Technical Squadron 042.

According to Air Marshal Sukardi, whereas the strength of Wing 300, at the time it was formed in the early 1960's, was based on an emergency program to meet pressing needs, the development of its combat strength at the present time is quite different. This is being done on the basis of the strategic plan prepared by the Ministry of Defense and Security.

It is planned that Squadron 12 will be based at Pekanbaru, in Riau Province.

5170

CSO: 4213/81

## INDONESIA

### BRIEFS

ADVANCED TRAINING AIRCRAFT--Yogyakarta, KOMPAS--Three HS Hawk MK 53 advanced training aircraft on Monday, 20 June, landed safely at Adisucipto Air Force Base in Yogyakarta, after a long flight from the plant where they were built, British Aerospace Company, Dunsfold, United Kingdom. The three multiengine aircraft will be assigned to Training Wing I in Yogyakarta to strengthen the "fleet" of aircraft there. From the factory where they were built the three HS Hawk's were flown out to Indonesia by British pilots, Chris Robert, D. Young and Keith Hartley, assisted by an Indonesian pilot, Maj Agus Suwarno. The route followed by the three HS Hawk's was from Dunsfold to Malta, Luxor, Dubai, Bombay, Colombo, Medan, Halim Perdanakusuma Air Force Base [Jakarta], and Adisucipto Air Force Base in Yogyakarta. According to the Information Service at Adisucipto Air Force Base, the arrival of the HS Hawk's follows the receipt of several aircraft last month, under a purchase contract involving a number of aircraft entered into by the Ministry of Defense and Security and British Aerospace, which is represented in Indonesia by PT BAE. The HS Hawk MK 53 is the newest Indonesian Air Force weapons system, which will be used for training purposes in the Indonesian Armed Forces Flight School, attached to Training Wing I in Yogyakarta. [Text] [Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 25 Jun 83 p 8] 5170

CSO: 4213/81

AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE DISCUSSES BILATERAL, INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS, REFUGEES

Paris SAMAKKHI in Lao Feb 83 pp 3-4, 9-10

[Interview with Mr Thongsai, Lao Ambassador to France; date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] SAMAKKHI: [Your Excellency], how did you feel when you were appointed to be the LPDR ambassador? We heard that you have already presented your credentials.

Ambassador: Hello. I am happy that you have come to talk with me on the occasion of my coming to my new job. I presented my credentials to his excellency, the French president, Francois Mitterand, yesterday.

His excellency M. Mitterand, along with his excellency Claude Cheysson, minister of external relations, welcomed us in a cordial atmosphere. They have a fine opinion of the friendship between our two countries.

I am honored to be trusted by the party and our government with the duty of improving relations and the friendship between our two nations.

This is an honorable and a rather serious duty because we know there will be a lot of work, for example, to help the French people and foreigners in France to know our country better, the ideology of the Lao people, and the political ideology of the party and our government, and to obtain their support in defending and constructing our nation.

SAMAKKHI: I would like to ask you to give us more details concerning relations between Laos and France.

Ambassador: Our people are happy about the revival of these relations. According to my talks with a number of French politicians, diplomats, businessmen, scientists, students, intellectuals and workers, they all praise the revival of these relations.

After the revival of relations we notice that the situation here is making progress, small but fairly solid, in mutual understanding and respect for our mutual independence, democracy and equality.

As for the political aspect, the French Government supports our foreign policies concerning the solution of problems in Southeast Asia in order to ensure peace and stability in this region of the world. It has recently supported the proposals of the Summit conference of the three Indochinese countries held in Vientiane.

Good political relations will be the foundation for economic and social relations. There have been communications between Paris and Vientiane. The French ambassador in Vientiane and high French officials met with our high officials of different ministries in order to sound them out concerning the possibility of cooperation in various aspects.

The French Government has agreed to help us in agriculture, education, public health and construction. The ministries concerned and the state planning commission are now still studying to include it in the plan. I think that soon we will have a definite plan to propose to the French Government.

SAMAKKHI: Meanwhile, we would like you to give us further views of the general situation in Laos at the present time, as to what the outstanding points are, and what is still left to be done.

Ambassador: In this discussion I will mention only the main things. Speaking generally of our country, in political and military terms it is peaceful; the enemies can no longer change the situation, and it is steadily improving. It has been 7 years, and now we are ready for action. I want everyone to clearly see this. If we all agree we will not hesitate; we will have correct opinions toward our country, and we will have a high judgment of its deeds. We have been defending our independence and sovereignty and the entire land of our nation.

We have constructed our national unity and conciliation. Our Lao people have high feelings toward politics and exercise their rights as the owners of their country. They want it to be strong with a good standard of living, and thus they decided to endure all difficulties in order to defend and construct the country according to the policies of the party and our government.

Each year we can see the expansion and progress of the new regime. Of course, there are still many difficulties. For example, the standard of living is still low. Market prices are still high compared with the salaries of cadres, military men, police and workers. Production still cannot meet the needs. The demand in each period, however, has increased. This is a rule and also a factor to encourage us to struggle more, to produce a lot. These are both internal and external phenomena and difficulties.

However, we have many good points. The most basic thing is that we have a glorious new regime, and independence, peace and national conciliation, and correct policies. We have all the conditions to advance. I am sure that we will advance quite rapidly.

SAMAKKHI: Please discuss more of the basic economic and social factors.



Ambassador: Over these 6-7 years we have revived our national economic base fairly quickly, and constructed production forces and production relations. The success of the 3-year plan (1978-80) and the first 2 years of the First 5-Year Plan (1981-85) has been fairly effective for the expansion of the economic and social bases. For example, in 1982 in agriculture we revived 435,000 hectares of ricefields that had been abandoned in the war, and expanded the ricefields that had already been cleared. This is a 7 percent increase when compared with 1976. There are 207 irrigation [projects] in all provinces. Sixty-two thousand hectares of cultivated area utilize irrigation. We have assembled a good quantity of vehicles and modern machines for production. Considering tractors alone, there were almost 900 in 1982.

We have changed to agricultural co-ops and have set up a number of agricultural settlements. The first agricultural co-ops in several places did not do so well because we wanted to progress too rapidly, and we had not had any experience. Later on there was an improvement. Now there are over 1,700 co-op units.

Because of intensive agriculture, in some places the harvest was 4 or 5 tons per hectare.

In 1982, though the weather was not good we still were able to harvest 1.1 million tons, which is good, and [this] is a 20.5 percent increase when compared with 1976.

Since 1980-81 we have not bought any rice from foreign countries. The expected level for 1983 is 1.3 million tons, and 1.5 [million] tons in 1985.

Agriculture is now a base for our economy. We have invested in constructing a fairly good number of the bases in this aspect because we will convert the expansion of agriculture into the construction and expansion of industry.

As for industry, we have revived, widened and newly constructed many [areas]. A number of these are already in operation. In 1981 industrial production accounted for 11.8 percent of the total national economic production.

The expansion in industry, handicrafts and forestry is still at a low level. However, in 1982 it was good, having a 20 percent increase when compared with that of 1981. In 1983 we will try to systematize industrial production by managing and balancing the economy, and by expanding small industry and handicrafts in the districts.

In the First 5-Year Plan we will accelerate investigating the bases to provide a certain grasp of the natural resources: land, forests, mines, and energy sources.

We have revived the network of communications routes which were both widely expanded nationwide and were newly constructed. Many things were completed. A number of them are being worked on, for example, the construction of Route 9 which is a route to the sea in Vietnam; a bridge across Nam Kading and Nam Ngum; the port in Keng Kabao; the survey of the construction site for the

permanent oil pipeline to Vientiane; and the survey of the railway construction plan in order to include it in the next 5-year plan.

We have improved trade to extend the trade network to reach the rural areas, to set up a financial and banking system from the center on down to localities, to promulgate many policies concerning financial management, tax and credit, and cash and foreign currency control. Circulation is also important because it is a [link] between production and consumption.

What I have discussed are good basic points. We still have many difficulties, and many things remain to be taken care of. For example, the enemies have not yet stopped plotting to destroy us. Though they cannot succeed they have disturbed us as bandits looting along the Lao-Thai and Lao-Chinese borders and in some ethnic group areas.

Production is still slow in expanding. Work efficiency is still low and has not yet made use of all of the capability in labor, vehicles and materials that we have, and also foreign aid.

Distribution and circulation are still facing many difficulties, e.g., trade. This is one field the Lao people are not yet good at. Generally speaking, we still are not good at economic management.

We can conclude that the situation in our country is steadily improving when we work for ourselves. We even have more peace and more conditions for the construction. As for the difficulties, we will not deny that there are still a lot as noted. However, these are difficulties on the path toward advancing, to independence, to be self-owners, and to fight against the difficulties. Nothing is reached easily.

SAMAKKHI: What are our government's policies toward Lao people abroad, especially in France, where there are a lot of Lao people living? As you know, a majority of the Lao people here are refugees. What is your opinion on this issue?

Ambassador: The party and government policies toward the Lao people abroad are the same as within the country. It is clear that we always firmly unite around the party and government in order to carry out together our duty to defend and construct the nation.

Therefore, our government has set up a national unity front consisting of workers, farmers, intellectuals, revolutionaries, and merchants, which steadily increases its important role in our society.

Particularly for the Lao people abroad, the policy of the party and government is to firmly and solidly unite around the party and the government, to turn to the country and together defend and construct the country according to the conditions abroad. If you want to help the country you can do it wherever you are. Those who are in the country are the ones who carried out the actual revolutionary work of our country.

Those who are abroad also have a duty in supporting the Lao revolution as the Lao Student Federation did previously and which is now being continued by the Lao People's Federation.

There are many types of Lao people abroad. As they say, a number of them came before 1975. A great number of them migrated to France after the nationwide liberation. Of these refugees, 31 people were sentenced by the people's court. The government will not compromise with these people.

Besides those sentenced by the court, if other refugees return the government will have a just policy toward them.

I would like to emphasize further that for many tens of thousands of refugees, the government always asks them to return to our country. They should no longer have any doubt about the party and government. They had better not associate with those whom the court has sentenced. They should do nothing, just make their living and take care of their families or seek to learn, etc. For those who are young men now, many years later when their thoughts have calmed down, if they want to return to the country there will not be an problems. If they want their rights and interests to be protected the embassy will consider [them] according to the roles and duty of the embassy and the laws of France.

SAMAKKHI: There is a rumor that your job is to take all the Lao people home. What is the truth of this?

Ambassador: I will answer right away that there is no truth to that. This is neither my purpose nor our government's intention. I have no influence to take people home. Whether to stay or go, the matter is up to them to decide themselves, except for the case where they violate the laws, customs, and traditions of the country where they are staying, when it is the right of that country to decide.

In conclusion, I would like to thank SAMAKKHI and to say hello to all the Lao people through you.

9884

CSO: 4206/89

RETURNEE NOTES FEWER VN MERCHANTS, USE OF FREE MARKETS, FOREIGN AID PROJECTS

Paris SAMAKKHI in Lao Feb 83 pp 5,8

["Eyewitness" Column by Banyen Phimmason: "Vientiane Nowadays"]

[Excerpts] Mrs Banyen is a senior Lao intellectual. She was the first Lao woman to receive a high school diploma (baccalaureat). She left her homeland with her husband Professor Paul Levy in 1944. During this long period of time she returned to visit her homeland twice, in 1972 and again recently.

[Mrs Banyen] This year (Nov 1982) I returned to Vientiane on a private visit to my family and to see the construction of the new regime.

The appearance of the city was the same as it was in 1972. There were not many automobiles but instead a lot of bicycles, especially at the times when people went to work and got out of work. There were many big trucks because now it is a period of economic construction. There were some buses in the city.

In the southern part of the city banana orchards and houses block the scenery of the Mekong River, and many more are still located along the roads. These are the heritage left by the Americans. At each place along the road there are vegetable gardens. Each family has its own vegetable garden and chicken coop. A minister's house also has a garden or a chicken coop. Many people raise quail and fish.

Most of the stores that were closed in 1975 have reopened. Wherever I went I could find small stores, e.g., general stores, stores that sold gold, and restaurants. But there were no longer gambling houses, nightclubs, opium smoking houses and houses of prostitution.

In the state stores there was everything we needed with reasonable prices. The free markets were jammed with all kinds of goods. There were all kinds of food, even seafood and imported fruits. Clothing was plentiful, the same as the food. However, the price was too high for the income of the Lao people.

Most of the merchants were Lao, especially in handicrafts and consumer products. Indians were still selling cloth as before. There were not as many Chinese and Vietnamese merchants as before.

While I was there I didn't see a single Vietnamese soldier.

Because of the attention of the minister of agriculture and also my nephew, I went to see the achievements of the significant construction in the Vientiane Province area.

Animal food concentrate factory. By investing 4 million dollars, most of which was from France and which we will finish repaying in 1988, the construction of this factory was completed in 1980. It is a modern factory where everything is automated with electronic controls.

The animal food that is now being produced is corn, soybeans, rice bran, dried fish powder, grated coconut meat after the milk has been extracted, the leaves of the genus acacia, and vine potatoes.

Production:        1980 = 3,000 tons  
                     1982 = 6,000 tons

Goal for 1983 = 10,000 tons  
               1984 = 20,000 tons

The food that is produced will be sent to state, military, and provincial settlements; it is mostly for raising poultry for eggs.

Na Pok is a production center with high achievements. Many of the Lao agricultural technicians graduated from the USSR and Australia.

This center covers 700 hectares and was built in 1979. They replanted rice and corn in 450 hectares including 3-4 hectares where machines spray water. Moreover, it is an experimental station for rice strains and new planting techniques. There are 48 technicians working in this center.

Also, there are bananas, sugar canes and vegetable plantings for families.

In 1985 the excavation will be completed. Now they are paying attention to cadre training most of all. There are 85 people working here at Na Pok center. Half of them are technicians. There are 20 women. There are two nurseries, one elementary school, one secondary school and one small hospital.

Na Pok Center is a state production unit. Formerly there were only 24 people here. They cut down trees under difficult conditions. There was no water, no electricity, and no roads. They lived by fishing and [hunting] for meat. Now there are many roads and it is convenient for cars to travel back and forth.

The UN loaned us over 1 million dollars and the World Bank loaned us 4 million dollars.

The UN aid will be finished in December, and the USSR will give us further aid.

Na Bong is located on the road to Pak San. It is a Laos-Cuba friendship settlement covering 21,000 hectares including 4 hectares for sugar cane growing and 256 hectares for grass growing for animal husbandry.



Now there are 30 draft cattle. At the end of the year Cuba will give it 120 milk cows and 10 good breeding cattle. These will produce milk in 1984.

During this waiting period they built 14 modern animal shelters for the cattle to live: one for artificial insemination, one for breeding, one for giving birth, one for getting a bath, one for treatment, one for milking, one for storing milk; many are for living in.

They will be able to send cattle to other animal-raising centers in the future.

9884

CSO: 4206/89

## MARRIAGE TO FOREIGNERS NOT OFFICIALLY PROHIBITED

Vientiane MEGNING LAO in Lao May 83 pp 5, 12

/"Problems in Life" Column/

/Excerpts/ /Question/ What conditions are there concerning marriage to foreigners? Is there any policy of the party and government on this? In the past it was very strict. Absolutely no Lao girl was allowed to marry a foreigner, whether socialist or capitalist. However, later on Lao men were officially allowed to marry foreigners. When I was studying abroad in 1982 I attended an official wedding of a Lao man and a girl who was a native of that country. There are more Lao girls than men, and yet Lao men are allowed to marry foreigners. This makes single and beautiful Lao girls feel especially slighted! I have a girl friend whom a foreign expert fell in love with and asked to marry. Then they asked to be stationed in Laos or allowed to travel visit the husband's relatives if the government permitted them. It turned out that the government did not approve. What was the reason for this? Vientiane, 10 January 1983. From S. Chittaphong

/Answer/ Marriage is the rule for young men in general when it is time for it. Before marriage, each will select the one whose characteristics agree with him. Each has his own preference so that when they are married they will be happy. Marriage must ensure long-term happiness; it is not just for happiness in the immediate future. Thus, many brides and grooms will have a chance to study each other's characteristics for many years. When they are sure they are not making the wrong choice, then they can decide to get married.

Regarding the problem of marriage to foreigners, in the past both men and women were allowed to marry foreigners. Some were married unofficially, and some officially. This depended on the proposal of the bride and groom, when the organization, along with the parents of both sides, all agree to let their children marry the one he (she) loves. Meanwhile, the organization will base /its permission/ on the condition of both the bride and groom. If they are agreeable, it will study the case to see whether, if they marry, they will be ensured long happiness, and if so it will be approved. However, for some couples, the parents of both sides do not agree, and the condition of both is not yet suitable. It was also felt that if they married they could not be ensured a long, happy life. Thus, the organization might not be able to grant them permission to get married.

What was discussed above is MEGNING LAO's opinion on your question, S. Chittaphong. Our laws do not yet mention the issue of marriage to foreigners. In your girl friend's case, you should ask her to check again in order to avoid misunderstanding toward the organization she is under. I hope you have nothing to be sorry about! No matter what, our Lao men will certainly not let you be disappointed. MEGNING LAO believes that there are still many Lao men always waiting for you....

9884

CSO: 4206/98

## FACTORY RELATIONSHIP WITH STATE CORPORATION, PROFITS NOTED

Vientiane HENG NGAN in Lao 16-30 Apr 83 p 9

[Article by Vanthong Petvangvieng: "The Mechanics of Ensuring Production"]

[Text] The Lao detergent powder factory is one of the factories that needs to order raw materials from foreign countries. This is because our country has been implementing its First 5-Year Plan for only 2 years. In true socialist economic development, it is certain that along this path there are good points and many unavoidable difficulties. However, the Lao detergent powder factory is able to struggle to operate its business as normal, and gradually to advance to production with a complete plan. One reason is that they attentively and regularly train the factory workers in political ideology.

In January 1983 their factory was able to sign a trade agreement with the Lao Trade Company. In the agreement they set up obligations to ensure the mutual rights and interests of both sides. The factory must sell Lao detergent powder No 1 to the Lao Trade Company at approximately 75,000 kg per month (for 1983). In case the factory is not able to carry out the agreement it must report the reasons to the other party to the agreement 1 month in advance. Otherwise, the Lao Trade Company has the right to impose a fine of 20 percent of the total value of the goods. As for quality, when it is first moved the factory must ensure plastic bags for samples while the Lao Trade Company workers are loading trucks with the detergent powder from the factory. If any bags are broken they have the right to return or exchange them for new bags immediately.

The obligation of the Lao Trade Company is that each month it must guarantee the transportation of the detergent powder out of the factory within that month, otherwise the factory must abide by the agreement and charge for storage at the rate of 20 percent of the total goods value. This agreement has already been carried out for 4 months.

How does the Lao detergent factory guarantee such an agreement? Comrade Khamton, the chief of the board of directors for the factory, explained that they pay attention to recycling production which is a good method when using chemicals that are distilled from the production of detergent powder No 1. They then put them back in to produce detergent powder No 2. This is another way to increase the factory revenue, and to save on raw materials. Also, No 2 production is not bad at all.

This recycling technique started in 1977. Meanwhile, their aim is to use 17.5 percent of the investment money for factory repairs, 8.75 percent for welfare savings, and 8.75 percent for remuneration for the workers. These percents are calculated from the total monthly /profits/ as a way to indirectly push forward the production in the factory.

Having an export partner for an agreement like this has helped mobilize the Lao detergent powder workers to strengthen their production. This is one of the rights and interests of the producer. When they have achieved the production goal the board of directors must regularly guarantee and recognize it according to the plan. This also is consistent with the socialist production system which is balanced and complete production.

9884

CSO: 4206/98



## WORKER ALLOWANCES, BENEFITS REPORTED

Vientiane HENG NGAN in Lao 16-30 Apr 83 pp 15-20

/Article by Khao Kammakon: "Factory Restaurant"/

/Excerpt/ This room is a restaurant in a plywood factory. The discussion with the secretary of the factory trade union, concerning the living of the workers here, began after each of us had finished our cup of coffee. The trade union secretary comrade said that one important problem in reaching the goal in socialist emulation, which is the factory's historical mission, is that the board of directors and the trade union has considered it important to raise the standard of living for the workers and government employees. Thus, they set up this restaurant. The prices for drinks here are the lowest. As for food, especially lunch, the workers and government employees eat together here and each has to pay only 5 kip, which is half of the total food cost. The other half is paid by the factory. Each meal provides enough, and it is also a good saving for the workers and government employees.

In everyday work the factory provides transportation for them in a timely manner. For female workers with children, in order to ensure and facilitate their work and to ensure the expected plan set by the factory, and further to create conditions for the workers' children to have bright collective ideas and to carry on the great tasks of the nation in the future, there is a nursery in the factory. Meanwhile, there are medical doctors to take care of and treat the children and all the workers. Moreover, in socialist emulation the factory will have a correct salary adjustment policy according to the regulations for those who are allowed to have vacation, for example, for those who have 2 months maternity leave, short-term sickness confirmed by a doctor, and other policies according to the regulations for those who are allowed to rest because the factory does not have work for them to do. Those who are sent to take courses and those who are sent for 3-6 months' treatment will receive 70 percent of basic salary.

Those who are allowed to have 7-12 months' treatment can get 50 percent of basic salary. As for family support money (money for children), the factory continues it very well.

At the end of the conversation the factory trade union secretary emphasized that by paying attention to raising the standard of living of the workers, our plywood factory has scored achievements in production.

# MONG RESETTLEMENT, UN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DESCRIBED

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 6 Jun 83 p 2

[Article by Viengkham Thanousai: "For the Happiness of the Mong"]

[Excerpts] While we were sitting in a car Comrade Mountha Nalisak, the committee chief who is responsible for rural development projects in Vientiane Province, told our team of reporters that now the party Central Committee and government, and especially the party committee and the Vientiane provincial administrative committee, are paying special attention to resolving the socioeconomic development plan in which the primary problem is to build new houses for the people of all nationalities who have uncertain occupations, in order to help them have a better starting point and a better life.

We agreed with all that Comrade Bounmi said. It took us 3-4 hours to reach the Pha Hom development project which is being newly set up so that the Mong who came down from the mountains can live and settle and progress in the future.

The Pha Hom rural development project involves cooperation between Laos and the UN Development Program, Narcotics Control, and the Social Welfare and State Veterans along with the Vientiane provincial administrative committee. It is located in the middle between Ban Phon Thon and Ban Phon Beng, Feung Canton, Feung Subdistrict, Vientiane Province. Its primary goal is aimed at carrying out the policies of the party and government in building a new life for the Mong in mountainous areas, to turn them from slash and burn highland cultivation and opium-growing, and to lowland rice growing and animal husbandry and other enterprises instead. [This is to] lead them from a nomadic existence with no permanent settlement to a permanently settled and advanced lifestyle, consistent with the scientific methods of flat land.

On this occasion [we spoke with] Comrade Mountha Nalisak, chief of the committee responsible for three rural development projects in Vientiane Province: the Pak Cheng agricultural development project in the Thoulakhom District area, the Phou Bia development project in Saisomboun District, and the Pha Hom development project. He told us that the Pha Hom development project had started the survey and had adopted its construction

plan in 1981; however, the actual construction got started in early May 1982. From the time it started until now, which is 2 full years, they have confronted many difficulties due to external and internal circumstances, e.g., the project [construction site] was a dense forest, there was poor transportation, insufficient construction equipment, and the organization and management level for technical cadres was still weak. However, with the counterrevolutionary spirit they have learned while they worked. One project expert attentively and closely followed up the operation of the project. Higher echelons also paid attention, along with the local administrative organizations and the people of ethnic groups who live near this project. Therefore, they were able to obtain this basic achievement.

Concerning the basic production outcome, they raised 150 pigs, 100 good strain cattle, 5,000 chickens for meat, and 100 hectares of starchy crops. Now the completed work consists of one pig sty that can hold 150 pigs (150 pigs had already been brought in according to the plan), and 2 chicken houses for chicken for meat purposes. Each building contains 2,500 chickens. They will be brought in at the end of this year's rainy season. The building for beef cattle can hold 100 cattle, of which 16 had already been brought in. There was 1 silo that can hold 120 tons of animal feed. Also built were one small animal food factory which will start to install machinery and will produce animal food by the end of 1983, one office for veterinarian cadres, two houses 6 meters wide and 12 meters long for cadres. They dug 1 unit of cement water wells 14 meters deep and 1.20 meters wide, installed a water pump using electricity from the animal food factory in order to pump water up into a 7-meter large steel tank with a capacity of 12 cubic meters, and built a cement water reservoir 3 meters wide, 9 meters long and 120 meters high with a capacity of 30 cubic meters.

Concerning the future plan, especially from June to December 1983, Comrade Mountha Malisak told us that the primary work has started with installation of 3 permanent generators to be used in the small animal food factory, the rice mill running with a 15 kW electric generator that can mill 2 tons of rice per hour, and a potato plant chopping machine, a corn shucking machine, a machine to grind raw materials for production of animal feed, and an animal feed mixer, and to provide light in the project area. They set up two feed silos each capable of holding 1 ton of animal feed. They have continuously cleared rice and starchy crop growing areas and have 60 hectares to go. The area is 100 hectares according to the plan, and they have already completed 40 hectares. They have raised animals as planned, built new houses and moved 40 Mong families down to carry out the actual production according to the basic plan including 10 families this year alone. Meanwhile, they prepared a training session for cadres in cultivation and animal husbandry and animal feed production [techniques], including organization and management of other production for the Mong. This will train the Mong who are coming down to build houses. This project is able to control production and firmly continue the new style enterprises at each step.

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CSO: 4206/90

# INTENSIVE AGRICULTURE TO FOCUS INPUTS ON KEY PROVINCES

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 23 Jun 83 p 2

[Article by Lithi Sisouvong]

[Excerpts] The LPDR Party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers set the figure for 1983 rice production at 1.3 million tons. This is to ensure having enough rice through the year nationwide.

Having learned from the past years, in 1983, by believing in the direction of the party and also decree No 005 of the Council of Ministers, the sections concerned have set up a committee called the committee to promote the 1983 agricultural production. The aim of this committee is to guide in the implementation of the policy plan, as well as, the figure set by the party and government, and especially to push forward strongly this year's rice growing.

After being set up, this committee creatively organized and set up intensive agriculture locations in 5 provinces: Vientiane, Khammouan, Savannakhet, Champassak and Saravane. In these 5 places they also included 28 districts in the goal of setting up yearly intensive agriculture because these regions have 281,351 hectares.

The purpose of setting up the committee for intensive agriculture for 1983 is to encourage and guide the people throughout and to help increase the production capacity of the work units. Meanwhile, its aim is to mobilize farmers gradually to turn from private to collective production. This is to carry out determinedly the decree of the third party congress to convert all-around production and to advance to great socialist production.

With this purpose and the resolution and implementation of the policy plan in setting up and raising the efficiency of intensive agriculture in their area, the cadres of the committee to promote this year's agricultural production consist of political guidance cadres, specialized task cadres in agriculture, and specialized task cadres that turn a great deal of agricultural production [on down to localities and rice fields] in order to lead the people actually to carry out and to raise their efficiency higher.

Besides the party Central Committee and the government, the committee to promote the 1983 agricultural production also sacrificed some important

capital to assemble vehicles and machines, e.g., 170 tractors, 224 rakes and plows, and over 6,000 hoes, shovels, and knives. Moreover, there are 500 tons of chemical fertilizer and 13 tons of pesticides. There are also medicines to treat animal diseases in pigs, cattle, and buffalo, and equipment, e.g., injection tubes, fuel oil, etc. Most of the vehicles and equipment were distributed to intensive agriculture locations and important areas of agricultural production from which it is now mostly sent down to the bases.

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CSO: 4206/93



EDITORIAL URGES DECREASE IN SWIDDEN; FOREST DESTRUCTION CONTINUES

Vientiane SIANG PASASON in Lao 7 Mar 83 pp 1, 3

Editorial: "Limit Destruction of the Forests"

Text It has always been the case that whenever the highland cultivation season comes our farmers, especially the people of all ethnic groups along rural or mountainous areas, will often go to the forest and slash and burn in order to grow rice or other crops for their living. This causes the natural resources of our country to decrease steadily each year, and has a harmful effect not only on the environment, weather and water resources, but also on our people's living.

Seeing the harm of the situation since the revolution, especially after our country was liberated, our party and government have been concerned and recognize the special importance of protecting the forest and replanting trees where they have been destroyed. This is one important work of forest protection, along with restricting forest destruction for highland cultivation for our people of all ethnic groups.

With regard to this problem, when our army and our people were still fighting the American imperialists and their henchmen, most of the liberation zones were mountainous areas where a majority of the people made their primary living by highland cultivation. Moreover, our country's revolution steadily increased the need for rice and food to feed the army. However, the party and our government still decided to mobilize the people to decrease forest destruction by turning to cultivation requiring digging of rice fields of all kinds. Each year forest destruction was decreased by thousands of hectares. However, the cultivation areas and rice and other crop production capacity did not decrease; on the contrary, the areas of the dug rice fields and rice fields of all kinds increased every year, and helped to increase rice products and other crops so that we were able to meet the basic needs for our people's liberation until the victory.

Now, during the period of defending and constructing the nation, the carrying on of this heritage is necessary and consistent with the economic expansion plan issued by the party committee and administrative committees of all levels, especially in rural areas where the occupation of a majority of our people is slash and burn cultivation. We should increase close guidance in order to educate and guide the people of all ethnic groups to decrease forest

destruction as much as we can, by encouraging the people to do rai lok, rai khout or het na khan da wherever possible. Where it is necessary we should guide the people to clear reed jungle, grass and brush forest so they can carry out dry rice cultivation and gardening. We should avoid slash and burn of the wild forest preserve, especially at the top of ravines and at the edge of rivers; this would cause great harm to the environment, e.g., drought, water shortage, flooding in the rainy season, etc.

The party committees and administrative committees of all levels should educate the people and deeply explain this problem, and try to restrict ideas on destroying the forest by scatter cleaning it with the thinking that no matter how much of the forest they destroy, it will never be gone. This is what our people of all ethnic groups usually think. We should especially try to explain so they will clearly see the advantages and disadvantages of clearing the forest. On this foundation we should lead them to the way out by doing rai lok, rai khout or het na khan da as mentioned, along with using scientific techniques in the cultivation and redivision of rural areas.

Doing this will not only be good for increasing production capacity but also will help a great deal each year to keep the rest of our country's forests safe from being destroyed. Many localities have been effectively and admirably carrying this out, for example, in the northern region and in some central and southern provinces. Meanwhile, it is noticeable that many localities are still taking it lightly and do not consider guiding the people concerning clearing the forest an important issue. Because of this, scattered clearing in forests or near the top of ravines and the edge of rivers is still being practiced in a number of localities. These phenomena although few should be stopped immediately, in order to avoid a great and incalculable loss to the national interests as a whole, and to the social environment.

Whether the carrying out of this task will be effective or not depends on whether the party committees and the local administrative committees pay attention to it or not. Thus, during this period the party committees and the administrative committees in the rural areas must increase their responsibility in order to get ready for the farmers' 1983 production, to be active, efficient and consistent with the policy of the party and government and to decrease forest destruction. However, we must increase cultivation areas and correctly follow scientific theory in cultivation, encourage agricultural co-ops' collective techniques, and also raise the production capacity per hectare. This is the policy concerning agricultural expansion of our party, and it is also the goal our farmers are striving for in this year's production season.

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CSO: 5000/4343

SOVIET-AIDED FORESTRY WORK IN KHAMMOUAN, WASTE REPORTED

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 13 Jun 83 p 2

[Article by S. Sai Se Bangfai: "State Forestry Enterprise No 5 in Khammouan Province Is Being Improved"]

[Excerpts] Khammouan is famous as a first class province, rich in forests, where presently the State Forestry Enterprise No 5 is driving force in the construction, protection and cutting of trees in this locality for the nation's interests.

The State Forestry Enterprise No 5 is one of many big forest enterprises aided by the USSR. Previously its offices were in Vientiane, but after being assigned the new task by the higher echelons it moved to Khammouan Province on 1 January 1982, and it has seriously and immediately carried out the task since then. Since February 1982, with the special cooperation of the (kyprorestank) Institute of the USSR, they have started to do geographical inspection, roads, bridges and the office construction site, and they have also collected various data for the purpose of adopting a complete plan for the enterprise construction. For example, [the carried out] experimentation on tree-cutting in Khammouan Province, cutting roads in the woods in the experimental tree-cutting area in Nam Cho Ko, and did soil testing and soil analysis in the log storage field in Gnommalat and the wood distribution field in Thakhek, etc. Meanwhile, the cadres and workers in this enterprise also constructed production bases. For example, they set up 1 office building, 2 garages for storing 20 vehicles 8 x 35 meters in size, 1 engine storage building that contains over 50 tons of machinery, 1 contemporary garage for car repairs, [and for] repairing, inspecting and altering broken-down machines. For example, they repaired an old MAZ 509 and turned it into a log-pulling vehicle holding 8 to 10 cubic meters. Meanwhile, they taught the workers how to use the equipment that was sent from the USSR.

Beginning in 1983, because they had some basic capital they had saved at the end of 1982, based on the decision of the cadres, government employees, and workers in the State Forestry Enterprise No 5 and along with aid in lessons and techniques from the Soviet experts, they surveyed and repaired and cut roads into the forest for tree-cutting. In the last 5 months they were able to succeed in the basic survey and to cut a road 14 km

long, repair 25 km of route 12 and route 8 including filling 120 cubic meters of dirt, widen the narrow sections and modify the curved parts, cut the surface where it was steep and hilly, dig drainage, ditches, repair small bridges, and build a road into the woods for 17 out of the expected 33 km. Meanwhile, they began to cut a total of 2,083 cubic meters of trees. They put all this together in the wood storage fields in Thakhek, Gnommalat, and Nam Cho Ko. Along with the tree cutting, the workers of the State Enterprise also paid attention to the transportation of the logs from where they were cut to each wood storage field with great sacrifice.

Through the 17-month period of this tree-cutting construction enterprise, it has been beset by difficulties and [needs] and many problems have remained unsolved, especially in education, ideology and specialized tasks, and in increasing efficiency and management organization. Some of these have not yet met the standard; efficiency is still rather low and the waste of equipment is still quite serious. They still lack technical experts in planning, techniques, etc. However, when we look at it as a whole, the base construction of the State Forestry Enterprise No 5, though over a short period of time, has scored many achievements which have become material and technical bases for the further expansion of production, and also in shaping up the capability and opinions of the cadres and workers. It also demonstrated the Laos-USSR cooperation in tree cutting which is steadily improving and expanding endlessly.

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CSO: 4206/90

SRV COOPERATION ON ROUTE 9 CONSTRUCTION DESCRIBED

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 24 Feb 83 p 3

[Article: "On Route 9"]

[Text] It used to be 40 km from Tha Khong to the Laos-Vietnam border. Now, because of the aid in clearing and cutting shorter by cadres in the 384th Division of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the road has been shortened to only 33 km.

On that day the sky in Sepone District was clear and cool. It was a good time when we went to visit the beautiful scene of the road construction by the division's workers who were so happy. The route from Tha Khong to the Laos-Vietnam border has greatly changed. Prior to the day of seizing power in 1975 we were on this route. We could see only cemeteries, dead bodies, and the tanks of the American giants who were defeated in the operation named Lam Son 719 in early 1971. Nowadays, however, the old curving road up to the mountain and climbing up the river bank was filled in and was straight and wide as far as the eye could see. The SRV workers, our close friends who have continued to share life and death with our Lao people since the war are continuing to expand this fine relationship. [They] stand shoulder-to-shoulder with our people in constructing socialism, and have helped us with the clear spirit of proletarian internationalism according to the agreement signed by the Lao and Vietnamese governments in 1977.

"This is based on that agreement," Comrade Phuong, chief of the 384th Division, told our reporters and he also praised the special solidarity friendship of Laos-Vietnam by pointing out the speech of Comrade Kaysone Phomvihane, secretary general of the LPRP, to the 5th Vietnamese Communist Party Congress [in which he spoke of] implementing the bright proletarian internationalism that has existed since ancient times. Ever since the nation's liberation the Vietnamese party and government have unyieldingly and attentively helped the Lao. The real evidence is part of the strategic route 9 construction of 40 km where previously there was jungle, mountains, cliffs, and sharp rocks. However, with the pure bright solidarity spirit of the Vietnamese workers, no matter how difficult it was, they resolutely and bravely struggled to put all their energy and ability into achieving what was planned each year. They were the driving force in digging the mountains, filling cave-ins, repairing the road, and paving stones and asphalt from the border to Tha Khong with an unyielding spirit.



Now this road is wide. Over three-fourths of the asphalt paving of the 36-km stretch has been completed. The rest is expected to be 100 percent completed in 1983, according to the plan. Many bridges were successfully coated with cement and many bridges are continuously and determinedly being constructed in sections.

According to Comrade Phuong, the chief of the 384th Division, the Laos-Vietnam friendship route is expected to be finished in 1985 as in the agreement.

When we passed by there was an impressive unforgettable picture of our fraternal Vietnamese workers, both male and female, wearing hats and black worker uniforms who were controlling cranes to lift, bulldozers to excavate, paving the stones, filling in the road and constructing the bridge posts with joy and bravery. They were working as seriously as though they were building and improving their own hometown. Although some days the weather was cool, the wind was strong, or the sun was strong, they did not falter or get discouraged.

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CSO: 4206/83

ROUTE 9 WAR DAMAGE, BUDGET, SECURITY NOTED

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 14 Jun 83 p 2

[Article by Sibothong: "Construction Company No 923 Progresses"]

[Excerpts] The struggle of cadres, workers and government employees in different units within construction company No 923 in Se Thamouak has helped the plan and [what was needed] to become reality.

I had an opportunity to join the work at the construction company No 923 headquarters in Se Thamouak. Lieutenant Colonel Thongleun told me that since 1976 we have been carrying out and struggling through the first phase, aiming at the fourth resolution and the 3-year plan of the government, and with the firm cooperation between the Phin and Sepone District party committees. As for the provincial party committees, they facilitated, organized and employed forces with 3 primary duties: improving and constructing strategic route 9, organizing forces for economic construction and to raise the standard of living, and organizing military forces on down to the bases to carry out national defense and public security.

Because of the diligence and persistence of the cadres and workers, the resolutions and the government plan became reality gradually. It is not commonly [known] that of route 9's 244 km, 184 km was destroyed by the war and could no longer be used. There were 5 large bridges, 72 mid-sized and over 100 small bridges out of order. Nowadays travelers or transportation people who are using route 9 are able to see how, each year, it is becoming increasingly convenient. This means the transporting of goods and traveling to coordinate the work on this route has been on schedule. This has fulfilled the goal which is evident in the present convenience of route 9 from not functioning to its present usefulness.

When attending the fourth congress of the Phin District party committee, Lieutenant Colonel Thongleun, chief of the construction company No 923 headquarters, gave a talk in which he said that by carrying out the

government assignment to revive route 9 from 1976 to 1979, they were able to repair 137.5 km from Phalan to the border. At the early stage of the bridge construction they put all their energy into joining the soldiers in constructing the Phalan bridge heads and posts. Meanwhile, they searched for metal remnants to make into a Bailey M 3 bridge which holds a maximum of 60 tons. Also, they continued constructing posts and bridge heads at 29 places, and laid 10 Bailey M 2 bridges, two sites of steel reinforced concrete bridges, and 33 bridge pipes. They experimented with paving 1,740 meters of asphalt. [The are] now working on a big task in which 23 km of the road construction has been completed and is valued at many millions of kip.

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CSO: 4206/90

## VANG VIANG ROAD CONSTRUCTION, PUBLIC SECURITY, PARTY BUILDING DISCUSSED

Vientiane SIANG PASASON in Lao 1 Mar 83 pp 2-4

[Article by Viengkham Thanousai: "For the Happiness of the People of All Ethnic Groups"]

[Excerpts] Vang Vieng District contains 13,340 square kilometers in a plateau area north of Vientiane Province, and is approximately 160 km from Vientiane Capital. It is located between [dense] mountains and valleys. It is militarily and politically strategic, and also a rich economic area. It is divided into three areas: mountainous, rural and small town. Route 13 cuts through the center from the foot of Phakeung Mountain in Kasi District and there are two small routes: Route 7 starting from Houai Mo to Xieng Khouang Province, and a second route starting from Hin Heup to Ban Don, Feung District. It adjoins Sanakham District. There are two strategic rivers, the Nam Song flowing from Noi Thin On down to Hin Heup bridge, and the Nam Lik flowing past Phou Gneuy Mountain down to the Kachang rapids. Moreover, there are also small streams suitable for irrigation construction and many water reservoirs. This district's borders adjoin other districts. For example, the northeast adjoins Kasi District, the east adjoins Saisomboun District, and the southeast adjoins Phon Hong and Keo-oudom Districts where the enormous LPDR electric dam is located. On the west it adjoins Sanakham District, the outpost and the spear point of Vientiane Province. Vang Viang District has 16 cantons, 213 villages, 8,169 families, and over 52,400 people consisting of three nationalities: Lao Loum, Lao Soung, and Lao Theung.

At the Vang Viang District administration office we had an opportunity to meet Comrade Channam Chittavong, district party secretary, who told us about the activities of cadres, the military and the people in the development of transformation and socialist construction over the past years. For example, he told us that in 1982 [they had] the spirit to accomplish the implementation of the LPRP third party congress and to struggle to build Vang Viang District into a strong one in every way. First of all the district paid special attention to national defense and public security work, which is to attentively train and improve three types of military forces: regular, regional, and guerrilla militia to forcefully expand in both quantity and quality having solid understanding in political ideology, strength in organization, and good discipline. This can be demonstrated by two district

military companies that were trained [with] two types of military training and studied many different political documents. The guerrilla militia throughout the district had solidly organized military forces. There are many guerrilla battalions stationed in Pha Tong, Na Mon and Meuang Feung Cantons. However, companies and mobile guerrilla platoons have been completely organized in 13 cantons. They organized basic military training and studied many political documents for those guerrilla forces, and organized forces to inspect and guard their localities night and day to maintain peace. They are able to effectively wipe out bandits and spies, and to maintain peace and order. This results in the happiness of the people of all ethnic groups. They feel free to engage in earning their living. The most outstanding ones are two mobile guerrilla battalions stationed in Meuang Feung and Na Mon Cantons, and two mobile guerrilla platoons in Pak Ngoua and Pha Tang Cantons. All are good examples in their struggle to destroy all the enemies' tricks, military threats, and psychological warfare in a timely manner. They are praised and well trusted by the higher echelons as well as by the people of ethnic groups.

Party construction is a primary duty and is the most life-and-death aspect in the new phase of the revolution. The district party committee has focused on the plenum of the party central committee in building up the party in terms of organization and political ideology by considering political ideology as the basic idea. The expansion of the party must be closely tied to the outstanding revolutionary process of the masses. In 1982 alone Vang Viang District was able to wipe out white cantons [areas where there is no LPRP presence--FBIS]. In some cantons there are party chapters and base party committees. Some cantons have party members. Generally speaking, in 16 cantons throughout this district there is party leadership in all aspects. Many villages have full party members. The most outstanding thing is that new party [units] were formed in some co-op units, for example, Ban Na Louang and Ban Na Mon agricultural co-ops. Thus, if we compare 1982 with the past years the leading role of the party has already extended down to the population bases and they are confidently carrying out their duty in the transformation and socialist construction in their district areas.

Concerning the work policy for future years (1983-1985), especially for 1983 which is the third year of the first five year plan, Vang Viang District Party Committee Secretary Comrade Channam Chittavong told our writer that the primary task is to continue and increase national defense and public security work, to construct and to make the new face of Vang Viang District outstanding. [Our] economic work is to raise the standard of living and focus on constructing and expanding irrigation, to increase the wet rice growing areas, to decrease highland cultivation, to bring the mountain people down to widely engage in lowland cultivation, and to expand animal husbandry both big and small. Before 1982 in forestry the people were effectively educated to protect the forest and to make use of the forest and also the nation's natural resources and to improve and expand agricultural co-ops and state farm settlements to become strong both in quality as well as in quantity. This is to implement the economic construction policy of the government to progress step by step and to build the material and

technical bases for socialist industrial construction in the future. Concerning party construction, Comrade Channam Chittavong confirmed that the district administrative committee will struggle to implement the policies, to direct cadre and [party] members' forces down to the bases, to put their energy into improving, constructing, and strengthening the party chapters in all aspects, and to increase the party groups and their members in villages and cantons, for example, in rural and mountainous areas of nationalities and in agricultural co-ops, and also to improve the canton administrative committees to become a sacred and sharp tool of the party. All of these above are to help the party to better guide the masses, awaken them to participate in national defense, economic construction, and socio-cultural expansion in order to bring happiness to the people of ethnic groups within the district, and also to participate in the nation's overall work, which is to victoriously complete the first five year plan of the government.

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CSO: 4206/83



## EDITORIAL NOTES ROAD CONSTRUCTION NEEDS, USE OF NONMOTORIZED TRANSPORTATION

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 22 Jun 83 pp 1, 3

[Editorial Column]: "We Must Put All Our Effort Into Building the Structure of Communications and Transportation"

[Text] For our country, communications and transportation were most difficult under the old regime. Many bridges and roads were damaged and destroyed. Communications routes in many districts and many provinces were not connected, even though they were strategic routes. The only road that went from south to north was route 13. They didn't pay any attention to it or repair it at all.

After the nation was liberated, though facing many obstacles the party and government invested a substantial amount of capital to repair and expand roads, and construct bridges, boats and many additional new routes; they considered communications and transportation to be important. This has resulted in an increase in daily regular transportation and communications of our people, and it is able to meet the basic needs of national defense, peace and happiness, to increase production and the circulation and distribution of goods between provinces, and between provinces and districts, cantons and villages.

However, when contrasted with the steady and great increase in the needs for national construction and raising the standard of living of the members of ethnic groups far away in mountainous and hard-to-reach areas, communications and transportation in our country are still backward and cannot yet be guaranteed. For this reason the third plenary session of the party Central Committee has issued a decree concerning communications and transportation which states that "we must put our efforts into building the structure of communications and transportation, to ensure the ties between the center and provinces, provinces and districts and out to the sea. Especially in 1983 and the following years we must put our energy and investment into constructing routes 9 and 8, improving route 13, and ensuring communications along the northern provinces." Meanwhile, each province should repair and use road construction vehicles available in its own locality. Wherever conditions are suitable we must try to put together machinery and hand tools so that the roads will be finished soon. [We have] to study and announce the [yearly labor obligation system] in order to mobilize the people to participate in road construction from province to province, and from district to

district by a definite division of the work in each locality. Roads from canton to canton and from village to village are the responsibility of the canton administrative committees which must mobilize the people to expand and repair them on their own.

Along with road construction and repairs we must make full-scale use of water routes, because in our country there are many rivers suitable for navigation. If we expand water transportation to its fullest it will be very beneficial for the circulation and distribution of goods. In this endeavor the most important thing is to help those provinces where conditions are suitable for boat construction investment and training boat construction cadres and workers to build boats. Meanwhile, we must have a policy to encourage the private sector to invest in the expansion of land and water transportation, and attentively to improve docks that repair barges in different rivers, in order to ensure regular communications and transportation.

For land communications, besides improving and protecting transportation forces with government automobiles we should encourage the wide use of different basic vehicles, e.g., ox carts, horse-drawn carriages, and push-carts in the rural flatland area, and the use of horses in mountainous areas. This is because most of the rural areas in our country, especially in the mountainous provinces in the northern region, lack roads. If we do not use these kinds of vehicles it will be difficult for the circulation and distribution of goods to reach the hands of the people of all ethnic groups.

All of these are important contents of the policy on communications and transportation of the party and our government and the party committees and administrative committees of all levels must study and lead the people to carry them out correctly in the way which will help to expand both water and land communications and transportation in our country, and which will connect the center and provinces, provinces with provinces, provinces with districts, and districts with cantons and villages, and also to ensure the route to the sea.

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CSO: 4206/93

## TAX COLLECTION, RICE SALES ACHIEVEMENTS, TARGETS REPORTED

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 6 Jun 83 pp 1, 3

[Article: "Agricultural Tax Collection Is Achieved Nationwide"]

[Text] Agricultural tax collection from the Lao people on farmlands in various provinces nationwide has been carried out at the same time as rice purchasing since the end of the harvest season, and was successfully concluded at the end of last February. It can be concluded that 35,317 tons of agricultural tax was collected, which is 76.36 percent compared with the plan. In particular, rice purchases at the present time totals 49,899 tons, which is 85.58 percent of the plan. Many localities are still carrying out rice purchasing continuously and effectively, especially at this time when people in many provinces have just finished harvesting their dry season rice and brought the rice which their families cannot use to sell and exchange for merchandise in different stores.

According to Mr Thongsouk Khounphounsavan, deputy minister of the trade ministry, judging from past agricultural tax collection and rice purchases in many provinces, it can be concluded that it has been fairly effective. The provinces which exceeded the expectation in tax collection are Phong Saly, Houa Phan, and Champassak. Considering only rice purchasing, the outstanding provinces are Houa Phan, Sayaboury, Xieng Khouang, Vientiane, Champassak, Saravane, and Attapeu. After carrying out these two duties simultaneously, many provinces succeeded but some still could not meet the expected level because of conditions. For example, some provinces had to face natural disasters such as drought, during last year's rice production season. This lowered the scale of production. Some provinces however, set the expected level high. Moreover, cadres in agricultural tax collection and also rice purchasing have not yet fully paid attention to their work, and the resulting outcome has not been as good as expected.

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CSO: 4206/90

## GUERRILLA POLITICAL, SECURITY ROLE IN HOUA PHAN DESCRIBED

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 22 Jun 83 p 2

[Article by K. Khounousai: "Role of the Sam Tai Guerrilla Militia"]

[Text] To maintain the peace and happiness of the people is the aim of the Sam Tai guerrilla militia as they struggle together to shoulder their responsibility. Once again I had an opportunity to observe the situation and their carrying out of their duty in Houa Phan Province.

It has really been admirable how the cadres and combatants in the Sam Tai guerrilla forces have deeply acknowledged the general situation in their own area of responsibility which has been at peace for a long time. Those who were assigned by the higher echelons and the public to be a solid wall, protecting and building their own homeland, are all ready and alert. All comrades under platoons, companies and battalions throughout the canton are determinedly considering the duty of protecting the rights, interests and collective mastery of the co-op members in their own canton. In addition, this canton guerrilla force is also a leading force in increasing production, for example, the process of converting to agricultural co-ops, starchy crop growing, and animal husbandry. The first period of conversion into collective production by the people of all ethnic groups throughout the canton was difficult because the level of the people's knowledge was not yet equal. At this time the guerrilla forces put all their wisdom into propagandizing to persuade the people, and openly led various movements.

As for carrying out their own duty, [Commander cadres] of each level had divided up the details of their own areas of responsibility. Once a month the guerrilla unit must check its home area. Moreover, the guerrilla forces throughout the canton also obey the order to have continuous military training. This is to accelerate their level of strategic and tactical knowledge and to raise forever their political knowledge. Thus, in the period of late 1982 and early 1983 they succeeded in mobilizing a great many youth to serve the country. Meanwhile, they also successfully encouraged cadres and combatants who were with their families to return to their own units. During the tax collection and rice sales for the government in the 1982 harvest season, all guerrilla forces had roles in actively and voluntarily mobilizing the general public.

It can be concluded that they work for the rights and interests of the nation and the people. They also effectively protect the rights and collective interests of the people in their own canton. They neither steal nor are greedy, they don't engage in illegal trade, etc. In the 1983 plan their policy is actively to carry out their own work, gloriously to achieve according to the plenum of the third party congress.

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## BRIEFS

**ATTOPEU RECRUITMENT**--By absorbing and clearly understanding the policies of the party and government, and with a deep understanding of the honored and glorious duty of youth in the new phase in 1982, 150 youths of ethnic groups in different localities in Attapeu Province awakened and volunteered to take part in serving the nation's tasks, such as being combatants in the ranks of the national defense and public security forces and being cadres and workers in different offices and departments. [Excerpt] [Vientiane SIANG PASASON in Lao 2 Mar 83 p 1] 9884

**SWEDISH ROAD CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT**--Road Construction Company No 1 of the Road and Bridge Construction Company No 1 under the Ministry of Construction, in the past as well as now has scored a great many achievements and is taking part in the nation's transformation and socialist construction. The road construction company now consists of a total of 160 personnel including a number of technicians who have studied within the country and abroad. It has been aided in equipment. For example, Swedish aid includes three scrapers, two cranes, four tampers, one water sprayer truck, three steamrollers, and a number of trucks for general use. [Excerpt] [Vientiane SIANG PASASON in Lao 2 Mar 83 p 3] 9884

**SRV HOSPITAL GIFT TO PHONG SALLY**--On 25 February a ceremony was held in the Phong Saly Provincial Hospital to officially hand over an operating room between Lai Chau Province in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and Phong Saly Province in Laos, following the completion of its construction. Mr Bui On, the assistant chief of the construction company of Lai Chau Province and Mr Somdi, the Phong Saly provincial public health service chief, took turns giving their speeches to hand over this operating room amidst Mr Maisouk and Vang Kosieng, the party standing committee, and Phong Saly provincial administrative committee, along with the cadres involved on both sides. The operating room that was being handed over at this time was the implementation of the joint agreement concerning various construction projects between the two provinces, Phong Saly and Lai Chau. This is participation in increasing and expanding the friendship, the special militant solidarity and the all-around cooperation between the people of both provinces in particular, and between the parties, the governments, and the peoples of both countries in general, to be forever more fruitful. [Text] [Vientiane SIANG PASASON in Lao 3 Mar 83 pp 1, 3] 9884



**LUANG PRABANG DISTRICT POPULATION, ROADS**--Oudomsai District (Nam Bac) is one of eight districts subordinate to Luang Prabang Province. It is in the north of Luang Prabang, adjoining Oudomsai and Phong Saly Provinces. It consists of 7 cantons, 150 villages and a population of over 29,000. Ban Phon Sa-at is the site of the Oudomsai District office. The land is flat. Oudomsai District has paved asphalt roads running through it. From here one can go to Ngoi and Pak Seng Districts and also to Viang Thong District, Houa Phan Province. On the other side, one can also easily go to Oudomsai, Phong Saly and Louang Namtha Provinces. It not only gained victory in national defense but also gained achievements in steadily constructing economic bases, improving the standard of living, and protecting their own land step by step. [Excerpts] [Vientiane SIANG PASASON in Lao 28 Feb 83 p 2] 9884

**OUDOMSAI POPULATION**--Oudomsai Province is in the center of four northern provinces and is newly established. It has approximately 12,400 square km. Its border adjoins Phong Saly, Louang Namtha, Sayaboury and Luang Prabang Provinces, and also adjoins China and Thailand. It consists of 8 districts, 68 cantons, 778 villages, and 173,000 people of 3 nationalities and 17 ethnic groups. It has a large area with a small number of people, and is mostly mountainous. The people engage in highland cultivation and collective rice growing. [Excerpts] [Vientiane SIANG PASASON in Lao 19 Feb 83 p 2] 9884

**OUDOMSAI ROADS**--As we recall our past, Oudomsai was a fierce battlefield of the imperialists who invaded and burnt this land to ashes. [Now] the roads are cleanly paved with asphalt. One is from Louang Namtha, and another is from Phong Saly via La District. They are important arteries for meeting people each day who are always stopping to rest. This creates an atmosphere in Oudomsai like a temple fair almost every day. [Excerpts] [Vientiane SIANG PASASON in Lao 26 Feb 83 p 3] 9884

**CHAMPASSAK DISTRICT POPULATION, SECURITY**--Soukhouma is one of 10 districts under Champassak Province and consists of 6 cantons, 55 villages and a total population of over 26,000 people. Though facing many difficulties, for example, because of its location with 74 km of its border adjoining Thailand and with the revolution's enemies coming in to sabotage peace, with a resolute and firm belief in the clear-sighted guidance of the LPRP and recalling the cruelty and savagry of the old regime, the people of all ethnic groups, althgether and solidly, decided to defend their own land. They were able to get rid of the enemies in a timely fashion in order to maintain peace and happiness throughout. [Excerpts] [Vientiane PASASON in Lao 4 Jun 83 p 2] 9884

**JAPANESE AID**--During conversations in Vientiane Capital on 10 June 1983 between Professor Bountiam Pitsamai, minister of education, and Mr Yoshinao Odaka, Japanese ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Laos, Mr Odaka spoke to Mr Bountiam concerning Japanese aid of 30 million yen in science equipment to the Lao Ministry of Education. This equipment is in the 1983 aid plan. On the same occasion, both of them discussed some problems concerning past and present Japanese aid to the Lao Ministry of Education. [Text] [Vientiane PASASON in Lao 13 Jun 83 p 1] 9884

SARAVANE COFFEE, RICE SALES--(KPL) Along with attentively and effectively sending different kinds of goods down to serve and to raise the standard of living of working people along different production bases, the Lao Ngam District trade cadres and also the collective store cadres in Thongkham Canton and Lao Ngam Canton subordinate to Saravane District, Saravane Province, have purchased a fairly good quantity of forest products from the people in different localities, especially in the 5 month period in early 1983. They were able to purchase 277 tons of paddy rice, 295 tons of coffee beans, over 10 tons of cardamom, and soybeans and peanuts. [Excerpt] [Vientiane KHAOSAN PATHET LAO in Lao 10 Jun 83 p A7] 9884

SAVANNAKHET DISTRICT'S POPULATION--Songkon District is in the southern part of Savannakhet Province. It stretches along route 13 and has a total of 21 cantons, 205 villages, and 75,583 people, including 9,093 Lao Theung. [Excerpts] [Vientiane PASASON in Lao 20 Jun 83 p 7] 9884

MILITARY RECONNAISSANCE SCHOOL--In order to carry out the policy to improve the military, to turn it into a modern revolutionary military moving step by step in a spirit of emulation to score bigger new achievements in order actively to greet this coming 35th anniversary of the establishment of the military (on 20 January), from January to June 1983 military officers and privates throughout school No 311 under regiment "S," Department of Defense, have all struggled cheerfully and actively to complete their duty assigned by the higher echelons. Their achievements are to be long distance trained at 40 to 55 km and 120-150 km, and to be able to pass examinations in mapping and other important subjects 100 percent. They all passed each subject at the expected level. Meanwhile, they also emulated each other in collective enterprise construction. For example, they raised a number of cattle and pigs, grew 2.5 hectares of highland rice and grew and harvested 215 kg of vegetables, etc. Moreover, they also helped the people nearby to increase their production. Now the military officers and privates in this school are continuously emulating each other to score new achievements greater than before so that they can achieve, at the end of the course, completion of their duty assigned by the department and the higher echelons. [Text] [Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao 23 Jun 83 p 7] 9884

VIENTIANE DISTRICT GUERRILLA MILITIA--Recently the Sanasongkham District military command committee, Vientiane Province, officially opened a seminar to improve the political way of life for the Nam Kuam Canton guerrilla militia under its own district. There were over 380 guerrilla militia from 12 villages nearby who attended the course. During the 10 days of the course the guerrilla militia, besides learning different decrees and documents of the party and government, also studied documents on defense work and public security work along with strategy and tactics for fighting and defense. Moreover, the organizers also received support from the public who brought in many kinds of food to help out during the course: 1,200 kg of rice, 24 kg of fermented fish, 5 kg of hot peppers, 30 kg of meat and dried fish, 20 kg of different kinds of vegetables, 12 kg of salt, and 1 pig and 1 buffalo. [Excerpt] [Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao 18 Jun 83 p 7] 9884

NATIONWIDE LPRYU MEMBERSHIP--The success of the first congress of the Lao People's Revolutionary Youth Union (LPRYU) has reflected the progress and expansion of the Youth Union under the leadership of our party. It was the outcome of the combined intelligence of the Youth Union organization in which its 115,000 members reflect the nationwide Youth Union, the high unifying solidarity of our youth, and the great support of the Youth Union organizations of fraternal socialist countries and the youth who are progressing in the world. /Speech by Mr Thongsavatsai Khamphithoun, member of the party Central Committee and the first secretary of the LPRYU Central Committee nationwide, on the occasion of the Internationalist Labor Day, 1 May/ /Excerpt/ /Vientiane NOUM LAO in Lao 1-15 May 83 pp 8, 9/ 9884

CHAMPASSAK DISTRICT POPULATION--Outhoumphon, a district subordinate to Champassak Province, consists of 6 cantons, 90 villages, 5,579 families, and a total population of 28,670 people, of which 13,593 are male. [Excerpts] Vientiane PASASOM in Lao 10 Jun 83 p 2] 9884

CSO: 4206/90

## EDITORIAL SUPPORTS VISIT OF MISSILE CRUISER 'USS TEXAS'

Wellington THE EVENING POST in English 6 Jul 83 p 2

[Text]

**SECURING THE DEFENCE** punch of nuclear superpower America on the cheap through ANZUS membership still involves intangible costs.

One such cost is to co-operate with the nuclear partner in the knowledge that a number of citizens are apprehensive about, or absolutely opposed to anything associated with risk of nuclear war or nuclear accident.

The forthcoming visit here by the missile cruiser USS Texas will be seen by peace campaigners and others as a symbol of all these fears and risks. As such, they will see it as something to be protested about.

Other New Zealanders will see that ship as a symbol of the powerful defence technology which can be called to our country's protection because we are a member of ANZUS.

The American crew members will accept that some dissent is inevitable in a sophisticated free democracy.

If we are a party to an alliance which can provide the protection of a ship like the Texas, we must expect at least to host that ship and its crew.

Military pacts imply readiness on the part of pact members to accept the risks and responsibilities associated with the collective benefits of such an alliance.

The growing proportion of nuclear propelled ships in the American fleet is a fact of life. The Soviet Union's Pacific fleet now totalling more than 700 ships, including more than 120 submarines, is another fact of life.

It is naive to believe that a modern

nuclear propelled warship of the potential power of the Texas is this far from home base without the most modern and effective weaponry.

"Jane's Fighting Ships 1980-81" reports that it is planned to have Tomahawk cruise missiles fitted to the class of ships which the Texas belongs to. Such missiles can carry nuclear or conventional high explosive warheads.

The people who find those risks and responsibilities unacceptable have to convince the Government and any alternative government we must change ANZUS or opt out of it.

Such critics have to do more than that. They have to explain what they intend should be done to defend New Zealand and how that will be paid for.

If the same critics advocate nuclear free zones they must explain how the United Nations General Assembly criteria for establishment of nuclear weapons-free zones can be observed. In particular, securing support of nuclear weapon states, and practical verification of such a zone's nuclear-free status.

Perhaps eventually the anti-nuclear and peace support groups will come up with the answers, and with sufficient nationwide support. In the meantime the country has to accept there is dissent, and we also have to accept that while we remain members of ANZUS we shall play our part, including welcoming the Texas and her crew.

# LABOR LEADER REVERSES NUCLEAR STAND

Auckland THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD in English 7 Jul 83 p 1

[Article by G. G. Shand]

[Text]

**The Leader of the Opposition, Mr Lange, has backed down on his first major initiative since his election last February.**

He sparked a furore in the party several months ago when he revealed in an interview with the *New Zealand Herald* that he would promote a major change in Labour's defence policy to allow nuclear-armed, warships to visit New Zealand ports.

However, in a statement late last night Mr Lange changed his stance considerably to the point where he has now effectively committed a future Labour government to abide by present policy banning visits by either type of vessel.

His embarrassing retreat on such a sensitive issue came as no surprise in senior party circles yesterday.

Given the hostile opposition to his plan from the party left wing at the round regional conferences earlier this year, they said it was only a matter of when Mr Lange would be forced to get himself "off the hook" before confronting the annual conference in Auckland in early Sep-

tember.

## Embarrassed

And they confirmed that the announcement on Tuesday of the visit to Auckland and Wellington by the American nuclear-powered warship USS Texas early next month — only weeks before the conference — would have further embarrassed Mr Lange had he persisted with the initiative.

Last night's statement is believed to have followed consultation with opponents of Mr Lange's nuclear stand. It is described as the new "agreed" position of both camps.

Although Mr Lange still tries to leave the door open to possible visits by nuclear-propelled-only warships, he has stipulated two conditions which effectively seem to rule out any likelihood of their being allowed to enter New Zealand's territorial waters under a Labour government.

The first condition provides for entry of nuclear-powered ships if the nation owning the vessel gives an undertaking that it is not carrying nuclear arms.

Referring to the problems of disclosure, Mr Lange said he was well aware of the reluctance of nuclear powers to disclose the type of weaponry being



carried by their vessels.

### Assurance

"But the next Labour government will make nuclear powers aware that their ships and aircraft can visit New Zealand territory only on the understanding that they are not nuclear armed," he said.

"In effect this means unless I, as prime minister, receive an assurance that these ships and aircraft are not carrying nuclear weapons, entry to New Zealand territorial waters will be denied," he added.

As the United States has repeatedly stated that it will give no such assurances (it has already refused such requests from other nations), this would seem to rule out any visits by nuclear-propelled ships.

However, making it even more difficult for Labour to approve entry is a second condition Mr Lange has introduced concerning environmental safeguards.

"Until strict safety conditions can be devised and enforced preventing any environmental hazard, no nuclear-propelled ship will be permitted to visit New Zealand," he declared.

Party sources agreed last night that the effect of both conditions made it highly unlikely that any nuclear warship — be it nuclear powered and/or nuclear armed — would visit New Zealand under a Labour government.

### No Transit

From the statement it appears the only area where Mr Lange is still promoting

significant changes is on the much less contentious issue of a South Pacific nuclear weapons-free zone.

Present policy does not provide for nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed ships to "transit" across the zone but Mr Lange reiterates that passage through such a zone by such ships may still be necessary.

"We must recognise transit through international waters but we will work to convince the nuclear powers to respect the wishes of the Pacific peoples to keep the Pacific nuclear free."

Meanwhile the Labour Party president, Mr J. P. Anderton, has accused the Government of insensitivity in allowing the USS Texas to visit against the wishes of "hundreds of thousands" of New Zealanders.

### Implacable

"The Labour Party remains implacably opposed to visits of this kind, no matter what the country of origin."

And the Press Association reports that the Opposition foreign affairs spokesman, Sir Wallace Rowling, has suggested in Wellington that the Prime Minister, Mr Muldoon, may be timing the warship visits to coincide with the Labour Party conferences.

Sir Wallace said the visits from nuclear ships could not be justified on strategic grounds.

The warship's visit has also brought a warning of large-scale protests by the peace group Greenpeace.

## LABOR LEADER DENIES REVERSAL IN NUCLEAR STAND

Auckland THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD in English 8 Jul 83 p 3

[Text] The Leader of the Opposition, Mr Lange, has strenuously denied that he has now backed down on his controversial initiative to convince the Labour Party to accept visits by nuclear-propelled-only warships.

He dismissed as fabrication a considerable and diverse array of opinion yesterday which interpreted his latest statement on the visits issue as amounting to an endorsement of the party's present policy banning calls at New Zealand ports by nuclear powered or armed warships.

The Prime Minister, Mr Muldoon, the president of the Labour Party, Mr J. P. Anderton, several Labour MPs and political commentators all agreed yesterday that he had significantly altered his stance.

But Mr Lange, clearly angered at media talk of a backdown, dismissed such comment as rubbish, declaring that "you would have to work extraordinarily hard to find any suggestion of a reverse."

**Extraordinary**

He accused political journalists of making "quite extraordinary interpretations" by not "allowing facts to cloud their judgement" and of being "careful to obscure the statement made from the public gaze."

Mr Lange's latest statement on the issue, released late on Tuesday night, contained two tough conditions

which appeared to effectively prohibit entry of any type of nuclear vessel under a Labour government.

The first condition stipulated that before a Labour government would allow a nuclear-propelled warship to visit New Zealand it would have to get an assurance from the nuclear power owning the vessel that it was not nuclear armed.

Under the second condition, no nuclear-propelled ship would be allowed to visit until strict environmental safeguards preventing any hazard were drawn up.

**Insisted**

As the United States has repeatedly and forcefully emphasised that it will not disclose which of its warships is carrying nuclear arms, this alone appeared to effectively rule out the likelihood of any visits.

But during a lengthy and at times testy press conference Mr Lange insisted his position had not changed in the slightest.

He claimed he was still trying to convince the Labour Party to accept visits by nuclear-propelled-only warships subject to

the above conditions) in return for nuclear power agreement to an enlarged South Pacific nuclear weapons-free zone.

And he said he still had every intention of pursuing this policy change through the policy council.

### Exceptions

"I believe it is a practical, reasonable suggestion," he asserted.

Mr Lange insisted there was precedent for the United States to disclose. This had occurred in Japan and the former Australian Government of Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser had also obtained a commitment from the Americans to divulge whether any B-52 bombers landing in Darwin were carrying nuclear weapons.

Asked what made him confident he could change American policy in relation to New Zealand if Labour became the government, Mr Lange replied, "Well, if I do not change it then they (nuclear warships) do not come."

At present the Americans would say they would not change their policy, said Mr Lange, and he expected them to "keep saying that at this stage."

But once Labour came to power that could easily

change.

Mr Lange said he was promoting the change simply because Labour had to recognise that in return for nuclear power agreement to a nuclear weapons-free zone it would want the right to transit for nuclear vessels across the zone.

On the environmental safeguards question Mr Lange said such safeguards would not be a top priority of a Labour government but Mr Lange was sure they could be drawn up before any proposed visit.

### 'Capitulation'

Despite Mr Lange's "no change" statement, the Prime Minister yesterday accused him of "abject capitulation to the left wing of the Labour caucus."

"He knows very well that the American authorities will never indicate whether nuclear weapons are on any of their warships, thus the inevitable result of his latest policy is that there will be no New Zealand ports open to American warships," said Mr Muldoon.

"He also knows that Anzus cannot operate on this basis and he will thus satisfy the left wing of the Labour Party which wishes to withdraw from Anzus."

EDITORIAL EXAMINES NUCLEAR WARSHIP VISIT

Christchurch THE PRESS in English 11 Jul 83 p 20

[Editorial: "U.S. Cruiser's Visit"]

[Text]

The visit of an American nuclear powered cruiser, the Texas, to Wellington and Auckland next month has caused the leader of the Labour Party, Mr Lange, to set forth his ideas of how he would treat such visits if he became Prime Minister. His views are being examined to discover whether they are consistent with other views that he has expressed. By and large, what he has been doing is clear, though his views on the visits of nuclear ships from the United States are not universally shared in the Labour Party and he has been trying to change the views of the party. So far, he has been unsuccessful; the visit of the Texas will ensure that he remains unsuccessful.

Mr Lange has two major constraints on him. As leader of the Labour Party, he needs to express the will of the party. In addition, the issue is a divisive one and Mr Lange will consider that it is in the best interests of the Labour Party to hold the party together. Such actions tend to be among the necessities of politics.

Rather than exposing any split within the New Zealand Labour Party on the issue Mr Lange has drawn attention to the split between the Australian Labour Party and the New Zealand Labour Party on the visits of American warships and on a review of the defence alliance, ANZUS. The Australian Labour Government will permit the visits of American nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed warships to Australian ports and wants ANZUS to be reviewed, apparently to be strengthened. The New Zealand Labour Party does not want to see ANZUS extended, say, to take account of the Indian Ocean as well as the Pacific, to which it is confined by definition.

Because of the divisions within the Labour Party in New Zealand on the subject of visits by nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed warships, and because of the implications for ANZUS,

the issues have the potential to embarrass the party and to put the party in difficulties with the electorate. This means that the party is vulnerable politically, and the National Party, and Mr Muldoon in particular, have not hesitated to score points.

The timing of the visit of the Texas, not long before the Labour Party conference in September, raises the question about whether the visit has been planned in agreement with the Americans deliberately to embarrass the Labour Party. The Texas is on a long voyage, woven into operations with American fleets around the world, and the visit to New Zealand is one of a number of South Pacific visits. The connection, in timing, with the party conference seems entirely fortuitous, happening to fall into a complicated plan of operations.

The opposition of the Labour Party to visits by nuclear warships, and the Labour Party's advocacy of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific, are matters of major concern to the Defence Department in the United States. It may have been a fortuitous visit, it could hardly be done in blissful unawareness.

From an American point of view it could be argued that the United States Government has to deal with the Government of New Zealand and that, if an invitation to visit is extended or a visit is accepted, it is perfectly proper for the visit to go ahead. The difficulty comes in whether the visit has the potential to embarrass another political party, and whether this should matter in United States thinking. It could be argued that this amounts to interference in domestic politics. The argument barely stands the obvious test: should a foreign government ever act in agreement with another government if an opposition party might be upset? Virtually any diplomacy could

be defeated if this were the rule.

The visit of the Texas will certainly focus attention on the subject and this attention may be sustained until the Labour Party conference. Even if the Americans could be cleared of all suspicion of timing a visit to embarrass the Labour Party — and such suspicions are notoriously hard to deny or confirm — Mr Lange is undoubtedly right that the visit will ensure that the conference will damn the A.N.Z.U.S. alliance. Mr Muldoon must have foreseen this: if the Americans did not, they misread the Labour Party in New Zealand.

Labour Party conferences have damned the A.N.Z.U.S. alliance before. This does not mean that a Labour government would withdraw from A.N.Z.U.S., the party's policy committee finally makes policy. No political party that sees itself as an alternative government allows itself to be wholly governed by resolutions passed at annual conferences. The effect of the visit will simply be to harden attitudes. This would not seem to be in the interests of either a New Zealand with which the Americans will some day have to deal when it has a Labour government, or the Americans themselves. This raises a dilemma. If the United States wanted to avoid the hardening of lines, it would have to treat the Labour Party conference as if it were the government of the day, not even stopping to guess what a Labour government policy might be in due course. If the United States has an eye on its relationship with New Zealand, and wants to take a future Labour government's views into account, the first problem is to find out what the view would be. Mr Lange is not yet able to help, though he has given himself the task of changing his party's policy to do more to accommodate the A.N.Z.U.S. relationship.



EDITORIAL COMMENDS AUSTRALIAN INDOCHINA INITIATIVE

Auckland THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD in English 7 Jul 83 p 6

[Editorial: "Australia Gives Lead"]

[Text] New Zealand, according to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, is unlikely to support the Australian peace initiative in Indo-China unless the plan wins the support of the Association of South-east Asian Nations. Thus, for the time being at least, the policies of the Anzac partners diverge on a matter affecting an area of vital concern to them both.

After visiting Hanoi last week, the Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Hayden, announced that Canberra would open a bilateral relationship with Vietnam. It would back Vietnam's right to multilateral aid through United Nations agencies, and conduct ministerial and cultural exchanges between the two countries.

The Australian initiative would, in effect, end the international isolation imposed upon Vietnam for its invasion of Kampuchea. Whether Asean, which has rigorously upheld the boycott, will support the idea is, at best, questionable, for it could be interpreted as approval of the Vietnamese aggression. The United States Secretary of State has certainly made it clear he believes that the quarantine should be maintained.

Since it risks offending so many friends, including its most important military ally, Australia is acting boldly--even dangerously. But its policy has about it the realism that Mr Hawke has promised he will implant on Canberra's dealings in Asia and the Pacific.

Undoubtedly there is a lack of realism about the imposition of political, economic or any other sort of sanctions against any country. What did the United States' prolonged isolation of China achieve? Even its boycott of the Soviet Union for the invasion of Afghanistan yielded to economic pragmatism. And for all the weight of world opinion against it, South Africa continues to flourish.

The inflexible Asean and United States attitude to Vietnam and Kampuchea has achieved next to nothing in nearly five years; nor does it show signs of accomplishing anything. It is time to try another approach--in the name of

political realism and, it should be unashamedly acknowledged, in the name of economic advantage.

The Asean states take between 8 and 9 per cent of Australia's total export trade, as compared with about 6.5 per cent of New Zealand's. If Australia can establish a working relationship with Vietnam without jeopardising its Asean markets, New Zealand should not be slow to follow it. We have, after all, had the grace to admit that our foreign policy is determined almost wholly by considerations of trade.

CSO: 4200/735

MALDOON REVEALS PROBLEMS WITH AUSTRALIA

Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN in English 27 Jun 83 p 2

[Article by Ian Perkin]

[Excerpt]

THE Prime Minister of New Zealand, Mr Muldoon, flew out of Canberra at the weekend declaring how "famously" he got on with the Australian Prime Minister, Mr Hawke, and saying the future of the New Zealand-Australian relationship was bright.

He dismissed any difficulties between the two countries as mere details in a wider perspective. They would be overcome with time and further negotiations.

Below the surface of this diplomatic language there are problems in the bilateral relationship which emerged during his first lengthy discussions with Mr Hawke and his senior ministers.

Some of the setbacks Mr Muldoon received during his talks with Mr Hawke, the Treasurer, Mr Keating, and the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Bowen, included:

**A REALISATION** that the Federal Government does not regard the Closer Economic Relations agreement signed earlier this year as being as significant as New Zealand does.

**SOME** concern in the Federal Government about entry of some Australian goods, including motor vehicles, into New Zealand under the new CER arrangements and other New Zealand domestic policies.

**A COMPLETE** rejection of his proposals to ease local foreign investment restrictions on New Zealand companies wanting to invest in Australia.

**CONCERN** that New Zealand's decision to accept a French offer to send a scientist to 'monitor' nuclear tests at Mururoa Atoll could amount to a de facto acceptance that the French had the right to test in the Pacific.

In this interview, some of which is detailed below, Mr Muldoon outlined some of the difficulties being experienced between the two countries.

## GOVERNMENT TO OUTLAW COMPULSORY UNIONISM

Auckland THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD in English 8 Jul 83 p 1

**[Text] The Government yesterday appeared to set itself on a collision course with trade unions — and some employers — by announcing its intention to outlaw compulsory unionism.**

National Party MPs agreed in principle to a proposal by the Minister of Labour, Mr Bolger, to exclude the unqualified preference clause from industrial awards.

Mr Bolger is to prepare draft legislation to that effect and expects to have it passed during this year's session of Parliament.

At the same time, the Government MPs gave approval for another controversial amendment to the law. Mr Bolger's draft bill will contain provision for the compulsory inclusion of youth pay rates in those awards which do not already cater for them.

Both proposals—part of a package of industrial law reform measures promised by Mr Bolger—immediately ran into heated opposition from the Labour Party and the Federation of Labour. The employers' stance was more reserved.

### Gimmick

The Leader of the Opposition, Mr Lange, described the move to voluntary unionism as "class-divide-and-rule politics" and as evidence of a Government desire to bring "mayhem" to the industrial relations scene.

The Federation of Labour secretary, Mr K. C. Douglas, saw Mr Bolger's initiative as a pre-election year gimmick with which the Government hoped to smash the trade union movement.

The executive director of the Employers Federation, Mr J. W. Rowe, said the move was unexpected and that his group would be examining it.

But both Mr Bolger and the Prime Minister, Mr Muldoon, were adamant that the measure was desirable — as a means of giving effect to the principle of freedom of association and as a channel towards improved industrial relations.

### In Principle

Announcing the caucus decision, Mr Muldoon said the normal procedure for planning new legislation would be changed because of the complex industrial law at issue.

Mr Bolger had been given approval in principle to prepare a draft bill instead of the usual practice by which draft legislation is put to the caucus as a first step.

The bill would essentially provide that there should not be an unquali-

fied preference clause in awards.

"But that is the point where we want to see exactly what the minister has in his bill before finally approving it," said Mr Muldoon.

A number of Government MPs wanted to see how the new law would work in practice.

The Prime Minister was apparently expecting a strong trade union reaction.

"We think they would not be enthusiastically in support of it — that would be a fair guess," he said.

### 'Good Sense'

But he expected a divided reaction on the part of employers, arguing there were signs that some had changed their previous opposition to the principle of voluntary unionism.

Large employers were generally content to retain compulsory unionism, he said, while for smaller businessmen who had good working relations with their employees, compulsory union membership was seen as a confounded nuisance.

Most employers recognised the "good sense" of youth pay rates and would support their universal application.

His personal endorsement of voluntary unionism should be well known, he said adding: "I don't join [a] dahlia association because I grow lilies--why should I be forced to?"

Mr Bolger said he saw the proposed legislation as part of a move to free up the economy, rather than any attempt to teach the unions a lesson or punish anybody.

He said he had become increasingly concerned in recent years over the way trade unions in New Zealand were reacting.

"That reaction has been negative and certainly backward-looking and I am firm in my view that one of the real reasons for that is that they have not had to respond to their members in a way that a voluntary organisation has to respond."

Mr Bolger said he accepted that closed shops had developed wherever union membership was voluntary, but gave a warning that the Government would take countermeasures to prevent their emergence in New Zealand.

### 'Insecurity'

Mr Lange said the last time the Government had tried to introduce voluntary unionism through a series of ballots, the voting had been overwhelmingly in favour of the present system and the idea was dropped.

By raising the concept again, the Government was trying to create industrial insecurity.

"It is designed to produce a degree of conflict in the workplace and the National Party is always very good at trying to get people into conflict for its political advantage," he said.

### 'Smokescreen'

Mr Douglas branded the announcement as the act of a "desperate" government.

The Government was trying to provoke a response from the trade union movement "to give them a smokescreen of industrial action to carry them through to the election."

Mr Douglas said the unqualified preference clause was a "very sound principle" accepted by most employers.

Mr Rowe said last night that the move was unexpected. The employers were at present reappraising their policy on voluntary unionism and the Government's intention to draft legislation lent urgency to this.

"In the next few weeks the federation will be looking into this issue in the context of its wider issues of wage reform and industrial relations," Mr Rowe said.

EDITORIAL APPLAUDS 'THINK BIG' SUCCESS

Auckland THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD in English 7 Jul 83 p 6

[Editorial: "'Think Big' Pays Off at Bluff"]

[Text]

It is rare, particularly during periods of persistent industrial unrest, for a major construction project to be completed earlier and more cheaply than planned. But the seemingly impossible has happened at Bluff where the aluminium smelter's third potline has been commissioned for \$242 million. The cost is \$6 million less than was predicted and the date of completion was more than a month earlier than expected.

The decision to press ahead with the expansion of the smelter was a bold move in itself because the world aluminium industry was then severely depressed. Now that aluminium prices are gradually but steadily recovering it looks as though the

gamble will pay off. If it does, the country will benefit from the industry's increased overseas earnings.

For Southland in general and Invercargill in particular, the expansion of the smelter undoubtedly provides a substantial bonus. With the third potline in production, the smelter will put more than \$33 million a year in wages into Southland and spend an equivalent amount locally on goods and services.

Statistics have shown that Invercargill is one place that has been least affected by the blight of unemployment. For its comparative prosperity, the city owes much to the smelter at Bluff.



## IMPROVED FISHING ZONE CONTROL MEASURES

Auckland THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD in English 4 Jul 83 p 6

[Text]

**A South Pacific crackdown on foreign high-technology tuna clippers and other foreign fishing boats begins on September 1 when the Forum Fisheries Agency brings into effect a register for the world's largest fishing zone.**

The move is designed to give tiny Pacific Island nations a means of policing their 200-mile zones by obliging all foreign fishing boats to sign in a common register.

Under the arrangement, all foreign transgressors will be logged and banned from fishing anywhere within the forum zone.

It is likely to end moves where some foreign superseiners allegedly sail in unannounced and fish around island waters with complete disregard for that country's fishery and immigration regulations.

### ***Proper Control Possible***

The director of the forum fisheries agency, Mr Philip Muller, admits that island nations do not yet have the muscle to detain foreign fish poachers.

But the threat of a total ban from the area for any breach of the regulations is expected to go a long way towards the proper control of fishing boats.

Under the proposed access licensing arrangements the foreign fishing boats will have to log their positions and the Forum Fisheries Agency's Honiara headquarters will feed the data into a computer.

The agency will still have the problem of checking the honesty of individual fishing boats and agency officials believe they may have to depend on the good offices of the Royal New Zealand Air Force and Royal Australian Air Force for some time.

Long-range maritime surveillance aircraft will be called upon to make snap checks on the foreign boats in the same manner as the RNZAF does in New Zealand waters.

As very few Pacific Island nations have armed forces, and hardly any have suitable civilian maritime surveillance aircraft, they have little choice but to depend on others.

### ***Divergent Interests***

The Forum Fisheries Agency also wants to introduce common licence fees to create total uniformity and avoid some nations being played off against others by the big foreign fishing interests.

It has some way to go on that topic because the fishing interests of many of the nations concerned are fairly divergent.

Skipjack tuna is the link among nearly all. A South Pacific Commission study estimated a total stock of about 3.4 million tonnes in the region and suggested present catches could be increased ten-fold.

Probably more than 800 foreign fishing boats work the area, most of them seeking tuna, they fish by a variety of means — from traditional island longline methods to Asiatic pole and line systems, and to high-technology American tuna clippers.

Japan has already agreed to limit its purse seine fleet to 32 vessels and will not fish in traditional island longline areas.

The United States has dramatically increased its tuna clipper fleet. Just nine boats fished in 1981, as many as 45 are expected this year.

### ***Efficiency of US Boats***

The high-technology American boats are a force to be reckoned with because of their efficiency.

Some of these supersciners have fast

sonar gear so sophisticated that fishermen can scan 50 square miles of ocean in less than 15 minutes.

The gear is so accurate it can detect vast schools of tuna unseen from the air, and it can differentiate between species such as yellowtail, bigeye and skipjack.

It means the big supersciners can leave behind their helicopters and land-based, fixed-wing, fish-spotting aircraft and roam farther offshore.

Some of the big seiners are being fitted with highly automated net hauling systems by which it is possible to set and haul nets with a minimum of manpower in winds of up to 50 knots.

The American boats are being squeezed out of their home waters and traditional fishing grounds off the west coast of Central and South America.

These American tuna clippers can carry 2000 to 3000 tonnes of skipjack and a few of the bigger ones about 5000 tonnes.

Only Nauru, among Pacific Island nations, has tuna clippers and it has only two.

If Forum nations are to gain full benefit from their oceanic resource the next step for them, after gaining control of the fishery, will be to develop their own fleets.

A number of countries, principally Fiji and Papua New Guinea, have been doing this.

Generally, they have had only average success.

SHARP DROP IN DAIRY INCOMES AHEAD

Auckland THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD in English 1 Jul 83 p 1

[Excerpt] **A weaker world dairy market and a shock cut in cheap Government overdraft finance could see dairy farmers' net incomes fall by a third, or as much as \$7000 this season.**

The dairy Board calculates that the net income of a dairy farmer could be as low as \$12,000 to \$13,000 in the season just started, against \$19,500 in the 1982-83 season.

The cost of the Government's finance move is estimated at about \$2400 a farm.

A stunned and angry audience at the New Zealand dairy conference yesterday was told by the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, Mr MacIntyre, that Reserve Bank credit for the industry was to be limited.

The Dairy Board chair-

man, Mr J. T. Graham, said the limit of \$750 million set by the Government meant the dairy industry would have to find a further \$400 million at commercial interest rates during the next season.

He estimated the change would cost dairy farmers more than \$30 million a year in added interest.

The use of Reserve Bank concessional overdraft finance at 1 per cent interest for the Dairy Board has long been envied by other sectors of the economy, including meat and wool farmers.

## BRIEFS

WOOL SEASON ENDS WELL--Woolgrowers are estimated to have earned New Zealand substantially more than a billion dollars in overseas income during the season which ended in Napier on a reasonably high note yesterday. "We have cracked the billion for the first time," the managing director of the Wool Board, Mr Hugh Peirse, said last night, "and we look forward to modestly enhanced returns in 1983-84." The slightly increased wool export earnings came largely from a higher volume of wool sold and a higher level of prices over the last quarter of a season which was clearly split into two parts. Prices were generally depressed until March when they gained a lift from devaluation of the New Zealand dollar and an appreciable rise in market demand. [Excerpt] [Auckland THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD in English 1 Jul 83 p 1]

CSO: 4200/735

## BRIEFS

**PRIME MINISTER TO VISIT MALAYSIA**--The Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, Mr Somare, is to make an official visit to Malaysia later this year. The visiting Papua New Guinea Foreign Minister, Mr Namaliu, said in Kuala Lumpur that Mr Somare was expected to sign a Technical Assistance Agreement during the three day visit. From Kuala Lumpur, Mr Somare will go to New Delhi for the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting which begins on November the 23rd. A radio Australia correspondent, Wong Puan Wah, says under the technical assistance agreement, Malaysia will provide training for Papua New Guinea officers in Civil Service Administration, Plantation management, Health and Education Development as well as Technical and Youth Development. Mr Namaliu has already discussed the proposed agreement with his Malaysian counterpart, Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie. They also discussed regional and border security problems. [Honiara SOLOMON STAR in English 15 Jul 83 p 8]

**LIAN FROM AUSTRALIA**--Australian Aid to Papua New Guinea is to be increased by about \$A17.5 million next financial year. The Australian Prime Minister, Mr Hawke, gave this commitment to the Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, Mr Somare, during talks they had in Port Moresby. Mr Hawke had arrived in the Papua New Guinea capital only hours earlier, on the first stage of a 19-day overseas tour...and his first as Australia's Prime Minister. Under a programme drawn up three years ago, Australian aid to Papua New Guinea was to decline by five per cent in real terms each year for five years. But Mr Hawke said that the programme was put together when Papua New Guinea's prospects were better...under the new arrangement, the real decline will be one per cent in 1983-84, two per cent in 1984-85 and three per cent in 1985-86. However, if Papua New Guinea's revenue from its Bougainville copper and gold mine should rise substantially the rate of reduction in aid will rise to maximum of five per cent. Mr Hawke said that because of increased aid to Papua New Guinea, there could be a reduction in the real rate of increase to some other aid recipients, reflecting changing Australian aid priorities towards its own region. He declined to specify where the cuts would be made. [Honiara SOLOMON STAR in English 15 Jul 83 p 8]

## FORMATION OF TRUE OPPOSITION AFTER 1984 ELECTION SEEN

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 23 Jul 83 pp 1, 8

[Article by C. Valmorla, Jr.]

[Text]

The formation of a second national political party, which is expected to be the real opposition, after the 1984 Batasan election was predicted yesterday by leaders of the ruling Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL).

This prediction was based on the possibility that, for purposes of the presidential election in 1987, elected members of various registered regional parties will unite to form the nucleus of the "other party" under the two-party system mandated by the Constitution.

It was observed that since the 1984 polls will be regional, unlike a presidential election which is national, the regional parties, as in the past, will show stronger political clout in their respective regions than the newly founded parties claiming national constituencies.

Political Affairs Minister Leonardo B. Perez said the KBL decision to waive its right to accreditation and forego the prerogatives of an accredited party "will go a long way in creating the political climate conducive to the eventual establishment and strengthening of a

two-party system in the country as envisioned in the 1981 constitutional amendments."

Perez allayed fears that the KBL proposal to grant all registered political parties, both national and regional, the same rights and prerogatives would encourage further fragmentation of the opposition.

The political affairs minister said that since the KBL has complied with all three conditions under the Constitution, it is entitled to accreditation "without need of any enabling law because the constitutional provision is self-executing."

The conditions are that the political party must have nominated and supported its official candidate for president, that the candidate should obtain at least the first or second place in the election, and that the votes he obtained should be at least 10 per cent of the votes cast.

Perez explained that a self-executing constitutional provision is one that can be enforced without need of implementing legislation. "Once a political party complies with the requirements for accreditation under the Constitution, the Commission on Elections has

no other recourse but to grant accreditation upon filing of the proper petition," he said.

"It is this right which the KBL is abandoning for purposes of the 1984 Batasan elections in order to give meaning and substance to President Marcos' declared policy to give the opposition a 'sporting chance' to win in the coming elections," Perez added.

The rights of a registered political party include block voting, expenses as a political party for the campaign of its official candidates, in addition to maximum expenditure for individual candidates, authority to receive copy of election returns, representation in various Comelec committees.

As to the strengthening of the two-party system, Perez said that "in the light of the current political realities, there is no hope that the fragmented opposition can put up a common front against the KBL."

He agreed that the registered regional parties will have a better chance of electing members to the Batasan than the so-called national parties that are more real in paper and press releases than in fact.



ANOTHER GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION ANNOUNCED

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESSION in English 23 Jul 83 pp 1, 7

[Text]

**PRESIDENT MARCOS** yesterday announced plans for another reorganization of the government, involving ministries and government corporations.

The President said the revamp, which will be ordered in a decree, will not affect personnel but policies, guidelines and fiscal operations.

"Complaints of inefficiency on the part of offices that deal with the public have become points of irritation," the President noted.

The President said that he would also look into the intelligence fund of all the ministries. He said he would ask the ministries questions like "What are we doing with the money? Is it worth it? What do we get out of it?"

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**THE PRESIDENT** said the government spends P300 to P400 million in intelligence.

He said he would also look into the reported expenditures for special operations, the nature of these activities, the people running them and who is financing them.

"What kind of special operations are these? Who authorized them and under what authorization do they operate?" the President said.

Citing the case of the Presidential Office for Advance Studies, the President said: "What has it done for me? I do all my work anyway."

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**THE PRESIDENT** said he would check the provisions of various codes and laws as well as the new decrees, letters of instruction and other executive orders and would look into the possibility of updating them to make them dovetail with the overall streamlining efforts.

The President said he has commissioned various teams to draw up basic guidelines to promote interaction among various government agencies.

Right now, the President said, many conflicts have cropped up among government agencies due to overlapping of functions.

"Transportation and communications is just one of them," he said. "You see the almost scandalous quarrel between the Board of Transportation and Bureau of Land Transportation. There's also no policy with respect to regulations of television and radio."

The President said this resulted from the failure of a ministry to set up policies or guidelines for the operational set-up of various offices under it.

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**THE PRESIDENT** said that the revamp is actually part of the work of the Reorganization Commission but it was discovered that the body did not take into account the new Constitution and the new political setup.

# PRIEST, 17 OTHERS CHARGED WITH SUBVERSION

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 21 Jul 83 pp 1, 8

[Text]

**ZAMBOANGA CITY,** July 21—A priest, two women, a former student of the University of the Philippines, and 14 suspected members of the Moro National Liberation Front were charged with subversion last week.

The first four were arrested by PC and police agents in Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte, and in Dipolog City last June 9 for alleged subversive activities.

They were identified as Fr Joel Atarra of Marbel, Cotabato; Nueva Sayas Absin of Musuan, Bukidnon; Erlinda C. Ataro of Davao City, formerly residing in Dipolog; and Peter Mendiola Garcia, alias Gregory Yu Dixon of Manila.

Maj. Muslemin Tahir, judge staff advocate of the 9th PC-INP regional command, filed the case against the four with the provincial fiscal of Zamboanga del Norte.

Tahir said the four were arrested after distributing and posting several materials, leaflets, and streamers in different barangays in Manukan town.

Taken to the Manukan INP station by PC police teams headed by Master

Command headquarters for further investigation.

Tahir said the acting Provincial Fiscal Herminogenes Balisado of Zamboanga del Norte has set for Friday, July 29, the preliminary investigation.

The case of subversion and possession of explosives against the 14 MNLF members was filed by the Southcom with the fiscal's office here.

The suspects were arrested at the Zamboanga City wharf aboard the ml Shatter which came from Sandakan, Malaysia. Also seized from the engine room were five cans of sodium chlorate, a chemical used in manufacturing bombs.

Five of the suspects were detained, while nine others are under house arrest in the custody of responsible persons. They were recruited in Basilan by MNLF commander Gerry Salapuddin for training in a foreign country.

They were returning through the southern backdoor in the guise of returning workers from Malaysia when arrested by the PC. (Vic Arevalo)

**COTABATO CITY,** July 21—A group of 10 heavily armed men believed to be members of the Moro National Liberation Front "lost com-

mand" ambushed yesterday a patrolling team of Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force, killing one militia man and wounding two others in barangay Balut, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao.

An MNLF guerrilla was also slain during a 30-minute gunbattle which followed the ambush, the second in two weeks in the Muslim-populated town.

Meanwhile, six suspected rebels attacked a Muslim farmer's house at 3 a.m. today in barangay Kurantim, Dinaig, Maguindanao. The armed men shot dead a woman and wounded two other civilians.

Sultan Kudarat police station commander Capt. Felino Maguete identified the slain ICHDF members as Borabero Macalangas, 50, and one of the wounded militia man as Roberto Kudo, 32.

Maguete reported to Col. Ricardo Trinidad, Cotabato metropolitan district commander, that the paramilitary troops were on a regular patrol when the rebels, who

were deployed on both sides of the road, opened fire.

The rebels were believed to be the same group which ambushed the other week Sultan Kudarat Mayor Toca Mastura and his party who were returning home from Cotabato City.

Mastura and five other persons in his party were seriously wounded while a grade-school boy was killed.

A police report identified the slain Dinaig woman as Salandang Mama, 43, and the wounded as Kalima Subdula, 45, and David Mustapha, 50.

Police said the armed men later ransacked the house and took an undetermined amount of cash and several personal items.

The series of rebel activities prompted Central Mindanao Command chief Brig. Gen. Jose P. Magno, Jr. to instruct his field officers to initiate necessary measures against the dissidents. (Tony Pe. Rimando)

# TWO LOAN AGREEMENTS SIGNED WITH JAPAN TO FINANCE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 19 Jul 83 p 2

[Text] **THE PHILIPPINES** and Japan signed yesterday two loan agreements totalling 69.05 billion yen (\$271.04 million) to finance nine economic development projects and the construction of a power plant barge project in the country.

Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo and Japanese Ambassador Yoshio Okawa signed an exchange of notes on the loan agreements at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The foreign ministry said the agreements are part of a series of accords scheduled for signing this week between the Philippine and Japanese governments.

...

**ON THURSDAY**, Romulo and Okawa will sign more agreements — one involving a Japanese grant of 1.37 billion yen (about P58 million) for the construction of a library building for the Philippine Normal College and the other a still undisclosed amount of grant for the establishment of an aquacultural promotion complex in Tugbilaran, Bohol.

The first loan agreement involves a \$5.45 billion yen (\$231.04 million) 11th yen credit package from the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund of Japan, while the second involves a special yen credit amounting to 9.6 billion yen (\$40 million).

The 11th OECF loan package will finance the Leyte geothermal development project (stage II), the National Power Corporation's extra-high voltage transmission line project (stage III), the

integrated steel mill construction project, the West Leyte and Northwest Leyte roads improvement projects, Metro Manila radial road No. 10 and related road projects, the railcar maintenance depot project, the telemetric portion of the country's flood control project, and the engineering services of the Port Irene development project.

...

**THE SPECIAL** yen credit loan will be used by the power company to fund a geothermal project designed to supply electricity to power-dense coastal urban centers.

The OECF loan, which has a 3-percent interest per annum, is payable in 20 years with a 10-year grace period.

The special yen credit loan carries an interest of 4 percent per annum and is also payable in 20 years with a 10-year grace period.

...

**JAPAN'S GRANT** for the PNC, meanwhile, will be used for the construction of a library building and in acquiring audiovisual facilities. The building will also integrate the various PNC library activities and its graduate and undergraduate library science courses.

Romulo said after the signing that the agreements were a "firm restatement of the mutually beneficial nature" of relations between the Philippines and Japan.

JAPANESE LAND IRON PLANT DEAL

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 23 Jul 83 p 10

[Text]

THE National Steel Corp. (NSC) yesterday said it has awarded to a consortium of Japanese companies the contract for the \$235-million iron-making package of its integrated steel project.

According to NSC, the package involves the turn-key supply of a rotary kiln-based direct reduction plant, including raw materials handling and other related facilities.

Trade and Industry Minister Roberto V. Ongpin signed the contract yesterday on behalf of NSC with representatives of Marubeni Corp., Mitsubishi Corp., Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, UBE Industries of Japan and Krupp Industrietechnik GmbH of West Germany.

The iron-making contract constitutes the first major package in

the construction of an integrated steel plant at Iligan City.

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A PRESS statement of NSC said, "the project has obtained unprecedented financing terms with five years grace period and twelve years to repay."

The interest rate of the financing was, however, not disclosed.

The projects, NSC claimed, is expected to contribute at least \$400 million a year in foreign exchange savings, thus, boosting the stabilization of the country's balance of payments and the value of the peso.

The iron-making plant utilizes the Krupp CODIR direct reduction process for the production of iron, while generating substantial electric power from byproduct gas produced in the rotary kiln.

## SEPTEMBER RICE HARVEST DELAYED

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 25 Jul 83 p p 1, 2

[Text]

**THE RICE** harvest which is usually in September will be delayed because of many reasons, including the drought that hit the country late last year and early this year, industry sources said yesterday.

Without the September harvest, the price of rice is expected to go up, because traders (who are aware of the situation) will blackmarket rice, according to Manuel Rotea, secretary general of the National Congress of Farmers Organization.

Officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and the National Food Authority are also aware of this predicament but they cannot officially confirm it. Instead, they are exerting efforts to peg the price of rice at the ceiling of P3.10 per kilo.

**ANOTHER** cause of the delay in the planting of palay was the scarcity of fertilizer (most of which was hoarded by traders waiting for the official announcement raising fertilizer prices) and certified palay seeds, Rotea said.

A third factor is that some 500,000 hectares of rice farms are not wet enough despite the rains brought by typhoon "Bebeng" early this month.

As of last June 30, some 8.6 percent of the country's rice farmers have actually planted, according to statistics of the Philippine Crop Insurance Corp.

For the period, the PCIC reported having insured only P30.22 million out of the targetted P351.6 million of the areas planted to rice.

Planting is usually covered by insurance — both under the government's supervised credit program and self-finance farms — in case of typhoons, floods, droughts and pests.

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**ABOUT** 400,000 hectares of waterless rice fields in Central and Northern Luzon and another 120,000 hectares in the Visayas are still not ready for planting, a report quoting an agriculture ministry survey said yesterday.

The unplanted areas provide the bulk of the country's domestic and export requirements, the report added.

Agriculture officials earlier pointed out that the rice harvest will be set back by one to two months, meaning harvest may come in November instead of August or September.

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**BECAUSE** of these adverse developments, Agriculture Minister Arturo R. Tanco Jr was reported to have asked President Marcos for the release of the remaining P20 million of the P40 million allocated for the seed subsidy program.

Tanco was said to have asked for an extension in the distribution period of the seed subsidy program to enable farmers to replant without delay.

The subsidized seeds program was launched by the President last March in answer to the drought victims' appeal for assistance.

Of the P40 million allocated for the program, only P20 million has been distributed to the drought-stricken farmers of the Visayas and Mindanao.

Farmers in Bicol are also asking that the program be extended to them because they, too, have been hit by the seven-month drought.



COCONUT EXPORT RECEIPTS DOWN

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 24 Jul 83 p 18

[Text]

Philippine exports of coconut products declined by 26.5 per cent to P262 million during the first half of the year due mainly to a 17.7 per cent drop in volume.

According to the Philippine Coconut Authority, volume of coconut product exports (in copra terms) totalled 827.68 metric tons from January to June compared to 1.0 million for the same period last year.

However, due to increasing prices of coconut oil in the world markets, the export performance for the month of June already showed significant improvements.

Export receipts during the month showed a market increase of 18.3 per cent to \$61.5 million as volume of exports went up by 16.9 per cent.

Receipts from coconut oil amounted to \$188 million during the six-month period. Copra contributed \$3.46 million; copra expeller pellets, \$14.8 million; copra solvent pellets, \$31.9 million;

desiccated coconut, \$32.9 million; coconut shell charcoal, \$1.43 million; and activated carbon, \$4.1 million.

The United Coconut Oil Mills, the umbrella trading organization for a number of coconut oil mills, exported a total of \$118.7 million during the six-month span out of the total coconut oil exports of \$188 million registered for the period.

In terms of volume, Unicom shipped a total of 294.022 metric tons of oil, as against the total exported volume of 473,951 million during the January-June period.

In other products, Unicom likewise exported the bulk during the six-month period. It shipped \$6.9 million worth of copra expeller out of \$14.8 million total receipts; \$14.7 million worth of copra solvents out of \$17 million total; \$11.7 million worth of desiccated coconut out of \$32.9 million total; and \$2.9 million worth of copra out of \$3.4 million total.

REBEL PLAN TO INFILTRATE GOVERNMENT ARMORIES REVEALED

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 21 Jul 83 p 6

[Article by Mel Parale]

[Text]

**TWO TOP** leaders of rebel fronts in Mindanao exposed yesterday a plot of the underground movement to infiltrate government armories and gain full mastery of how to use modern weapons in the military's inventory.

The rebel leaders, who were captured during operation by military operatives in Davao City over the weekend, broke down during interrogation and disclosed details of the dissidents' infiltration offensive.

The two were identified as Eddie L. Quitoriano, with seven aliases and secretary of Front 6 in Central Mindanao; and Agnes R. Gallardo, a ranking member of Front 6 regional party committee and using five aliases.

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**THEY WERE** arrested in a house on Chavez st. in Davao City while apparently preparing to organize re-

bel contacts for infiltration missions.

The two told investigators they were transferred by the CPP executive committee from their Bukidnon base to Davao area to recruit new members who are good in research work.

They said they were under instruction to concentrate research on how to operate newly-commissioned armored vehicles and to fly combat helicopters.

They said they were also ordered to discover "weaknesses" of government weapons "for passing on to rebel cadres."

The revelations of the two were interpreted by military experts as a contingency move of the dissident hierarchy to shore up the morale of cadres in the field.

Rebel ranks in the field were reported plagued with defections because of reverses suffered lately in encounters with government troops.

CSO: 4200/733

MILITARY CLAIMS DETAINEES WELL-FED

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 19 Jul 83 p 24

[Article by Cornelio De Guzman]

[Text]

DAVAO CITY. Two big women organizations were reported to have asked authorities to act on the plight of detainees who were on a "hunger strike" at the local PC stockade but Davao Metro District Commander Col. Andres Superable said the political detainees were not "fasting" at all.

Superable invited media members to visit the so-called fasting detainees to see for themselves what is really happening in the detention cells.

This came following a joint statement by the Philippine Nurses Association and the Women's Alliance for True Change that authorities must act because the detainees have already been "fast-

ing" for the last 24 days.

Superable said that relatives and friends of the detainees were continuously supplying them with biscuits, sandwiches, soft drinks and vitamins.

Among the demands aired by the two women organizations were the return of the detainees' beds which were reported removed when they used the said beds in "a noise barrage" inside their cells.

Superable pointed out that there are no political detainees which the two groups are working to be released since all those inside their cells were all properly charged in court for violation of law.

He also said that the detainees are provided with well-balanced meals.

CSO: 4200/733

# ACTIVITIES OF CIVILIAN HOME DEFENSE FORCES EXAMINED

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 20 Jul 83 p 6

[Article by Jesus Bigornia]

[Text]

**P**RESIDENT Marcos went into a lot of trouble in 1972, including clamping martial rule on the country, to rid the Philippines of the notorious "private armies." True enough, the battalions of armed hoodlums disappeared as fast as their political patrons, the old oligarchs, vanished from the country's political stage. But, as the old saying goes: Bad weeds never die. For now, private armies are enjoying a revival — with a vengeance. Where before they served as mere bodyguards and political henchmen of political overlords, the private armies come clothed in Civilian Home Defense Forces uniforms and armed with government-issue Armalites.

Typical of the use to which CHDF units have been applied by local politicians is that headquartered at Hamtic, Antique, which Antiqueños have previously denounced in this column with acts of violence against henchmen of a rival political group. Members of the unit, a

report said, surrounded the Hamtic residence of Nene Javier, mayoralty candidate defeated in the last elections by Mayor Julius Pacificador, at night in mid-April, breaking the nocturnal quiet with volleys of gunfire into the air. Neither the mayor nor the local constabulary responded to the noisy breach of the peace, the report says.

There is no question about the need for CHDF units in dissident-infested areas like Antique. But the Constabulary under which such units operate and function should exercise strict control and supervision so that they serve the general interest, not those of a political faction or political leader. For one thing, persons with alcohol-related problems or with known criminal tendencies should never be issued any form of firearm. Selection of recruits for service in CHDF squads should, moreover, be scrupulous so that those selected do not gravitate to a political overlord. If the civilian defense forces become obnoxious to the communities they serve, they can only alienate the mass of the people from the government.

PCO SOUGHT FOR SURIGAO PRIESTS, NUNS

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 22 Jul 83 pp 1, 12

[Text]

DAVAO CITY, July 20 — Constabulary authorities said today that they were seeking the issuance of a presidential commitment order (PCO) for each of the three priests, two nuns, and three other persons accused of seditious activities in Surigao del Sur.

This was learned from Col. Dionisio Tan-Gatue, 11th PC regional commander, who was informed by his deputy for operation Col. Jesus Hermosa, who is based in Tandag, Surigao del Sur, that there are additional evidence of subversion against the suspects which warrant the issuance of a PCO.

Arrested for allegedly uttering seditious language on several occasions were Fathers Francisco Olvia, parish priest of Hinatuan; Donald Aloy, parish priest of Tago; and Francisco Navarro, parish priest of Langa; Sisters Fe Nicodra Lagurin and Erlinda Valenton; Alicia Cortes, a public school teacher; Herminigildo Pimentel, Jr., and Jose Adorable, Jr., both of Tago town.

Hermosa said the evidence they were able to collect included leaflets and pamphlets containing highly seditious and incendiary language which were allegedly distributed by the accused during a

rally last July 4 in Tandag.

In his recommendation to Tan-Gatue, Hermosa said the issuance of the PCO will afford the accused a chance to ask higher authorities that they be placed under house arrest.

Judge Geronimo Castano of the Tandag municipal trial court issued the warrant of arrest and did not recommend bail for the accused.

Hermosa said that he recommended that the three priests be detained in their respective areas of work so they can continue to say mass and administer liturgical services.

Meanwhile, a report from the office of Tan-Gatue announced that a top leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines in Mindanao and his wife were captured by intelligence agents in a raid in a downtown eatery last week.

Tan-Gatue identified the suspect as Eduardo Quitoriano alias "Gabby" and his wife Agnes Rivera Gallardo.

A native of Misamis Oriental, Quitoriano was reported to be a former secretary of the CPP Front 6 and was elevated recently to the military staff of north-central Mindanao regional party committee. (RCC)

# SEVEN MILLION FACE TAX EVASION CHARGES

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 19 Jul 83 p 1

[Article by Jun Ramirez]

[Text] The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) furnished yesterday its regional and district offices with the names of some seven million individual and corporate taxpayers for investigation and prosecution for alleged non-filing of income tax returns.

Revenue Deputy Commissioner Romulo M. Villa said the names of the suspected tax-evaders were obtained from the Social Security System, the Government Service Insurance System, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.

These persons are listed as members of either the SSS or GSIS, but their names do not appear on BIR records of those who have filed returns or paid any tax, Villa said.

Villa said the same

was true of many business enterprises registered with the SEC.

Under present rules, an individual is exempted from filing returns, if his annual income is less than his personal exemption.

These are P3,000 for a single individual, P6,000 for married, and P4,500 for a single head of the family.

On the other hand, business enterprises are required to submit returns whether or not they make profit.

Villa said civil and criminal charges will be filed against tax evaders.

If found guilty, they are liable to pay a 50 per cent surcharge and 20 per cent annual interest on the amount due the government, plus imprisonment, depending on the gravity

of the offense.

BIR records showed that only 2.5 million of the estimated 10 million individual taxpayers and only 30,000 out of 160,000 business enterprises are filing returns annually.

Insiders said many taxpayers do not file returns in the belief that the BIR would not discover them, remaining nonentities so long as they do not submit any record.

However, Villa said that with the use of computers and assistance from other government agencies, the BIR can now easily identify tax-evaders.

He said that a substantial number of taxpayers do not file returns, and as a result, the tax burden is shouldered by limited number of income earners.



## PHILIPPINES

### BRIEFS

AQUINO RETURN PREDICTED--NINOY AQUINO will most probably not make it to Manila as he scheduled. It is most probable, however, that he will be allowed to come home before the end of 1983. In other words, the government is in command of the situation, not Ninoy. The sooner Ninoy learns that he can't dictate his terms, the better for himself and his followers. [Teodoro F. Valencia] [Excerpt] [Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 23 Jul 83 p 4]

CSO: 4200/733

## BRIEFS

OPPOSITION DEPLORES AUSTRALIAN DOMINATION--Vanuatu's Opposition Union of Moderate Parties, the U.M.P. has claimed the country is becoming increasingly controlled by Australia. In a statement which describes Australia's influence in Vanuatu as Neo colonialist, the U.M.P. claims the country is losing its freedom. Quoting Papua New Guinea as an example of a country which is suffering as a result of its close relations with Australia, the group says it cannot accept Australian influence in the Pacific. The U.P.M. says it does not want to see Australia providing all the financial and technical needs of the Pacific. Referring to New Caledonia, the Opposition Group which consists mainly of French speaking Vanuatians, says it does not want Vanuatu to become a tool of Australia in getting France out of the Pacific. However, the statement supports independence for all Pacific countries, and calls on France to begin moving towards a peaceful independence in New Caledonia. [Honiara SOLOMON STAR in English 15 Jul 83 p 8]

CSO: 4200/739

## MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

### PHAM HUNG ADDRESSES PUBLIC SECURITY CONFERENCE

BK280944 Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 4 Jul 83 p 3

[Address by Pham Hung, member of the CPV Central Committee Political Bureau, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers, and minister of interior, at "ceremony held to launch a movement to study, thoroughly understand, and strictly implement the six lessons given by respected and beloved Uncle Ho to the People's Public Security Forces"--date not given]

[Text] Over recent days, our entire country and many other countries throughout the world have solemnly celebrated the 93d anniversary of great President Ho Chi Minh's birthday (19 May 1890-19 May 1983). During the coming years, our entire party, people and armed forces must make very great efforts to successfully implement the resolution of the Fifth National Party Congress and victoriously fulfill the Third 5-Year Plan. Our entire country is launching a socialist patriotic emulation movement to celebrate the 55th anniversary of our party's founding and the SRV's 40th anniversary, greet the Sixth National Party Congress of Delegates, and observe the 95th anniversary of respected and beloved President Ho Chi Minh's birthday in 1985. In conjunction with the socialist emulation movement of party cadres, members and the people throughout the country to live, fight, work, and study like great Uncle Ho, our People's Public Security Forces should push forward the emulation movement "for the fatherland's security," resolutely defeating the multifaceted war of sabotage of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in collusion with the U.S. imperialists, and firmly maintaining national security and public order and safety in any circumstances.

To bring into play the results of the campaign to implement Directive No 92 of the party Central Committee Secretariat, continue to build really pure and strong people's public security forces, and promote the mass movement to protect national security, the Ministry of Interior today launches the "movement to study, thoroughly understand, and strictly implement the six lessons given by respected and beloved Uncle Ho to the People's Public Security Forces."

President Ho Chi Minh was the founder, leader, and trainer of our party; the beloved father of the Vietnamese people's armed forces; the boundlessly respected and beloved great leader of our working class, our people, and the entire Vietnamese nation; and an outstanding militant of the international communist movement and national liberation movement.

Respected and beloved Uncle Ho's life was a shining example of revolutionary heroism, militant solidarity, virtue, simplicity, modesty, diligence, thriftiness, honesty, righteousness, fairness, and impartiality. His name has been linked with the glorious victories of the Vietnamese revolution since the party was founded to this day and symbolizes the most illustrious era in the Vietnamese nation's history.

"Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom"--this edict by respected and beloved Uncle Ho embodies the unshaken and undaunted will displayed by the Vietnamese nation throughout its 4,000-year history.

A son of our nation, people, and country, President Ho, the great national hero, has brought glory to our nation, people, and country. His revolutionary achievements and virtue will live forever with our entire party, people, armed forces and country.

Uncle Ho showed special concern for our people's public security cadres and combatants. This was the concern of a party's supreme leader for the men who "live for the party, die for the party, and know that they will exist only as long as the party exists," the men to whom the party has entrusted the sacred duty of "preserving the party's life." For this reason, though burdened by thousands of tasks, Uncle Ho still devoted much time to advising the public security forces in large and small matters alike. During his lifetime, he on many occasions contributed suggestions to our Interior Ministry on the task of building our apparatus and fighting the enemy. He visited many public security units and offered valuable advice on professional work and on the building of public security forces.

In a letter to the public security service of Zone 12 on March 1948, Uncle Ho also pointed out the criteria necessary for every revolutionary public security cadre and man, in terms of quality, capability, behavior, and ethics. He said:

"The qualifications of a revolutionary public security man include:

He must be diligent, thrifty, honest, and just; be cordial and helpful to his colleagues; be absolutely loyal to the government; respect and be polite to the people; be devoted to his duty; and be resolute and alert against the enemy."

These six lessons carry the most profound contents and fully reflect the revolutionary and scientific significance and character concerning the quality and capability of public security cadres and men in both theory and practice.

Most of the contents of the six lessons given by Uncle Ho to the public security forces have already been explained in a ministry document. Now, I will tell you, comrades, only about some main contents and things that should be done in order to implement satisfactorily the uncle's six teachings.

In his first lesson, Uncle Ho said: "One must be diligent, thrifty, honest, and just." Thus, he wanted, first of all, to urge all public security cadres and combatants to voluntarily put into full play their role as masters of themselves and struggle to instill in themselves the basic quality of a real revolutionary combatant: diligence, thrift, honesty, justice, and impartiality.

"Diligence" is the working viewpoint of the working class and laboring people. It is also the state of working with a sense of voluntarism, technique, discipline, and high productivity and quality. Only by working diligently, creatively, and selflessly can our public security cadres and combatants fulfill their duties and defeat enemies of all types.

Public security work is a scientific category of class struggle against counterrevolutionaries and other criminals for safeguarding the revolutionary gains. Public security work is also a special type of work, a type of mental labor, and a type of struggle to defeat the enemy through wisdom. For this reason, Uncle Ho wanted our public security cadres and combatants to work and study hard in order to obtain a firm political background, a good professional level, and fair educational and scientific and technical knowledge to meet the needs of their assignments. As for leading cadres, it is necessary for them to work harder and more creatively.

As Uncle Ho put it, "diligence" must go along with "thrift." Thrift is the laborers' basic virtue. It shows recognition of the value of the fruits of labor. Uncle Ho used to say that if we want to succeed in building socialism, we must work diligently and practice thrift. Now, because our country is still poor, we must ensure rational consumption in order to build socialism successfully and defend the socialist Vietnamese fatherland firmly. Therefore, thrift is our state's national policy. Practicing thrift means struggling resolutely against waste, luxury, corruption, and theft.

By satisfactorily upholding diligence and thrift, one can create favorable conditions for instilling honesty. Honesty means purity. An honest person does not feast on corruption, always values and safeguards public property, does not accept bribes or take anything from the people, always maintains a pure and simple life, and lives on the fruits of his labor.

"Justice" means that one must do right deeds and avoid wrong deeds, even minor ones. Justice means righteousness and faithfulness. Public security forces are entrusted by the party and the state with the function and task of safeguarding law and justice. We all know how harmful the effects of dishonesty and injustice are.

It is necessary to combine diligence, thrift, honesty, and justice with impartiality. Diligence, thrift, honesty and justice cannot exist without impartiality, and vice versa. Diligence, thrift, honesty, and justice are the essence of Uncle Ho's virtue and conduct. That virtue is the virtue of



the working class. Due to the industrial working conditions and because of its material activities, the working class is instilled with a sense of collectivity and such a fine and lofty virtue. Meanwhile, because of its close link with the system of private ownership of the means of production, the morality of the non-proletarian classes is characterized by individualism. Uncle Ho said: "Individualism is the ferocious enemy of socialism." During the first stage of the transitional period, the struggle between the socialist and capitalist paths requires that we promote socialist thought and struggle resolutely to wipe out individualism. Uncle Ho taught: "You are public security combatants fighting the enemy of socialism, but within yourselves there is still an enemy at whom no guns can fire. That is individualism. Because individualism is very dangerous, you must struggle against it."

If all of our public security cadres and combatants can staunchly uphold diligence, thrift, honesty, justice, and impartiality, we will certainly be able to make the public security forces pure and strong.

In his second lesson, Uncle Ho told us that, "We must be cordial and helpful to our colleagues." This lesson stems from the fine tradition of our people and from the brotherly love of the proletariat. Those who are struggling for the same cause, the same aim, and the same ideal must love and help each other on the basis of "People of the same country are compelled to protect and love each other." By ensuring unity and mutual cordiality and assistance, we will be able to strengthen every person and organization. We must unite and help one another in order to make progress in our studies and training, satisfactorily carry out our combat and other assignments, and outstandingly fulfill all tasks. We must foster unity and mutual cordiality and assistance on the basis of party policies and state laws, and must absolutely not foster factional "unity" aimed at protecting those who have committed mistakes and shortcomings. It is necessary for all leading cadres to truly play an exemplary role in fostering unity and mutual cordiality and assistance. By satisfactorily ensuring internal unity and unity among various units, favorable conditions will be created for all public security echelons to achieve close unity and coordination with the people's army and various sectors and mass organizations, as well as with certain organs in other countries.

In his third lesson, Uncle Ho told us that, "We must be absolutely loyal to the government."

As you, Comrades, already know, when Uncle Ho said that we must be absolutely loyal to the government, he also meant that we must be absolutely loyal to the party, the people, and the country as well.

Because they are the reliable armed force of the party and the effective tool of violence of the proletarian dictatorship state, the public security forces must be absolutely loyal to the party, the government, the country, and the people. This is a matter of principle. Comrade General Secretary Le Duan affirmed: "The party has entrusted the public security forces with the task



of safeguarding it. For this reason, the party has selected public security men from among those who are most loyal to it--those who maintain that they can only exist as long as the party exists."

To ensure their loyalty, public security cadres and combatants must make sacrifices and fight throughout their lifetime for the security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the country, the restoration of socialist order, the independence and freedom of the nation, and the cause of socialism and communism. They must also implement party lines and policies and state laws scrupulously.

To consolidate and constantly enhance their loyalty to the party, the government, the country, and the people, it is necessary for public security cadres and combatants to regularly study Marxism-Leninism and party lines and policies and state laws, while constantly enhancing their political consciousness and revolutionary quality and ethics and improving their operational capability and fighting strength. Finally, the yardstick for that loyalty is the outstanding fulfillment of assignments and the operational and fighting efficiency and quality of each of our units and men.

To prove their loyalty, the public security forces must also enhance the stand and viewpoint of the working class and uphold a genuine revolutionary spirit and stalwart fighting will to actively and continuously attack the enemy and other criminals; place absolute confidence in and fully support the party's lines and policies; remain firm in the face of all ordeals and difficulties in the struggle to build socialism and defend the socialist Vietnamese fatherland; and resolutely ensure the successful implementation of party lines and policies and state laws. Public security cadres and combatants must live and work in accordance with the Constitution and law and must contribute actively to preserving the rules of society. They must also struggle resolutely against all violations of law and manifestations of negativism in economic and social life.

To be loyal to the party, we must ensure absolute safety for its leading organs and leaders, satisfactorily protect its organization, and contribute actively to making all party and administrative organs and mass organizations pure and strong.

To be loyal to the party, we must also know how to concretize and most effectively implement various directives and resolutions of the party, the state and the ministry, as well as to strictly enforce the discipline and scrupulously execute the operational codes and regulations of the public security forces.

In his fourth lesson, Uncle Ho told us that, "We must respect and be polite to the people."

The working people are creators of history, while revolution is the undertaking of the people under the party's leadership.

Our party's invincible strength and origin are in close association with the people's support.

Uncle Ho is the great leader of our party and nation who won the love and respect of the Vietnamese people and other people in the world. He devoted his whole life to the Vietnamese nation, people, and mankind. He said: "I have but one utmost aspiration: to see our country gain complete independence, our people enjoy complete freedom, our compatriots have sufficient food and clothing, and everyone has a chance to study." Before he died, Uncle Ho said: "Now, as I am leaving this world, I have no regrets except for the fact that I will not be able to be of longer and better service," and finally, he said: "I leave behind my boundless love for the entire people, the whole party, all the troops as well as for all the youths and children." As the top leader of the party and chief of state, his words and acts clearly demonstrated his respect and boundless love for the Vietnamese people. In his testament, Uncle Ho urged our party that it "must devise a truly satisfactory plan for economic and cultural development in order to improve the people's living standards." His viewpoint on the masses has been built into a system in which "the party leads, the people control, and the state manages" as stipulated by party regulation, the Constitution, and state law.

Uncle Ho often urged the people's security forces to "follow the mass-orientated line to win the people's confidence and love so that the people will help them accomplish their tasks." He often reminded party cadres and members at various state organs that "those who work with the administration, the people's security, or armed forces are servants of the people, because the democratic regime is the regime in which the people are masters."

Uncle Ho taught us that we "must respect and be polite to the people." This respect and politeness must be firmly grasped by all officers and combatants of the people's security forces everywhere, and at every echelon and unit. To respect and be polite to the people is a revolutionary attitude, a good principle and behavior of life, and a motto of action for all officers and combatants of the people's security forces.

To respect and be polite to the people is not merely an attitude in social contact, [phrase indistinct]--tasks which stem from the party mass-orientated viewpoint and line, and from the people's interests. Cadres and combatants of the people's security forces must uphold their responsibility, stand ready to correctly solve and satisfy all the people's requests, and strive to strengthen solidarity and cooperation with various sectors, mass, and social organizations.

In their work, cadres and combatants of the people's security forces must, depending on their specific functions, be aware of their responsibility to contribute to caring for the material and spiritual life of the people and to meet the legitimate demands of the masses. Security forces at all levels must offer regular services to party committee echelons in directing and

promoting the mass movement to safeguard national security; realize the laboring people's right to collective mastery in the field of security and order; carry out the system of meeting the people; and arrange for the people to make constructive criticism of the security forces. We must resolutely oppose officialism, arrogance, impoliteness, and all acts causing inconvenience to the people, and must strictly punish the crime of oppressing the masses. We must, by our concrete deeds, develop a close relationship between the security forces and the people in order to make the people "understand, love and assist the security forces."

In his fifth lesson, our uncle said that we "must devote ourselves to work." Setting an example himself, our uncle devoted all his heart and mind to serving the revolution, the country, and the people throughout his life.

The work of the security forces is very heavy, difficult, and complex; it is a struggle, both overt and covert, against the cunning, wicked, and secretive enemy. This struggle allows "neither a cease-fire," "nor a respite." Therefore, dedication, sacrifices, valor, resourcefulness, and creativity are required of the security forces.

To devote themselves to their work, security cadres and combatants must be highly aware of the party's revolutionary ideals, possess deep patriotism and ardent love for the people, and make sacrifices in the struggle for the realization of socialism and communism in our country. As Comrade General Secretary Le Duan said, "One cannot be a genuine revolutionary without readiness to make self-sacrifices. To achieve an ideal without sacrifices is impossible."

For the cause of defending national security, maintaining social order and safety, and defeating all enemies, security cadres and combatants must be ready to go wherever they are needed, satisfactorily fulfill whatever task with which they are entrusted, and carry out the motto "make self-sacrifices for the country and the people."

All security cadres and combatants must fulfill their work assignments with dedication. Nevertheless, even higher dedication is required of leaders and commanding cadres as their responsibility is heavier. Leaders and commanders must show dedication not only in performing their own tasks but also in managing and educating every cadre and combatant serving under them, as well as in caring for their progress work conditions, and material and spiritual life. Resolute efforts must be made to oppose bureaucratism, officialism, the tendency to strive for only an average work performance, the lack or fear of responsibility, and laziness.

In his sixth lesson, our uncle advised us "to act resolutely and resourcefully toward the enemy."

Resolution is an aspect symbolic of the position and viewpoints of the revolutionary security men. Security cadres and combatants must always clearly recognize the enemy in order to resolutely repress it, and must promptly prevent and smash its schemes and acts of sabotage in all fields in order to defend national security, safeguard socialist property, and protect the people's lives and property.

Being resolute toward the enemy means that in each stage of the revolution, we must be aware of the targets of the revolution and clearly recognize that the direct dangerous enemy of our country's revolution at present is Chinese expansionism and hegemonism and that the basic, long-term enemy of our country's revolution as well as the world revolution is U.S. imperialism. Being resolute toward the enemy at present means that we must defeat the enemy's multifaceted war of sabotage while always maintaining our guard and standing ready to fight and defeat a large-scale war of aggression that may be recklessly started by the enemy. The resolute struggle against the enemy must be closely linked with the struggle against other criminal elements and the struggle against negativism in economic and social life. We must study to grasp in a prompt, accurate, profound, and comprehensive manner the schemes, methods, maneuvers, activities, strong points, and weaknesses of each type of enemy; sharpen our revolutionary vigilance as well as our hatred for the enemy; and on this basis, devise the most effective plans for fighting the enemy. Programs and plans for fighting the enemy must thoroughly reflect the concept of developing the combined strength of all forces and bringing into concerted play all measures for positive construction, active prevention, active offensive, continuous offensive, offensive for mastery, and mastery for offensive in order to destroy and disband counterrevolutionaries and other criminal elements ideologically, spiritually, and organizationally.

The struggle must be spearheaded against the most dangerous enemy and targets. It is necessary to promptly deal accurate and telling blows to the ring-leaders, the masterminds, and the crime perpetrators; treat their accomplices who have repented with leniency; and commend and reward those who render meritorious services to compensate for their crimes. Discrimination in treatment must be accorded in a reasonable and rational manner. This is our thoroughly revolutionary stand that allows no compromises, hesitation, or middle ground. This is also the immense humanitarianism of the communists who wish to build a new system, a new culture, and a new type of men with a discipline and an order thousands of times more beautiful than those of capitalism.

Being resolute toward the enemy also means that we must neither allow a single agent of the enemy to escape nor punish any innocent person. We must not fall for rightism or skepticism, drop our guard, or turn soft toward the enemy or other criminal elements; at the same time, we must not allow ourselves to be "drawn to the left" and make indiscriminate and unwarranted arrests.



Being resolute toward the enemy must also be reflected in our concrete policies to actively build and protect the revolutionary forces, defend the party, protect our leaders, safeguard the material-technical foundations of socialism, and protect the people's lives and property. Being resolute also means that positive contributions must be made toward building clean, firm, and strong revolutionary organizations and ensuring political and spiritual unity and singlemindedness among the people.

Our uncle taught us to act resolutely and resourcefully toward the enemy. Being resourceful means that we must be sensitive and sharp in grasping the situation and employ strategies, counterstrategies, and tactics in the struggle in such a way as to win the greatest victories and inflict the heaviest losses on the enemy. Being resourceful also means that we must use all the forces combined, bring into concerted play all measures, and closely combine mass-proselyting activities with professional security operations--surveillance, investigation, interrogation, administrative and scientific-technological management, and so forth--in all spheres of work of the public security forces.

We must resolutely overcome laxity in vigilance, right-leaning tendencies, pure professionalism, as well as the tendency to take professionalism lightly.

The resolution of the Fifth National Party Congress of Delegates clearly pointed out: "Ensuring political security and public order and safety is an extremely important task aimed at defeating the enemy's multifaceted war of sabotage, resolutely suppressing counterrevolutionaries, promptly smashing all attempts of reactionaries of all stripes to rear their heads, preventing and punishing enemy acts of sabotage in all fields, strengthening law and discipline, and protecting public order and the people's security.

"To fulfill this task, we require a people's public security service that is pure and strong in all respects, really a sharp tool of the state of proletarian dictatorship, and absolutely loyal to the fatherland, the party, and the people. This service must have regular and modern specialized forces which are politically stable and professionally efficient which have high scientific and technological standards, and which are outfitted with necessary specialized equipment. It must also have stable and strong semi-specialized forces, a broad network of agents among the masses..."

Recently, in carrying out the campaign in accordance with Directive No 92 of the party Central Committee Secretariat, we have achieved very significant results, not only in meeting the requirements of the immediate tasks, but also in creating basic conditions for continuing to build pure and strong people's public security forces and promoting the mass movement to protect the fatherland's security in the years ahead.

The achievements and results recorded in the campaign have been reflected in the results obtained in carrying out our political tasks in the past years. In a very difficult and complex situation, we have stepped up the struggle against counterrevolution and maintained political security. We have actively made many efforts in the struggle against violation of socialist property and other crimes to maintain public order and security and cut down crime. New factors have emerged, contributing to the struggle to frustrate the enemy's multifaceted war of sabotage.

However, compared to the goals and requirements of Directive No 92 and subsequent party and state resolutions and directives, the aforementioned results have shown that we still have weaknesses and shortcomings in political and ideological education, in strengthening organizations, in improving work methods, and in training cadres and combatants.

In launching the movement to study, thoroughly understand, and strictly implement the six lessons given by respected and beloved Uncle Ho to the people's public security forces, the Interior Ministry leadership aims to continue developing the results of the campaign to build pure and strong people's public security forces and to promote the mass movement to protect national security.

This movement will start on 19 May 1983 and end on 19 May 1985.

The goal of the movement is to enable people's public security cadres and combatants to thoroughly understand the significance and contents of Uncle Ho's six lessons and turn their implementation into a regular endeavor in their daily life, work, and combat activities. People's public security cadres and combatants must uphold the working class viewpoints and stand, adopt a correct viewpoint toward the masses, show high unanimity with the party's line and policies, remain absolutely loyal to the party, stand firm in the face of all challenges, uphold their stalwart fighting spirit and thoroughly revolutionary spirit, and take the initiative in attacking the enemy and criminal elements. They must actively enhance their revolutionary quality, uphold their sense of organization and discipline, develop scientific operational and combat methods, continue to build and consolidate organization, and improve leadership and command capability. They must also build and consolidate the party and mass organizations in the public security forces to make them really pure and strong in order to implement successfully the resolutions of the Fifth National Party Congress, the party Central Committee's third and fourth plenums, the party Central Committee Political Bureau, the Council of Ministers, the national conference of public security forces, and the local party organizations congresses.

To achieve the goals and requirements of the movement, we must first of all organize broad and deep study of Uncle Ho's six lessons to the People's Public Security Forces while studying and implementing the resolution of the party Central Committee's fourth plenum. It is necessary to make



profound reviews, self-criticisms, and criticisms of viewpoints, ideology, the sense of organization, and discipline as reflected in the implementation of party lines and policies and the law of the state, as well as of the ethics and conduct of party cadres and members and state employees at all echelons of the People's Public Security Forces. We may organize scientific seminars and forums to study and discuss the contents of our Uncle's six lessons. For cadres and combatants who are party members, all these activities must be linked with the classification of party members and the review of their performance as party members. We must combine the study of Uncle Ho's six lessons with the review of the implementation of tasks by the various localities and units, and turn the making of self-criticism and criticisms from top to bottom--from leading and commanding cadres to cadres and combatants--into a regular practice with realistic results.

Thoroughly studying and scrupulously implementing the six lessons of Uncle Ho is practically meant to realize his sacred testament and to return his immense meritorious services to the people's security forces.

Satisfactorily implementing our Uncle's six lessons in effect means that we must continue to make the People's Public Security Forces become clean, firm, and strong, and advance toward standardization and modernization so they will be fully capable of fulfilling the tasks outlined in the resolutions of the Fifth National Congress of Party Delegates and other resolutions of the party Central Committee and the Political Bureau and that we must build the People's Public Security Forces into a reliable instrument of the party, a sharp tool of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and beloved brothers and sons of the people.

To help security cadres and combatants carry out this movement satisfactorily, the Ministry of Interior urges party committee and administrative echelons in the various localities to intensify leadership and create all favorable conditions possible for the security cadres and combatants to implement Uncle Ho's six lessons with good results. The ministry also urges the people's army, the various sectors, mass organizations, and the entire people to assist and supervise security cadres and combatants in their effort to study and implement the six lessons given by Uncle Ho to the People's Public Security Forces.

On behalf of the leading comrade of the Ministry of Interior, I earnestly hope that all the cadres and combatants of the People's Public Security Forces will actively, voluntarily, and enthusiastically steep themselves in the movement to study and implement the six lessons given by respected and beloved Uncle Ho to the People's Public Security Forces. Let us launch a seething, widespread, and continuous movement with realistic results!

I believe that under the close leadership of the party Central Committee and the various party committee echelons, with the coordination and assistance of the various sectors and people of all walks of life, and with the intensive

efforts of all the cadres and combatants of the People's Public Security Forces, we will definitely score great results in this movement, thereby contributing to firmly defending national security and social order and safety as required by the current situation and tasks of the socialist revolution.

Let us strive to surge forward with enthusiasm and confidence!

CSO: 4209/490

## MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

### HA TUYEN SENDS AID TO BORDER AREAS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 Jun 83 p 1

[VNA News Release: "Ha Tuyen Province To Send 10 Million Dong, 1,000 Tons of Grain and 1,000 Head of Buffalo and Cattle to the Border Areas"]

[Text] The Ha Tuyen Provincial Party Committee and People's Committee have launched a movement of each person and each household participating in the building of strong border areas, in an effort to send 10 million dong, 1,000 tons of grain and 1,000 head of buffalo and cattle to the border areas by the end of 1983.

The provincial party committee and people's committee have been guiding the various sectors and levels and guiding the agencies of the central level located within the locality in accelerating the socialist emulation movement, raising labor productivity and practicing economy in order to be able to send much money, grain and draft power to help the border areas build a strong combat defense line and help the cadres and soldiers at bases as well as the compatriots of the border villages that are regularly attacked by the enemy to stabilize and raise their standard of living.

During the 2nd quarter of this year, the provincial Federation of Trade Unions mobilized more than 60,000 cadres, manual workers and personnel to contribute 7 million dong to the fund for building the border areas. The Youth Union, the Women's Union and the Association of Collective Farmers have mobilized their members to contribute money and grain to the bases and compatriots in the border areas.

More than 400,000 agricultural laborers in Son Duong District are endeavoring to contribute 300 tons of paddy to the fund for building the border areas... The villages and cooperatives in Yen Son, Chiem Hoa, Na Hang and other districts have adopted plans for supplying draft buffalo and cattle to cooperatives and troop units stationed along the border.

7809

CSO: 4209/461

## MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

### HOANG MINH THAO DISCUSSES 1972 BATTLE IN KONTUM PROVINCE

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 5, May 83 pp 42-51

[Article by Lieutenant General Hoang Minh Thao: "Planning a Battle"]

[Text] Fighting the enemy by means of stratagems is a good fighting method. In the history of warfare, there have been many battles in which, because of the use of good stratagems or skilled planning, the side with few troops has defeated the side with many troops.

Our people's history of wars against foreign aggression has also proved that. Le Hoan, Tran Hung Dao, Ly Thuong Kiet, Le Loi, and Quang Trung had fewer troops than the enemy but because of strategic skills they won glorious victories in wars against the feudalist aggressor armies. Hannibal and Epaminondas, etc., also used stratagems to defeat armies larger than theirs.

Perhaps our ancestors' use of stratagems in war was manifested in a concentrated manner in the art of creating battlefield positions and opportunities. On the basis of the combat forces and methods they selected, our ancestors used stratagems to create an advantageous battlefield position and the opportunity to defeat much larger armies.

Bringing into play our country's precious tradition of strategic skill, during the wars against the French colonialists and the U.S. imperialists our people's armed forces fought many battles in which they used good stratagems to defeat the enemy. The following was one of the many battles, all over the country, in which we used good stratagems.

The year 1972 was a year in which there was a great strategic transformation to the advantage of our people in the anti-U.S. resistance war. After several years of heavy defeats, the U.S. "Vietnamization of the war" strategy had entered its final phase. In order to accelerate the collapse of the "Vietnamization" strategy and create conditions and the opportunity for completely defeating the war of aggression of the U.S. imperialists, we adopted the policy of launching a large-scale offensive on the battlefields.

The missions of that strategic offensive were to annihilate a large part of the enemy's armed forces and to liberate a number of important areas and population centers, including a number of cities, towns, and military bases. The objectives of those missions were to destroy part of the enemy's defensive

deployment and shrink their occupied areas in order to create a change in the balance of forces and a transformation in the war situation to our advantage.

Carrying out that strategic policy, the Central Highlands theater launched a campaign to liberate the Dac To district seat, the town of Tan Canh, and the city of Kontum.

The campaign was divided into two phases. In the first phase we would annihilate the enemy at the Tan Canh base and liberate the town of Tan Canh and the Dac To district seat. In the second phase we would annihilate the enemy in the city of Kontum and the enemy reinforcements sent up from Pleiku, and liberate the city of Kontum and the surrounding area.

What would be the best fighting method to attain the goals of the campaign? The High Command and the campaign command organ had to do a lot of hard thinking about that problem, for that would be the second time in the Central Highlands (the first was during Tet of 1968) that we would attack the enemy's main line of defense and attack the towns and cities, and it would be the first time that we would attack towns and cities by combined arms tactics, with the use of artillery, tanks, and antiaircraft guns. How should large-scale attacks, attacks on places where the enemy were strong, be carried out? What would be the best fighting method, one that would ensure a smashing victory?

If we were to win victory we would have to limit the enemy's strengths and turn them into weaknesses.

In the balance of forces, we did not have superiority over the enemy with regard to forces, so it was even more important that we pursue that line of thought with regard to the fighting method. According to that line of thought, the fighting method would be fighting by means of stratagems and superior position.

In the Central Highlands the enemy had two infantry divisions -- the 22nd and 23rd divisions -- and the 2nd Ranger Group. With regard to technical combat arms, the enemy had 10 artillery battalions, 4 armored regiments, and an air force regiment. Furthermore, the enemy had regional force, popular force, and border-defense ranger troops. The enemy regarded the Central Highlands as the main battlefield of Military Region II, so they concentrated there most of the regular forces and combat arm components of the military region. Of Military Region II's total regular forces, consisting of two infantry divisions and a ranger group, the enemy concentrated in the Central Highlands all of the 23rd Division, most of the 22nd Division, and the 2nd Ranger Group, the military region's mobile force. Most of the combat arms were also concentrated in the Central Highlands theater.

In addition to the forces of Military Region II, the General Staff of the puppet army often used its general strategic reserve forces in the Central Highlands. During the spring of 1972 it sent to the Central Highlands two brigades of an airborne division and the 6th Ranger Group. Thus in the spring of 1972 the enemy forces in the Central Highlands included 32 regular infantry battalions, 10 armored squadrons, 10 artillery battalions, and several dozen border ranger and regional force battalions.



In the Central Highlands the enemy concentrated their main forces in the area between Pleiku City and Kontum and in the town of Tan Canh.

For our part, our main-force forces included a full-strength infantry division, an understrength infantry division, four independent infantry regiments, an understrength sapper regiment, two artillery regiments, an antiaircraft artillery regiment, an understrength tank regiment, two combat engineer regiments, etc. Thus we had 29 regular battalions, slightly fewer than the enemy. With regard to local forces, the enemy were far superior. The enemy were also superior to us with regard to combat arms, even more so if U.S. aircraft were included.

The enemy's deployments were as follows:

At the town of Tan Canh the enemy deployed the 42nd and 47th regiments of the 22nd Division and a battalion of its 41st Regiment. Furthermore, they sent in the 9th Airborne Battalion and there were local forces consisting of two regional force battalions. With regard to combat arms, there were the 14th Armored Regiment and two artillery battalions.

In Kontum City the enemy deployed part of an airborne division, the 2nd Ranger Group, and the 6th Ranger Group, which was sent up from Saigon, along with the combat arms regiments and battalions. At Pleiku City the enemy deployed the 23rd Division, along with combat arms and air force troops.

On the basis of the enemy's deployments, we predicted that they would concentrate their defenses between Kontum City and the town of Tan Canh.

The enemy believed that we were not yet capable of attacking Kontum or Tan Canh. That conclusion drawn by the enemy was partly correct, but strategically it was partly in error. Thieu thought that our main strategic offensive would be carried out in the Central Highlands theater. After they noted the appearance of our 320th Division in the Central Highlands, and then had hints of the presence of our 2nd Division, Thieu and his General Staff in Saigon became even more confident of their assessment. That was why part of the airborne division and the 6th Ranger Group were sent to the Central Highlands.

According to our campaign plan, during the first phase we would attack Tan Canh and then attack the counterattacking and reinforcing enemy troops. During the second phase we would attack Kontum, keep the enemy pinned down in Pleiku, and attack the counterattacking and reinforcing troops.

In combat, attacking strongpoints and bases and the enemy's defensive positions are the primary combat activities. The secondary combat activities include fighting enemy troops who are counterattacking and reinforcing. If, after breaking through the enemy's defenses, we cannot defeat the counterattacking and reinforcing enemy troops, the battle will be hotly contended and prolonged, and we will sometimes be unsuccessful. Under the conditions of the enemy having many more troops and weapons, we must disperse and interdict the enemy, and perhaps must wear down and annihilate part of their forces on the outer perimeter or in another area before we attack the enemy defenses in the main line of advance.



With such a guiding spirit, we drafted a plan and deployed our forces in such a way as to win the greatest possible victory in the campaign with the smallest losses.

Our plan was to, before beginning the key battle at Tan Canh, make the enemy think that we would attack Kontum. At the same time, we had to wear down and annihilate the enemy's mobile reserve forces when we attacked Tan Canh, so that the enemy would have few capabilities and forces for counterattacking and reinforcing Tan Canh. One of the enemy's operational laws was that when one of their units or positions was attacked their reserve forces had to counterattack, relieve their forces, and stop and smash the adversary's attack. The enemy obeyed that law with relative predictability, for they had large numbers of troops and many -- and good -- transportation facilities. They had a good road network and a modern air transportation network. Especially, they had many helicopters.

Our stratagem was to cut off the enemy troops in Pleiku from those in Kontum and lure the enemy away from Kontum in order to annihilate them and wear them down, which would render Tan Canh vulnerable and create an element of surprise to facilitate our attack on Tan Canh. Our fighting method was to divide and attack the enemy and pin them down and annihilate them. In order to carry out that plan we made the following deployments:

We would use local troops and guerrillas of Gia Lai Province to attack traffic on Route 19 between the town of An Khe and the city of Pleiku, and to attack the enemy supply line between their strategic rear area bases in the lowlands and the Central Highlands, which were attacks on the enemy's strategic transportation route. We would use sappers, assault battalions, and specialized artillery battalions to attack the airfields, supply depots, and military installations in and around Pleiku. Those attacks would be attacks on the material infrastructure and headquarters organs of the enemy in the city.

Cutting off the enemy troops in Pleiku from those in Kontum, and pinning down the enemy's 23rd Division in Pleiku would be accomplished by the forces and activities of the 95th Regiment and the 24th Regiment, along with the local district troops and guerrillas along Route 14 in that area. The 320th Division, an artillery regiment, an antiaircraft battalion, and a specialized artillery battalion, along with sappers of the Military Command of Kontum Province, were responsible for pinning down the enemy in Kontum City and luring them out to the outskirts to annihilate them and wear them down. The 28th Regiment and the local district troops and guerrillas along Route 14 were responsible for cutting off the enemy troops in Kontum from those in Tan Canh.

The attack on Tan Canh and the Dac To district seat would be undertaken by the (understrength) 2nd Division, the 66th Regiment, an understrength sapper regiment, a battalion of local Kontum Province troops, a company of local district troops, and guerrillas in the area, along with combat arms including an artillery regiment, an antiaircraft artillery battalion, an understrength tank regiment, and a self-propelled antiaircraft artillery company.

Only because we had highly developed people's war could we deploy such a lethal

battlefield position, one that was closely interspersed with that of the enemy. And only with such a battlefield position could be achieve such a favorable deployment of forces.

In order to attain the planned goals of the campaign, we attacked the enemy along the roads first. Attacking the enemy along the roads is a fighting method by which we can easily gain the initiative and attain high combat effectiveness.

In mid- and late-March 1972 the local troops and guerrillas of Gia Lai Province began to attack the enemy on Route 19, annihilate and destroy the enemy's transportation facilities and materiel, and draw their reaction. On 26 March 1972 the 95th Regiment attacked the enemy on Route 14 between Pleiku and Kontum and cut the road between the two cities. It drew out, pinned down, and annihilated and wore down, the enemy's 23rd Division in that area. On 30 March 1972 the 320th Division inflicted heavy casualties on the 2nd Airborne Battalion and wiped out the 11th Airborne Battalion at highpoints 1049 and 1015 in the mountain range west of the Poko River and northwest of the city of Kontum. The 28th Regiment cut Route 14 at Vo Dinh, between Kontum and Tan Canh.

How were we able to lure the enemy airborne troops northwest of the city of Kontum so that we could attack them? That was the cleverest stratagem of that battle.

In order to annihilate and wear down the airborne troops, the enemy's "elite" mobile forces in that theater, and cause them to become fragmented and fatigued, so that they were no longer capable of serving as the "elder brothers" who put out the fires of the puppet army, we had to lure them out of their fortifications, into rough terrain we had selected, so that we could more easily annihilate them. That terrain lay in the mountain chain west of the Poko River. There the airborne troops could only use infantry, and would have no tanks or trucks. To be more certain that we could lure the airborne troops there we had to employ the stratagem of building two roads so that our mechanized vehicles could cross that mountain range, reach the bank of the Poko River, then link up with Route 14 in the direction of Kontum City.

The roads were bait which the enemy could not pass up. They were roads which emerged 20 to 25 kilometers north of Kontum City as the crow flies. That made them even more attractive, for everyone knew that trucks, artillery, and even tanks could use those roads. Tanks and artillery north of Kontum City? There was not an enemy soldier in the city who was not terrified! The appearance of roads at that place and at that time was a very well executed bit of deception. There was no doubt about it, the enemy would attack Kontum, not Tan Canh!

The first feint was successful: the enemy concentrated on defending Kontum. The second feint was also successful: the enemy sent the 2nd Airborne Brigade to stop our troops' attack northwest of Kontum City. Why did the enemy have to send airborne troops to set up a blocking position and upset our offensive preparations in that area?

The enemy thought that we had large, strong forces there, which was in our liberated area, only such strong forces as the airborne troops could handle them. They thought that if they used the 2nd Ranger Group of Military Region II

it might not be strong enough, and in Kontum City the airborne troops were then the largest forces.

The enemy's use of reserve forces in such a manner was not very wise. Their adversary had only struck the first blow, one that was of an exploratory nature and was perhaps not the decisive blow, so they played their triumph card a little early!

Furthermore, there was another reason why the enemy were forced to use airborne troops: in that area it was only possible to use helicopters and helicopter gunships to provide mobility and direct firepower, for there were no motor roads and the mountain defense line was at an elevation of 1,000 meters.

The enemy usually gave the airborne troops priority in using helicopters, for they were more expert in the use of helicopters and helicopter gunships. Helicopters are a facility with many advantages. They are one of the best combat facilities for resolving the contradictions between mobility and terrain and between mobility and firepower. Of course, they do not fully combine the elements of combat -- firepower, mobility, and assault force -- as well as tanks. But with regard to mobility they are superior to tanks and with regard to firepower they are equal to tanks, for they can carry anti-tank missiles.

Those were the reasons why the enemy had to send airborne troops to the line formed by highpoints 1049, 1015, etc. But why did they act so hastily?

The first reason was that we attacked a place they had to hold. We built roads in other places, roads which we actually used, but the enemy units in Military Region II did not try to stop us, or if they tried to do so they were very tentative.

Second, the enemy were still relatively subjective. While on the defensive, with the tactical principles of counterattacking and intercepting the enemy while they were still far away, the enemy were still capable of coming out to intercept our troops' attacks on their main defensive perimeter. In 1972, although the U.S. Air Force was still providing support, even with B52's, the puppet troops were no longer capable of striking deep into our liberated area, and were no longer capable of intercepting and counterattacking us far beyond their main defensive perimeter.

The commander is also a factor that should be taken into consideration. As we all know, General Ngo Du, commander of Military Region II, was a relatively inexperienced and timid commander. During the 1970-1971 operations, in which they penetrated deeply into our liberated area, when a few companies were wiped out several enemy battalions stopped or retreated an echelon. If a few battalions were annihilated an operation could conclude in defeat. In 1972, General Ngo Du was reluctant to send troops long distances despite the urging of John Paul Vann, the U.S. adviser to Military Region II.

Therefore, we could not lure the enemy a long distance but had to lure them to a point near their main defense line, to a strategic area.

We were successful in carrying out our first stratagem: interdicting the road and cutting off the enemy troops in Pleiku from those in Kontum. The 23rd Division and the enemy armored regiments could not clear Route 14 between Pleiku and Kontum.

Our second stratagem was more difficult but was also successful: surrounding the city of Kontum and luring the airborne troops -- strategic mobile troops who served as the enemy's campaign reserve forces -- from Kontum City so that they could be annihilated, worn down, and pinned down. The airborne troops fell into our trap, were annihilated and worn down, and had to withdraw to defend Kontum City. After the enemy's outer defensive perimeter was shattered the 320th Division sent a regiment across the Poko River to Route 14 to coordinate with the 28th Regiment in cutting Route 14 and completely isolating the enemy troop concentrations in Kontum City and the town of Tan Canh.

The success of those two stratagems created extremely favorable conditions for us to carry out the third stratagem: attacking Tan Canh and Dac To.

The opportunity to attack Tan Canh-Dac To had arisen. While the attacks on Route 19, in Pleiku City, along Route 14, and in the area northwest of Kontum City were taking place, our troops in the Tan Canh-Dac To area were actively preparing.

While fierce battles were taking place in the other places, in the principal area secret preparations were going well. A small part of our 2nd Division carried out actions so that the main part of the division could prepare, while also helping the 66th Regiment prepare. The 66th Regiment did a relatively good job of making secret preparations to attack base 42, the main objective of the Tan Canh units. Base 42 included the 42nd Regiment of the 22nd Division, the forward command post of the 22nd Division, and a fire support base, with an armored regiment defending its outer perimeter. Although we were able to deceive the enemy, as stated above, they were not entirely drawn into the area of Kontum City. Ngo Du and John Paul Vann were still alert to a certain degree and still kept an eye on Tan Canh-Dac To. At the urging of John Paul Vann, Ngo Du had to send the 9th Airborne Battalion from Kontum to Tan Canh, and sent Col Le Due Dat, commander of the 22nd Division, to assume direct command at the forward headquarters. He also sent Col Ton That Hung, a representative of the military region command, to oversee the fighting. Thus the enemy got a whiff of something at Tan Canh-Dac To. That was understandable. But if we did not use radios and throughout the period of our preparations in the Tan Canh-Dac To area we worked only at night, perhaps the enemy would have a hard time finding out anything about us.

After dispersing, wearing down, and pinning down the enemy in Pleiku and on routes 19 and 14, and pinning down the enemy in Kontum, we launched our attacks to take the Tan Canh base and the Dac To district seat. The attacks began on 24 April 1972. We took advantage of the element of surprise and attacked places in which the enemy had taken no or few precautions but which were vital to them. If we attacked those places the enemy might fall apart immediately. Those attacks were against the forward headquarters of the 22nd Division and the fire support base in Base 42.



In order to carry out those attacks we had to avoid the enemy's strong defenses west of Route 14 and the Poko River. The staging area of our attacks had to be east of Route 14, i.e. behind the enemy's defense line. Sending a division to the eastern side of Route 14 was difficult, but not too difficult, for we had forces and a political infrastructure in the area. The difficult thing was sending tanks, artillery, and self-propelled antiaircraft artillery to the staging area.

There was no other way than to build a road, for those were tanks and artillery pieces, not helicopter gunships.

The second difficulty was maintaining secrecy. It is very difficult to build a road in secrecy. The building of the road could not be kept completely secret, but it was necessary to maintain complete secrecy with regard to the movements of our troops on that road.

Thanks to the modern U.S. reconnaissance facilities and equipment, and to the intuition of Le Duc Dat, who was in direct command of the Tan Canh-Dac To defensive complex, the enemy were able to spot our road, which appeared and disappeared on the hillsides and in the valley northwest of Tan Canh. Le Duc Dat sent Regional Force battalions and the battalions of the 47th Regiment to investigate. Our combat engineers and infantry who were building the road engaged in minor clashes with the enemy.

Although Le Duc Dat paid special attention to that road because it was of immediate concern to him, Ngo Du paid little attention to it, for he devoted all of his attention to Kontum City. Therefore, by using skilled camouflage, the 2nd Division, the 66th Regiment, and our tank, artillery, self-propelled antiaircraft artillery, combat engineer, transportation, and medical units calmly crossed over to the eastern side of Route 14, east and north of the Tan Canh base.

Our deployments for the attack on the enemy's defenses north of Kontum (Tan Canh-Dac To) had been completed.

In the other areas we continued our activities to coordinate with and support the main attacks.

The time had come.

At 0510 on 24 April 1972 our infantry and tanks, supported by artillery and antiaircraft guns, launched a strong attack against the enemy positions. In addition to being used against tanks, our anti-tank missiles were used to destroy the command bunker of the 22nd Division and a number of important enemy blockhouses and bunkers.

The appearance of our guided anti-tank missiles created panic among the enemy officers and enlisted men. Ton That Hung and Le Duc Dat, realizing that their position was untenable, requested permission from Ngo Du to withdraw. Ngo Du, who had his hands full at Kontum and Pleiku, reluctantly agreed. Unfortunately, John Paul Vann disagreed. He still adhered to the doctrine of "using Vietnamese blood to protect American flesh!" As a result, the units defending the area

north of Kontum had to accept the unfortunate fate of people who served as lackeys of the imperialists.

Thanks to the close coordination of the various kinds of troops and among the combat arms, and with the brave, resolute fighting spirit and good combat skill of our cadres and men, within a period of little more than 10 hours our troops took the Tan Canh base. A few hours later the local troops of Kontum Province also took the Dac To district seat. Col Ton That Hung, the representative of Military Region II, demanded that Tan Canh and Dac To be defended "to the death," then hastily boarded the helicopter of the U.S. adviser and went directly back to Pleiku. Col Le Duc Dat, commander of the 22nd Division, his entire staff, and thousands of enemy troops, were captured. Most of the remaining officers and enlisted men, who fled toward Kontum, were captured along the way after being encircled by the 41st Regiment, a sapper battalion, the 28th Regiment, and units of the 320th Division, and by our local troops and militia, who were predeployed in that area.

At the military region level, Ngo Du was dismissed and was replaced by Nguyen Van Toan. The chief adviser, John Paul Vann, was burned to death when his helicopter was shot down by our troops.

For the first time in the Central Highlands theater, our troops had attacked a division-sized military base on the enemy's main line of defense. They annihilated a division in strong defensive positions, but that defensive position was simple and not deep and complicated. Our troops killed the division commander, captured the deputy division commander and the division staff, and liberated half of the province. How were we able to take Tan Canh-Dac To quickly and kill or capture all of the enemy troops? The principal reasons were as follows:

We cut Route 14 between Kontum City and the town of Tan Canh. The enemy could not send reinforcements and relief troops by road to Tan Canh. Reinforcements also could not be sent by helicopter because our troops had tightened the noose. Furthermore, Ngo Du had no more reserve troops, for the airborne troops had been drawn out and attacked, and after being defeated had to withdraw to join the Rangers in defending Kontum City.

Nguyen Van Thieu also had no more general reserve troops. Two divisions of the general reserves had already been deployed: the airborne division had been sent to the Central Highlands and the Marine Division had been sent to Hue.

Therefore, Tan Canh had been completely surrounded and isolated. When it was attacked, no one came to save it. In the end, it was completely annihilated. That was the clever part of the plan to attack Tan Canh.

After liberating Tan Canh-Dac To we concentrated most of our forces in an attack on Kontum City. Our troops took a number of enemy positions in the city. But because of deficiencies in our command the attack on the city was not successful.

There were many objective and subjective reasons for those deficiencies. But the principal reasons were the subjective shortcomings of the commander and the



campaign command.

Only then did the U.S. and Thieu recover from their strategic surprise. Only then did they realize that the principal strategic attack was in Quang Tri and that a key, very hot attack was taking place in the Loc Ninh-An Loc area, the doorway to Saigon. In Quang Ninh the enemy had been smashed to smithereens and the MacNamara line had been smashed. At Loc Ninh-An Loc the enemy defense line was penetrated and they suffered a heavy defeat.

In view of the perilous situations in those areas, Thieu had to send most of the airborne division from Kontum to reinforce those two areas. The airborne division was replaced by the 23rd Division of the enemy's Military Region II in the defense of Kontum City.

The enemy forces in Kontum City were not as strong as in the past, but had been dispersed to the other key theaters. We could not take Kontum City because the ability of the commander and the campaign staff to organize and command campaigns was still insufficient.

As for the enemy, they still had a number of strongpoints which we could not yet neutralize. One was their ability to transport reinforcements and supplies by helicopter. The enemy could use only helicopters but we were unable to penetrate and interdict the enemy's in-depth defenses in the city.

On 5 June 1972 the 1972 spring-summer campaign on the Kontum front concluded. Although the campaign did not win complete victory, we learned many lessons from our successes as well as from our failures. One of those lessons was a lesson regarding stratagems: they are quite interesting but are seldom studied in depth. In this article the author has endeavored to enter deeply into that aspect so that we can study it together.

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## MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

### ROLE OF ARTILLERY IN COMBINED ARMS COMBAT DISCUSSED

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[Article by Senior Colonel Nguyen Trung Kien: "The Effectiveness of Artillery in Combined Arms Combat"]

[Text]Our people's armed forces, especially the main-force units, are being equipped with increasingly larger numbers of modern weapons and technical equipment, such as automatic weapons, infantry combat vehicles, tanks, the various kinds of missiles, combat aircraft, warships, command, communications, and mobility facilities, and other material-technical support installations. The combat arms of the ground forces, and the air force, air defense, and naval branches, are developing more and more fully and have an increasingly higher professional level. Many units and combined groups have been formed on an increasingly larger scale. That inevitably leads to the widespread use of modern forms of combat and combined combat arms and armed forces branches combat in war to defend the homeland.

Modern combat -- combat by combined combat arms and armed forces branches -- is manifested in a concentrated manner in the mode of waging people's war. That type of combat can take place at the very beginning of the war, and on the front line of the homeland, in many different forms, including forms of combat that are new in comparison to those that were emphasized during several decades of liberation war and war to defend the nation. Therefore, there have arisen a whole series of new problems in using and commanding management to develop to the greatest possible extent the effectiveness of artillery in the combined strength of the combat arms, the armed forces branches, and the various kinds of troops.

Many military men in our country and abroad believe that increasing modern firepower facilities does not reduce the position and role of artillery; missiles and artillery do not cancel out each other in modern combat. Along with researching and producing the various kinds of missiles, much attention is paid to continually improving artillery in many regards: range, rate of fire, accuracy, lethality of warheads, mobility, the modernity of the command system, etc., in order to meet the requirements of modern combat. Many countries have formed "artillery-missile" combat arms. That further illustrates the correctness of our viewpoint: "Artillery is the main firepower of the ground forces."

As stated above, in war to defend the homeland modern combat -- combined arms combat -- is the principal, universal form of combat of the main-force units and of our army. Therefore, that type of combat is the principal, universal form of combat activity of the artillery troops. The artillery troops are not capable of organizing and carrying out independent campaigns. Sometimes an artillery unit or artillery cluster has the mission of attacking independently, such as by shelling airfields and supply depots, shelling command posts, sinking ships, etc., but the concept of "independent" in this case has a relative meaning, for those battles must also strictly obey the coordinated stipulations regarding objectives, times, and results that must be attained, as determined by a common plan or the campaign objectives.

The history of people's war led by our Party, as well as the history of Vietnamese artillery, have recorded that the artillery branch was the first combat arm to participate in combined arms combat with the infantry. Each developmental step of our army, from guerrilla warfare to regular, modern warfare, has been a milestone in its maturation, with regard to the level of coordination between the artillery troops and the combat arms and armed forces branches.

In the anti-French resistance war, the Border Campaign (1950) signified the appearance of the first artillery regiment -- the 675th Mountain Artillery Regiment -- which coordinated in combat with infantry divisions and regiments. The Hoa Binh Campaign (1952) proved the ability of the artillery troops to fight continuously over a long period of time (78 days and nights) and to command concentrated firepower at the regimental level when coordinating in combat with the infantry. The appearance of Vietnamese mechanized artillery and the combined use of the various types of artillery in battles and campaigns were signified by the victory at Dien Bien Phu.

In the anti-U.S. resistance war, the Khe Sanh Campaign (1968) was the first campaign in which we used long-range artillery to support infantry and tanks attacking the enemy. The continuous growth of the artillery with regard to organization and ability to participate in combined arms combat was also demonstrated in the Route 9-Southern Laos (1971) and Tri-Thien (1972) campaigns. The high point of that development occurred during the General Offensive of 1975, especially in the historic Ho Chi Minh Campaign.

The rich experiences of artillery during the past several decades, along with the all-round growth of that combat arm, are solid premises for further increasing the effectiveness of artillery in coordinated combat with the combat arms and armed forces branches in order to meet the new requirements of people's war to defend the socialist Vietnamese homeland. If that is to be accomplished, it is necessary to do a good job of resolving the following problems:

1. Correctly understand the combat role of artillery: supporting the combat arms and armed forces branches, especially the infantry and tanks, in fulfilling their missions.

In combined arms combat with combat arms and armed forces branches, artillery firepower can attain the highest effectiveness in annihilating the enemy only when it coordinates closely with the combat activities of the infantry, tanks,

airborne troops, sappers, marines, etc., and with the firepower of the air force, the navy, and the other kinds of firepower, in order to contribute to the formation of the greatest combined combat strength with which to fulfill the common missions of a battle or campaign. That is also a basic condition for bringing into play the fighting strength and ability to fulfill missions of artillery in combined arms combat. Because of its role of providing the main firepower for the ground forces, providing supporting firepower for the actions of infantry and tanks is a basic mission and is also the yardstick for measuring the actual effectiveness in that type of combat. As everyone knows, the infantry and tanks are the principal combined arms of the ground forces and play a decisive role in fulfilling the battle and campaign missions on the ground. Only by providing effective support so that the infantry and tanks can fulfill their missions in combined arms combat can the artillery play its role of being the main source of firepower for the infantry. That is one of our army's basic viewpoints regarding combined arms combat which the artillery troops must grasp and apply in actual combat acts. Therefore, artillery should not evaluate the effectiveness of artillery by merely calculating the enemy manpower and facilities killed or destroyed by our artillery, but must take into consideration the effect of the artillery shelling in creating conditions for infantry and tanks to fulfill their missions.

In the recent liberation and national defense wars, the artillery coordinated closely with and provided support for the infantry and tanks in many battles and even on a campaign level, and accumulated definite experience. But it would be incorrect to limit ourselves to that experience and make it the sole basis on which to study and resolve problems regarding combined arms combat methods of artillery in war to defend the homeland.

In war to defend the homeland there have been changes and developments regarding goals and characteristics as well as the war-waging forces and facilities and the objects of combat. Our armed forces, especially the main-force units, have undergone clear changes with regard to quantity, quality, organizational ability, weapons, technical equipment, military science and technology, etc. The activities of troops on the battlefield, especially those of infantry and tanks, will take place under extremely difficult, fierce, complicated, and continually changing conditions, in all kinds of terrain and over a large area. Therefore, we cannot but require the artillery troops to further improve their ability to organize and command firepower in coordinated combat by combat arms and armed forces branches.

It is possible to mention a number of missions of artillery in providing firepower support for infantry and tanks in two basic combat forms: offense and defense.

With regard to defense, the artillery must organize a complete system of firepower and provide effective support for the infantry and tanks, in order to smash the attacks by enemy forces which are numerically superior with regard to troops and war facilities. Firepower must stop the enemy at long range and coordinate with the forces on the front line to wear down the enemy troops, slow down their movements, and force them to make their move early. The artillery branch must be prepared to provide firepower when so ordered by the upper echelon. Firepower must stop, annihilate, and wear down the enemy before they



reach our lines and our defensive zones and strongpoints. Firepower must ensure that the infantry and tanks counterattack, wipe out the enemy troops who have broken through, and retake lost positions. Especially, firepower must be concentrated to destroy enemy tanks by all possible means (anti-tank artillery, anti-tank missiles, and even tanks and helicopters). Firepower must neutralize and wipe out the enemy missile, artillery, and mortar positions. Firepower must support the offensive actions (surprise attacks, ambushes of enemy troops on the move or concentrating forces, and attacking their command headquarters, fire support bases, and rear areas) by the units during the defensive phase. Firepower must also support the adjacent strongpoints and the flanks of the units. It is necessary to concentrate sufficiently strong firepower to support the infantry and tanks fighting the enemy in the main area of their attack. At the same time, attention must be paid to supporting the forces annihilating and smashing the enemy deep-penetration columns directed against the flanks of our infantry and tanks. In the defensive phase, artillery firepower must support the infantry, tanks, and other combat arms and armed forces branches so that they can attain their defensive goals of pinning down the enemy, defending the territory assigned them, stopping, surrounding, and dividing the enemy, annihilating the attacking forces and smashing their attack, and creating conditions for shifting over to the counteroffensive and attacking and completely annihilating the enemy troops.

When on the offensive, the artillery troops must correctly determine the action phases and have firepower plans appropriate to each phase. They must do a good job of using strong firepower to kill or wound large numbers of enemy troops, especially when shelling in preparation for an attack (or participating in pre-attack preparatory firepower). It is necessary to create and maintain firepower in the main line of advance and throughout the offensive phase. The highest requirement is providing prompt, continuous, effective firepower support for our infantry and tanks, so that they can attack with strong force and at a high rate of speed in order to rapidly annihilate the enemy troops segment by segment and take the important areas in their in-depth defense. Artillery firepower must also support infantry and tanks carrying out deep penetrations and surrounding and dividing the enemy troops. The artillery troops must be prepared to, along with the infantry and tanks, smash the enemy counterattacks and provide support so that those forces can temporarily change over to the defensive in a certain area.

It is necessary to realize that the process in which the artillery troops support the infantry and tanks on the offensive or on the defensive is a very complicated process of organizing and using firepower. The two forms of combat -- offense and defense -- in war to defend the homeland have also undergone new developments. With regard to our army in general, and to the artillery troops specifically, defensive combat, especially modern defense, is a type of combat with regard to which we do not yet have much experience. Therefore, the artillery troops must study and resolve problems regarding the organization and use of firepower, including artillery firing techniques, so that they can effectively support infantry and tanks on the defensive. A number of new problems, such as providing firepower support for forces fighting at the front, organizing and participating in preparatory firepower, organizing a system of anti-tank firepower, and providing supporting firepower for the forces fighting within the enemy's formations, in positions interspersed with those of the

enemy, must be studied and resolved. When on the offensive, the artillery troops must also know how to find the best way to organize and use firepower, in a manner appropriate to our artillery, shells, and facilities, so that they can provide continuous support for infantry and tanks attacking at a high rate of speed, attack the enemy while advancing, and provide mobile firepower and artillery in the mountainous terrain.

The combat missions of our army in people's war to defend the homeland also require the artillery troops to coordinate closely with the sappers, the airborne troops, and the marines, and with airplanes, ships, and even militia and self-defense forces, in order to bring the strength of its firepower into play by providing effective support so that those forces can fight enemy troops landing by sea or air, attack the enemy's rear areas, etc.

Those developments have posed for the artillery troops the requirements of further strengthening their active spirit, coordinating with the combat arms and the armed forces branches, applying the artillery combat principles correctly, creatively, and flexibly, and perfecting their tactics and gunnery techniques.

2. Correctly subdivide the artillery troops, fully bring into play the firepower of the existing artillery organization, and create the necessary firepower intensity in combined arms battles and campaigns.

In modern warfare, the artillery troops usually are more responsible for fulfilling many fire support missions for the combat arms and armed forces branches fighting in a large area with certain limitations with regard to the number of artillery pieces, shells, and technical facilities. Therefore, there must be a very scientific, rational subdivision of artillery in order to provide effective support for the combat arms and armed forces branches, so that they can fulfill their combined arms combat missions.

First of all, the subdivision must ensure that the artillery branch fulfills the principal firepower missions assigned to the artillery units in battles and campaigns. That subdivision of artillery is intended to concentrate artillery both quantitatively and qualitatively, in order to create the necessary firepower to successfully fulfill the most important firepower missions and effectively support the combined units responsible for the principal missions in the key areas of the battle or campaign. That subdivision is also intended to create superior, intense firepower to victoriously overcome the fierce, complicated circumstances in the important areas during the course of the fighting. That subdivision of artillery is also intended to provide direct fire support for the infantry and tank units and to enable the commanders of the combined arms operations at all levels to have firepower available to, when necessary, concentrate artillery firepower in order to fulfill missions relevant to the common situation.

The subdivision of artillery must also be appropriate to the missions, functions, capabilities, and strong points of the artillery organizations and the various kinds of artillery: artillery of the main-force units, artillery of the local troops, reserve artillery of the High Command, artillery in the TO&E, attached artillery, on-the-spot artillery, mobile artillery, portable artillery, towed artillery, rifled artillery, mortars, anti-tank artillery,



rocket artillery, etc. For example, in campaigns corps artillery usually assigned the mission of increasing the firepower of the divisions. The division artillery has the principal mission of providing direct firepower for the tanks and infantry in the division formation. The on-the-spot artillery has the capability of providing timely support for the forces stopping and defeating the enemy offensive columns from the very beginning. The mobile artillery has great power and long range, and is capable of creating strong, concentrated firepower which, combined with the on-the-spot artillery firepower, can create even more overwhelming firepower to facilitate the actions of the combat arms in campaigns. Indirect artillery fire from concealed positions is usually secret and safe, and it is difficult for the enemy to detect it. But directly aimed artillery is more accurate, wastes less ammunition, is more effective, and is a precious tradition of our artillery troops. Multi-barreled rocket artillery used in a concentrated manner can be very effective when attacking large enemy infantry concentrations in a very brief period of time. Even portable artillery -- which many command cadres still regard lightly -- such as mortars and recoilless rifles -- has the advantage of "accompanying the troops and firing quickly," as needed by the troops, more than any other type of artillery.

Front-line local artillery is capable of promptly discovering and stopping the enemy, interdicting the important roads, striking deeply behind enemy lines, etc. Subdividing artillery in accordance with the above-mentioned points is a basic measure for bringing into play the full strength of the firepower of the artillery organizations and the various kinds of artillery on hand.

The subdivision of artillery in coordinated combat arms and armed forces branches is also intended to ensure that the artillery troops are capable of providing continuous firepower support for the combat arms, of providing intense firepower without making major redeployments or carrying out complicated artillery movements. That is a very important matter when coordinated combat takes place in terrain in which it is difficult to move large forces or carry out reconnaissance, such as jungle-and-mountains terrain, areas with many rivers and streams, etc. Therefore, when subdividing artillery units and artillery pieces among the combined units, or when organizing artillery clusters at the various echelons or deploying the combat formation of the artillery troops (observation posts, primary firing positions, reserve firing positions, temporary firing positions, rear services and technical areas, road networks, etc.) it is necessary to study many factors so that they can be properly determined. Specifically, it is necessary to carefully study the number of artillery pieces and amount of ammunition on hand; the missions and areas of operation of the units which the artillery must support; the basic circumstances and developments of the battles and campaigns; the nature of the terrain, etc. On that basis, the commanders of combined units and the artillery commanders must decide on an appropriate plan for subdividing artillery, one which does not necessitate excessive movements of the artillery units or the movement of many artillery fire support bases over long distances, which does not have an upsetting effect on the command of firepower and the deployment of the artillery combat formations, etc.

In recent years the artillery troops have undergone many changes, not only quantitatively but also qualitatively and with regard to the organizational structure, equipment, and operational mode. There have been changes in

everything from the reserve artillery of the High Command to the TO&E artillery of the corps, divisions, etc., and the artillery of the infantry battalions. The organic artillery and prime movers of a division are much greater than those of our entire army during the Dien Bien Phu campaign. With regard to the effectiveness of ammunition, range, variety, and size, the artillery in a division TO&E is today far superior. That has created the capability for the commanders of combined unit commanders and artillery commanders to more easily subdivide artillery and create the necessary intensity in combined arms combat. But the existence of many artillery pieces and much ammunition does not automatically mean that there is a good artillery system. A good artillery firepower system can be created only by many factors, an important one of which is the scientific, rational subdivision of artillery and the use of artillery creatively and in correct accordance with principles. Under the conditions of artillery, ammunition, or facilities still being limited, and it being necessary to fight an enemy with many troops and weapons, it is even more necessary to select the most rational subdivision of artillery. We must oppose methods of subdivision which are arbitrary, lack calculation and weighing, spread facilities evenly, are too general in nature, etc. The subdivision of artillery must be positive and creative, so that all artillery, from campaign artillery to the artillery of the infantry battalions, can be well used, and in order to fully bring into play their existing strength, combine the lethality and destructive force of the various kinds of artillery to form a solid system of artillery firepower with the necessary intensity, in order to provide the most effective support for the combat arms in combined arms battles and campaigns.

3. Organize and command continuous, unexpected, resolute, and accurate artillery firepower.

The effectiveness of artillery in combined arms combat depends to a very great degree on the command ability of the commanders of combined arms units, the artillery commanders, and their staff organs. Actuality has shown that when the commanders of combined combat arms units have solid understanding of artillery they use it boldly and rationally, while at the same time creating conditions for the artillery units to fulfill the missions assigned them. The organization of firepower command may be regarded as successful when the firepower missions that are assigned are fulfilled accurately and promptly. The basis of artillery command in battles and campaigns at each echelon is decisions regarding the use of artillery by the commanders of combined units and the instructions regarding the use of artillery by upper-echelon artillery commanders. If the decisions regarding the use of artillery are incorrect, one cannot speak of the effectiveness of artillery firepower. Therefore the artillery commanders and staff organs must go all-out to help the combined arms commanders make correct, rational decisions regarding the use of artillery. Such decisions can be made only on the basis of scientifically studying and analyzing such factors as the missions of battles and campaigns, the missions of company-grade and field-grade units, the number of artillery units we have, the forces and actions, the upper-echelon directives regarding the use of artillery, terrain, etc.

Coordinated combat by combat arms and armed forces branches, in which many forces participate and which take place over a large area, require that artillery firepower be highly concentrated and provide timely support for combat

activities in many areas. Therefore, the commanders and staff organs must appropriately apply the command methods of "centralization" and "decentralization." The matter of organic artillery increasing the supporting firepower of the combined units in the overall formation as well as for the units operating individually, in mountainous terrain the "decentralization of command" method is often used. When using the concentrated firepower of many artillery clusters to create the necessary firepower in the various phases; in the important combat missions of battles and campaigns such as preparatory artillery fire when on the offensive and counter-preparatory fire when on the defensive; when sending second echelon units or reserve units into combat; or when concentrating facilities to oppose tanks, it is necessary to observe "centralized command." But the utilization of those command methods cannot be imitative, mechanical, or piecemeal. It is necessary to combine centralized command of firepower and decentralized command and know how to change the command relationship so that it can be appropriate to the actual situation of the battle or campaign. In the event that a number of artillery units attached to field-grade units are being used in a decentralized manner, it is possible to shift over to the centralized command relationship, and when necessary an artillery element under centralized command can be changed over to decentralized command and attached to the field-grade units.

It must be remembered that centralized artillery command is meaningful only when it is centralized at the right time and at the right place and is tied in with the centralization of forces and reconnaissance facilities.

In the offensive campaigns of the Great Patriotic War, in order to effectively concentrate artillery the Soviet Red Army concentrated in the assault columns many artillery reconnaissance battalions of the reserve forces of the Supreme Command, aerial reconnaissance, photography, and target-finding detachments, and observation balloons. It concentrated reconnaissance cadres who were capable of analyzing and piecing together the information that had been gathered. Therefore, it discovered 60 to 65 percent of the enemy targets and ensured highly effective, concentrated, and accurate artillery fire.

In combined arms battles the efforts of the artillery firepower command organizations are also manifestations in continuous, unexpected, resolute, and accurate firepower support for the activities of the combat arms. Continuous firepower support can be attained only on the basis of organizing, maintaining, and rapidly restoring coordination between the artillery and the combat arms and other forces, especially the infantry and tanks, in all phases of the battles and campaigns, especially at the decisive locations, at the decisive times, and under fierce circumstances. At the same time, the artillery commanders and staff organs must carry out the decisions of the commanders of combined units by making all-round, accurate calculations. They must draft firepower plans and plans to deploy and subdivide artillery. They must calculate the amount of firepower needed for the immediate missions, the succeeding missions, and the ad hoc firepower missions -- those outside the plan. They must calculate the mobility requirements and the amount of ammunition to be consumed. They must calculate the capabilities -- and decide on the measures -- for coping with enemy air attacks, chemical attacks, tank attacks, and even infantry attacks, on our fire support bases and observation and command bases. They must draft and organize the implementation of communications, reconnaissance, technical, rear



services, and other plans, especially plans for organizing and maintaining the command communications network and for achieving coordination between the artillery and the other combat arms. It is necessary to pay attention to the communications networks of the recently arrived artillery units and the artillery units assigned to the other corps or to the second echelon in the course of battles and campaigns. It is necessary to ensure secrecy and safety for the artillery units and elements close to the enemy, such as observation and command posts and easily revealed positions, by positively camouflaging, concealing activities, and carrying out feints to deceive the enemy. Even the artillery command methods and times during the various phases and under the different circumstances should not be imitative and mechanical, in order to enhance the secrecy and surprise of artillery firepower.

In modern combat and combined arms combat, combat activities take place at a rapid rate, so the element of time in the organization of artillery firepower command is an extremely important factor. Any tardiness when making the decision to fire can reduce the effectiveness of the shelling or render it completely ineffective. Meanwhile, in order to have timely, accurate artillery fire at the right time, the artillery command cadres, the staff organs, and their detachments must carry out many tasks and make many complicated calculations, which consumes a good deal of effort. Therefore, in addition to raising their level and improving their working methods so that they can be scientific and rational, it is necessary to use the modern facilities and equipment -- such as the various kinds of radar, supersonic reconnaissance aircraft, rangefinding equipment, aerial and surface photography, and the various kinds of specialized computers and sliderules. In addition, it is necessary to fully utilize the various kinds of simple equipment and apply the command experiences and strong points, in order to ensure that the system of artillery firepower command is increasingly perfected and fulfills the requirements of modern combat.

4. Raise the tactical and technical levels of the artillery troops in coordinated combat.

Coordinated combat requires the artillery troops to be expert tactically and well-trained technically. With regard to tactics, it is above all necessary to enable the artillery troops to firmly grasp the two modes of waging war, especially the mode of waging war by main-force units, and to closely combine those two modes in the armed struggle process of people's war to defend the socialist Vietnamese homeland. The artillery command cadres and staff organs at all echelons can thereby clearly understand the combat art and principles of combat activities of the combat arms and armed forces branches, especially the infantry and tanks, in coordinated combat and in offensive, defensive, and counteroffensive operations. On that basis, they can grasp the common tactics of combined units and the artillery troops can correctly and creatively determine the principles for using artillery and their operational principles in offensive, counteroffensive, and defensive campaigns, even in the kinds of campaigns which are now seldom encountered (opposing enemy troops landing by air, opposing enemy troops landed by air, etc.), in all types of terrain (mountains, seacoasts, islands, etc.) and under all circumstances (fighting when there is time to prepare and when there is no time to prepare, daytime fighting, etc.). Another basic content of tactics is that the artillery troops must expertly coordinate in combat with the local armed forces -- the local troops,

militia, and self-defense forces -- in the operational forms of local people's war.

The tactical ability of artillery troops is also manifested in their ability to organize reconnaissance to grasp the enemy's situation and promptly and accurately determine the targets that must be attacked: targets included in the plan, targets outside the plan, and targets requested by the infantry and tank units, especially such important targets as command posts, missile positions, artillery, mortar, nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons positions, and the principal enemy troop concentrations. It is necessary to grasp the enemy's situation both at the front and in the rear, and grasp the their situation in the main area and in all other areas in the relevant sphere of the artillery mission. That is a basic factor in ensuring the accurate, timely use of artillery firepower to meet the needs of battles and campaigns. Therefore, the reconnaissance cadres must be resourceful, bold, skilled in analyzing and synthesizing information, and expert in observation and surveying. The reconnaissance troops must truly be the "ears" and "eyes" of the artillery.

Under the conditions of our country having many mountains, especially in the border area, where the road network has not yet been developed and mobile facilities are still limited, the organization and implementation of artillery mobility in the course of coordinated combat is also a very important tactical content. According to theoretical calculations, and to the actual maneuvers of corps B-04, in an offensive campaign, at the rate of advance of tanks and mechanized artillery in a day the division artillery must be moved at least once and regimental artillery at least twice. Therefore, preparing for and carrying out the movement of large numbers of artillery pieces in the course of battles and campaigns must be studied and carried out very creatively, in a manner appropriate to the availability of gasoline and vehicles, the quality of roads, the weather, and the terrain of our country. It must be ensured that the artillery can be moved in a timely manner so that it can provide effective, intensive firepower support for the combat arms. That depends on the organizational ability of the commanders at the various levels in drafting artillery mobility plans in battles and campaigns; in preparing in advance, to a certain degree, the roads and ferry landings; organizing fire adjustment command; and coordinating the artillery troops, the combat engineers, and the local road maintenance forces, etc. The combat experience of the artillery troops in the timely movement of artillery is a basic measure supporting firepower for the forces fulfilling coordinated combat missions.

The artillery troops, a technical combat arm which is becoming increasingly modern, must be expert technically and especially must be skilled in gunnery. In order to increase the effectiveness of artillery in coordinated combat, the artillery troops must fire accurately and promptly in all complicated, difficult combat conditions. Specifically, they must fire skilfully both inside and outside the plan, fire skilfully from concealed positions, and especially fire skilfully when aiming directly. They must fire skilfully at stationary targets and moving targets, fire skilfully with full observation and with limited observation, fire skilfully with regard to all methods (mountain firing, coastal firing, etc.); and fire skilfully both when there is time to prepare and when preparations must be carried out urgently. Because of our limited artillery and ammunition, skilled firing is also manifested in attaining great

effectiveness in lethality and destruction with the least expenditure of ammunition.

In order to fire skilfully, the artillery cadres and men must also know how to expertly use the various kinds of artillery, and the computing, surveying, command, communications, mobility, and reconnaissance facilities, especially the various kinds of modern artillery and facilities. On that basis, it is necessary to do a good job of making technical preparations, such as meteorological preparations, preparing the gunnery element, limiting the inaccuracy of artillery to the minimum, and ensuring that artillery shells strike the targets. Artillery shelling in coordinated combat requires good coordination techniques. It must be coordinated not only with the infantry and tanks but also with the air force, the navy, and the other forces. The artillery troops must be expert in following rules, regulations, and code words so that they can recognize one another and in order to designate targets, order the commencement and cessation of artillery firing, ensure firing at the right time and the right place, and promptly cease fire and change targets when necessary.

The artillery troops must do a good job of maintaining and storing artillery, ammunition, equipment, vehicles, and other facilities. That is necessary if the artillery troops are to maintain a high degree of combat readiness, attain high effectiveness, and be capable of fighting strongly, continuously, and for a long period of time. Therefore, all artillery cadres and enlisted men must be conscious of maintaining weapons and equipment and truly treasure -- and do a good job of maintaining -- individual and collective equipment. The maintenance and technical inspection regulations must be observed continually and strictly. The arbitrary use of weapons and technical equipment, without observing the technical rules and regulations, and carelessness which leads to the damaging of weapons, equipment, vehicles, etc., and affects the fulfillment of the artillery troops' missions, must be resolutely ended.

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## MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

### PRINCIPLES OF BORDER DEFENSE DISCUSSED

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[Article by Major General Dinh Van Tuy: "Several Fundamentals in Border Defense Work"]

[Text] To discuss border defense work is to discuss the maintenance of security, the organizing of a struggle waged by means of the law, by means of combat activities and so forth to manage the border, to maintain and defend the border of a nation (on land, at sea, on the sea bottom and in the air). In the history of the development of mankind, together with the process of the emergence and existence of national borders, there have been many border wars and wars that have been started on the pretext of a border issue. Therefore, it is obvious that if war is a special manifestation of the class struggle and the national struggle in the form of armed conflict, the encroachment upon borders and border wars between one side that is committing aggression and carrying out expansionism and the other side that is resisting this aggression and expansionism inevitably bear the deep imprint of a class struggle and a national struggle.

In our 4,000 year history, our nation has often been forced to take up arms and fight to maintain the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation and the political security of the country. Today, as long as imperialism exists, wars of aggression will continue to be a danger, the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations and states will continue to be threatened and the borders of countries can still be sabotaged and violated. Now, especially, in view of the fact that the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists, are making every effort to sabotage us and are anxious to commit aggression against our country, defending the fatherland, defending each bit of its soil, defending the borders, the coastline, the islands, the continental shelf, the offshore waters and our air space and protecting the life and property of our compatriots have become an extremely sacred and very pressing task. The border is the gateway to a nation; maintaining security along the border means maintaining the security of the country. The more that they value their independence and freedom, the more our people respect the independence and freedom of other countries. The Vietnamese commit aggression against no one, but they will not permit anyone to violate their independence or sovereignty,

either. For this reason, in the cause of building socialism and defending the socialist Vietnamese fatherland, we must always attach the proper importance to border defense work and perform this work very well in every situation. Below, we have presented several fundamentals of border defense work.

# **1. Fully Understanding and Excellently Carrying Out the Basic, Primary and Constant Tasks Involved in Border Defense Work**

Of the various tasks that are faced in the maintenance of border defense, managing and protecting national sovereignty and maintaining border defense on land, at sea, on the sea bottom and in the air space of the fatherland are the basic, primary and constant tasks that must be performed well in both peace time and time of war. These tasks cause border defense work to be work of three different types: security, national defense and diplomatic.

In view of the present conditions underlying the class struggle and the national struggle, the border regions of every country are usually the places where illegal immigrants and emigrants, reactionaries, spies, commandoes, espionage agents, criminals, international smugglers and other violators of the law and saboteurs emerge, hide, operate or cross the border. When war breaks out, the border regions of the two sides in the war are always the first places to endure very heavy attacks or retaliatory blows by the opposition. This is an indication of the continuous, constant and permanent nature, the decisive and complex nature of border defense work. In this work, we must prevent, transform and educate; we must also organize struggle and suppression. The 24 hours of each day must be 24 hours during which the border defense machinery operates without stopping. In peace time, this machinery must be well coordinated and must operate in all border defense areas, in all of the dimensions of border defense work, that is, on land, at sea and in the air. When war break out and in the course of a war, this machinery must continue to operate, even operate more strongly and employ suitable forces, a suitable organization and suitable measures.

Our country's long land border is made even longer by the curvature and roughness of the natural terrain. It is a border along which there are many high mountains and dense forests in which the people on either sides of the border live and work amongst one another and have long lived together as neighbors and as members of the same families and tribes. The offshore waters and seacoast of our fatherland also stretch over a long distance and encompass the mouths of many large rivers and many large and small islands and archipelagoes; there are places where many religious followers live and places where there is much treacherous terrain that can be used by the enemy to infiltrate our country, evade detection and commit acts of sabotage. Due to the betrayal by the expansionists and reactionaries within Beijing ruling circles, the situation along our northern border has changed from one of friendship to one of hostility. All border defense work as well as the entire process of performing the basic, primary and constant tasks involved in border defense work there of necessity involve many different requirements than are faced on the other borders. The borders between Vietnam and Kampuchea and between Vietnam and Laos are friendly borders, but even they are still be used by reactionary elements, lackeys, foreign spies, bad persons and even the enemy to blend in with the population in order to commit acts of sabotage.

The air space of our country abuts the air space over major air force bases of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists and the U.S. imperialists, consequently, it, too, is an important area in which border defense work must be given special attention. Air fields, seaports and air and sea communications centers are also areas of operation in border defense work.

Throughout the 30 years from the founding of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to 30 April 1975, our border defense work had to be performed under the circumstances of a country that was not totally independent or reunified, a country that had to constantly fight both domestic and foreign enemies. For this reason, some of the basic jobs involved in organizing border defense were not performed as well as they could have been.

On the basis of the characteristics mentioned above, we were able to see the complex problems and the high demands involved in border defense work in the new period of development of the country.

At present, border defense work is being performed amidst circumstances in which the Beijing expansionists and hegemonists have been and are waging a multifaceted war of sabotage against our people; at the same time, they still might unleash a large-scale war of aggression against our country if they see the right opportunity. Along the borders and at the air and sea communications centers of our fatherland, they have been employing many different forms of organization and methods to sabotage us economically, militarily, ideologically, culturally, psychologically and so forth. They have intensified their espionage activities and sent spies and commandoes to infiltrate our country by land, sea and air routes to collect intelligence information, establish bases, assemble counter-revolutionary elements and sabotage us from within and without. They have used hoodlums and gangsters, taken advantage of social ills and negative phenomena in society, used religions and tribal relations and sowed division among nationalities in order to disrupt our social order and political security. They routinely engage in acts of arms provocation, sabotage and acts of encroachment and occupation in border areas.

In the present general situation, in order to perform border defense tasks well, insure compliance with border treaties and agreements on land, at sea, on the sea bottom and in the air, maintain the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the fatherland and maintain political security and social order and safety within border defense area, we must simultaneously perform numerous jobs involving many different forces and measures. Correct positions and policies must be adopted on the basis of the political line and the domestic and foreign policies of our party and state and on the basis of examining the political attitudes of the concerned countries. We must keep abreast of the enemy's situation and have a full knowledge of the terrain, the economic situation, the political situation and so forth within the various border security zones. We must mobilize and organize the masses in border areas to build installations, build villages, build district military fortresses and build the people's security defense line. The border security regulations promulgated by the state must be implemented well and positive steps must be taken to prevent spies, commandoes, reactionary elements and criminals from hiding among the people and committing acts of sabotage.



As regards keeping abreast of the enemy situation, together with the routine surveillance system, each border defense zone must, during each specific period of time, very accurately determine what the targets and objectives of the enemy are; the directions that enemy personnel and criminals might take to enter our country to commit sabotage or leave our country; the key areas and prominent objectives that must be tightly managed and against which our forces must be concentrated; and the new schemes, methods and tactics of each type objective.

As regards the people's security defense line, if we build it well, border defense work will have a dependable and widespread base upon which to spread its net at all times and places along the various borders in order to help accurately and promptly detect, capture or kill any type of enemy, regardless of whether they are leaving or entering the country, regardless of whether they are infiltrating the country by land, sea or air, regardless of whether they are alone or in groups, armed or unarmed.

The specialized border defense forces who are highly skilled in border defense work, have a network that has been organized in a tight, scientific, well coordinated and effective manner, are experienced and know each area of operation and type of enemy well are the key, primarily forces in the task of managing and maintaining the security of the fatherland's borders on land and at sea. These forces must rely upon the people's security defense line and must operate with extreme effectiveness in order to promptly thwart the schemes and acts of the enemy, of saboteurs and criminals at all times, be they overt or covert.

However, the tasks described above can only be successfully performed when the units and forces, which include main force troops and the local army, the standing army and the self-defense militia, border defense troops and public security forces, join with the other sectors and forces as well as the people on each border and within each zone closely coordinate with one another within a unified entity under the exclusive leadership and guidance of the local party committees and governments in the various border defense zones. For this reason, in the process of performing the basic, primary and constant tasks involved in border defense work, it is necessary to clearly recognize and establish the correct relationship between the buildup of forces and the organizing of border defenses, between our widespread forces and our key, specialized forces, between the locality and the central level, between inner defense lines and perimeter defense lines, between the methods of fighting employed against clandestine activities and those employed against overt, armed activities and so forth.

In conjunction with waging a multifaceted war of sabotage against our people, the Beijing expansionists and hegemonists, in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists, continue to constantly make preparations for a large-scale war of aggression against our country. We must make every effort to build a national defense system that is strong and solid; our army and people must constantly be vigilant and prepared in every respect in order to win victory over the aggressors in any situation.

## 2. Clearly Understanding and Establishing a Good Relationship Between Security and National Defense Within Border Defense Work

This relationship is most clearly seen in the fact that the firm maintenance of security is a guarantee that the national defense system can be constantly strengthened; and, a country that has a strong national defense system is also a country that maintains political security and social order and safety. The challenges to the defense system of a country generally come from the acts of espionage, harassment, sabotage and subversion of roving spies, spies that stay in one area, commandoes, intelligence agents, reactionary elements, armed reactionary groups emerging within the country or infiltrating the country from the outside and even decadent, negative and criminal elements within society. For this reason, the management of the border must always be closely linked to the management of the economy and society. Maintaining political security and maintaining social order and safety are jobs that must be routinely performed in peace time and in time of war. They are also basic, long-range tasks in the process of building socialism and strengthening the national defense system in order to defend the socialist fatherland in every situation. The greatest danger and challenge to the national defense system of a country continues to be a war of aggression. However, fighting a war of aggression, fighting to win victory over foreign aggressors, is only something temporary, even if this fight lasts for 5 or 10 years.

Maintaining political security and social order and safety in border areas and in the offshore waters of the fatherland means maintaining security at the very doorstep to a nation, at the places where there are daily contacts with fraternal neighboring countries (through friendly borders) or hostile neighboring countries (through hostile borders).

As regards the countries that are our neighbors, we have always respected and correctly implemented the treaties, accords and agreements together with the statutes governing borders, border areas and offshore waters that have been signed between the two states and, on this basis, avoid causing problems or difficulties to friendly countries in our organizing of border defense work. In certain cases, we have been and are prepared to coordinate and coordinate closely with the army and people together with the border defense forces of the two fraternal countries of Laos and Kampuchea in order to fully assess the enemy situation, find pockets of reactionaries and help one another annihilate and crush rebellions and maintain security along the friendly border on land and at sea. In these border areas, we act on the basis of solidarity, friendship and cooperation and fully respect the sacred and inviolable independence and sovereignty of each nation.

In border areas that are close to a hostile neighboring country, maintaining political security and maintaining social order and safety become much more complicated as a result of the acts of sabotage and harassment of the enemy. Maintaining political security and social order and safety in these areas truly involves a sharp struggle, a struggle that occurs continuously in peace time and in time of war, a struggle that assumes different forms and varies in intensity from one period of time to another. Inserting spies and commandoes, establishing the bases and rudiments of rebellion, sending armed groups across the border to conduct acts of harassment and sabotage,



organizing operations to encroach upon and occupy our land..., these are the methods being employed by the Beijing expansionists and hegemonists to undermine political security and social order and safety along our country's northern border. They even unleashed a war of aggression against our country along this entire border in February, 1979.

One fact that can be easily understood is that a war of aggression is usually accompanied by a spy war and a psychological war; the psychological war and spy war generally precede and parallel the war of aggression in order to serve its ends. In a war of aggression, spy activities, commando operations and attempts to foment rebellion generally increase, not decrease. Fomenting rebellion, raising a lackey banner, establishing collaboration between domestic reactionaries and foreign reactionaries in order to conduct activities against the people of the country being invaded, encouraging criminals, decadent elements and negative elements to commit crimes and so forth are the traditional methods employed by invading reactionary powers. For this reason, in the course of a people's war to defend the socialist fatherland, we cannot give light attention to maintaining political security and social order and safety, rather, we must attach even more importance to this effort than in normal times, in peace time. Of course, following a war, we must still be vigilant and organized so that we can defeat the "post war plans" of the enemy.

In peace time as well as war time, the national defense system must always have the support and coordination of the defense system. National defense and security must be closely coordinated. When the country is at war, all the people and the entire army must use every material and spiritual strength that they have to win victory over the foreign aggressors and firmly defend the socialist fatherland. The forces engaged in border defense work can best support the national defense system by performing their basic, primary and constant tasks in the best manner possible. The various border defense zones and border security forces as well as the border defense troops must take the initiative in managing and protecting the national sovereignty and maintaining the border defense of the fatherland by employing forces, forms of organization and methods of fighting the enemy that are suited to war time conditions. Of course, in border defense areas, border security forces and border defense troops must actively participate in the combat operations of the combat villages, combat bases and district military fortresses in order to block and attack the enemy, annihilate the enemy and protect the locality.

One matter that arises here is that it would be incorrect, either when a war starts or in the course of a people's war to defend the fatherland, for us to give light attention to border defense work, for border defense troops to give light attention to maintaining political security and social order and safety along the border and within the border areas of the fatherland. Because, this would be no different than giving the enemy a free hand to attack us through their spy war, psychological war and multifaceted war of sabotage at the very doorstep of the fatherland and allowing them to open a hole through which to deeply penetrate our hinterland and create better conditions for a large-scale invasion. On the other hand, it would also be a mistake for border defense troops and border security forces to allow border defense work and the maintenance of political security within border defense zones to prevent them

from coordinating and cooperating with the army and people of the locality in combat operations to annihilate invading forces and protect the locality. It must be stated that when the country is at war, the task of fighting aggression assumes foremost importance; at the same time, we must give full attention to and properly manage and protect our sovereignty and maintain border security; the task of fighting aggression must be closely coordinated with the border defense task. Maintaining the security of the country and strengthening the national defense system, maintaining combat readiness and fighting to win victory over the foreign aggressor are tasks that are very closely related to one another, tasks which all border defense forces must carry out well. To do this, they must possess scientific knowledge of border defense work, have guidelines to follow in their border defense operations and profession and, at the same time, have a firm grasp of military science and military art.

### 3. Fully Understanding and Properly Applying the Various Professional and Technical Measures Employed in Border Defense Work

Due to their requirements and special characteristics, border defense activities can be considered combat activities. However, these combat activities are not the same as the activities of the various forces, branches and services in combat operations that are coordinated in individual battles or campaigns. They are, instead, combat operations that are constant and continuous in nature, that are conducted hour after hour, day after day and year after year in all border defense zones. They involve patrols and guard duty along the border and at sea, combat operations against spies and commandoes and the struggle against counter-revolutionaries; they also involve operations to crush or combat rebellions and the struggle to break cases involving acts of sabotage against political security and social order and safety along the border. Such combat operations are directed against many different types of enemies: overt types, clandestine types, domestic types, foreign types, counter-revolutionaries engaged in armed opposition to us, counter-revolutionaries attacking us through professional activities or by economic, political, ideological or organizational means and persons who, for one reason or another, are being used by the enemy or decadent elements and have been drawn into many different kinds of activity. Therefore, these combat operations are not purely military in nature nor are they purely armed operations, rather, they are three-fold in nature: political, professional and armed. Each event, each incident and each specific thing that occurs in border defense work can assume only one of these natures or all three to different degrees and can sometimes even shift from one to another. Therefore, border defense professionalism is an indispensable fundamental in border defense work.

Border defense professionalism demands thorough familiarity with the area of operation, a full knowledge of the opposition, the collection of information on and the investigation of suspects, the building of a network on the basic level and a struggle to mobilize the masses to launch a political attack against, to educate and transform or promptly expose and eliminate enemy elements conducting clandestine activities. It is necessary to research ways to ambush and annihilate commandoes and spies infiltrating our country, tightly manage the border on land, at sea and in the air, including the large

ports and air fields within the hinterland, and combat decadent elements and reactionaries attempting to flee the country by sea or across the border as well as enemy personnel infiltrating the country from the outside. Border defense professionalism also demands that the necessary battle position be built for border defense work. This battle position must be firmly based in the support of the people of the various nationalities along the border, in the offshore waters and on the islands and at major air fields and ports so that a firm political-spiritual base exists for the deployment of border defense forces and for border defense operations. This battle position must be partially overt, with forces engaged in overt activities, and partially covert, with clandestine forces. It must utilize the key-specialized forces in border defense work and closely coordinate the strength of the other forces operating in the various border defense zones in order to create a broad and deep border defense network, one which makes it possible to control the border on land and in the offshore waters of the fatherland. The battle position that is established must be used as the basis for tightly managing the various areas of operation; keeping abreast of the enemy situation and promptly and accurately detecting the enemy; taking the initiative in attacking the enemy in order to prevent enemy attacks; closely linking the prevention of enemy attacks with the struggle and struggling effectively against forces engaged in overt, armed activities as well as forces engaged in clandestine, unarmed activities; and insuring regular, continuous and effective border defense work in peace time as well as in a war to defend the fatherland by flexibly and creatively applying the various measures involved in border defense.

Also because of the objectives and the nature of border defense activities, border defense measures are divided into reconnaissance measures, armed measures, mass agitation measures, administrative management measures and technical project measures.

In countries that have a developed, modern economy and industry, rather widespread use is made of project measures such as the erection of fences and walls, erecting obstacles along border roads, building reconnaissance and observation systems using electronic equipment and so forth, in order to prevent and control access to the border.

In reconnaissance measures, it is possible to use suitable forces and means, including such modern equipment as long-range, high power telescopes, night scopes, radar detection, helicopters and so forth to search for and detect spies, commandoes, bandits and pirates within each area of operation and each border defense zone and prepare battlefields for mobile units and other forces to surround, capture and annihilate the enemy.

Armed measures can be employed in patrols, guard duty, ambushes, searches and the annihilation of espionage agents and commandoes as well as in crushing rebellions, suppressing counter-revolutionaries and, on an even higher level, combating enemy operations to encroach upon and occupy land and fighting against an enemy war of aggression.

Mass agitation measures can be used to mobilize, educate, organize and guide the compatriots on the borders, along the seacoast and on the islands so that



they heighten their vigilance; are clearly aware of the schemes and acts of sabotage of the enemy; strengthen their solidarity and oneness of mind; make every effort to work, produce and build the locality in every respect; educate and transform bad persons; abolish social ills; actively participate in the movement to maintain security and manage the border; and promptly detect and resolutely struggle against counter-revolutionaries of all types committing sabotage along the border.

The administrative management measures are measures that are based on the administrative regulations and laws promulgated by the state for the purpose of inspecting, controlling and supervising border crossings to insure that all persons, baggage and merchandise enter or leave the country in the proper manner and that the maintenance of security in border defense zones is carried out in a strict and successful manner.

The result of every process of border defense activities and of every case, incident and event in border defense work is usually the result of the combined application of the professional measures mentioned above. One measure can be considered to be of prime importance in one case, in one area of operation, during one period of time or against a certain type of enemy but it might be a measure of secondary importance in another case. Therefore, none of these measures can be given light attention. However, this is not reason to fail to distinguish among the roles and effects of each measure. Of importance is the need to select, utilize and coordinate the various professional measures on the basis of the enemy toward which these measures are being directed and their acts of resistance in each locality and at each point in time in order to achieve the highest possible results.

In keeping with the basic and long-range guidelines for the development of border defense work, we must research and apply increasingly advanced professional measures and utilize increasingly modern equipment.

By launching a political attack from a good base among the masses and through special propaganda, we have recorded significant results in many cases of border defense work. However, facts have also proven that a political attack must always involve close coordination among enlightened, mobilized masses, the professional measures of the specialized forces and the power of the government in order to achieve large returns in border defense work.

In actuality, armed measures have given an indication of the resolute and highly effective nature of border defense work in many difficult and decisive cases, especially in cases in which the enemy is engaged in insane plunder or offering stiff resistance by means of armed operations, military technology, acts of banditry or piracy, commandoe operations, rebellions or armed acts of encroachment upon our territory or acts of aggression. However, they are still only one of several measures and cannot be substituted for any of the other measures within the system of border defense professional measures. The effectiveness of armed measures increases when they are employed at the correct time and place, against the correct objective and skillfully and closely coordinated with mass agitation and special propaganda. There is still a definite distinction and line between armed measures and the combat activities of our people's armed forces in the various forms of warfare along

the defense lines of the fatherland, even though these armed measures and combat activities are so closely similar that one could evolve into the other given the right situation. It is also because of the reasons cited above that we should always apply the various border defense professional measures in a manner closely linked to utilizing the role and function of the various forces engaged in the border defense task.

#### 4. Utilizing the Role and Function of Border Defense Troops

At present, border defense troops are a component of our people's army and have the function of serving as the key-specialized force in border defense work. As a result, border defense troops must have a thorough understanding of and correctly implement the political line and the military line together with the viewpoints and principles of the party concerning the buildup of forces, training and the maintenance of combat readiness within our people's armed forces. Border defense troops, more than any other force participating in defending the border and the border areas of the fatherland, have the basic, primary and constant tasks of border defense work as their own basic, primary and constant tasks and must create for themselves the strength of shock troops in the performance of these tasks. In their everyday operations, the border defense troops are a force that must directly establish a good relationship between security and national defense and apply the various border defense professional measures in the widest and most effective manner possible. Therefore, one matter of decisive significance in mobilizing and organizing the various sectors and forces in the performance of the tasks involved in border defense work is to regularly make use of the role and function of the border defense troops.

This involves educating, mobilizing, organizing and creating the conditions for border defense troops to manage and protect the system of kilometer posts and border markings on land and at sea and implement the border defense regulations as well as the various border treaties and agreements that have been signed between our country and other countries. Border defense troops must employ various measures to struggle against counter-revolutionaries, against reactionaries at home and abroad who are collaborating with one another to undermine us or foment rebellion; track down and wipe out groups of spies, commandoes, bandits and pirates; struggle against other violators of criminal law and maintain political security and social order and safety within border areas. Border defense troops, themselves, must actively and effectively participate in the effort to build border areas that are strong and solid politically, economically, culturally, militarily and so forth, thereby laying a firm foundation for both border defense work and national defense activities; they must maintain combat readiness, must be ready in every respect, so that they can join the other forces in annihilating aggressor forces, defending the locality and defending the fatherland in every situation.

In order to increase the effectiveness of border defense work in the present stage of the revolution, the force of border defense troops must be built and regularly strengthened, must truly be worthy of being a component of the powerful, regular force, modern revolutionary people's army, a component that is politically solid and pure, tightly organized, professionally skilled,



skilled in modern border defense technology, equipped with increasingly modern weapons and equipment and possesses the fighting skills needed to coordinate in combat operations with the armed forces within the local battle deployment of a people's war to defend the fatherland. We must teach to border defense troops the spirit of sacrifice, pride and responsibility so that they feel a permanent closeness to border defense work and the people of border areas, maintain close contact with the people and always display the proper style, maintain discipline and maintain good relations between the army and the people as well as good international relations. The elementary and advanced training of the corps of border defense cadres and soldiers must delve deeply into their profession, provide them with increasing experience and constantly improve the quality of their work. We must train cadres and soldiers in the skills that they need in their work so that everyone is able to perform his task in an independent and effective manner and in exact accordance with the lines, positions and policies of the party and state along the borders and within border areas. Every agency and unit, every border defense post and mobile force must be able to organize and conduct the activities needed to complete its task with the highest possible results.

Every border defense post must be organized as a complete unit, a unit that has a leadership and command structure and all the necessary specialized components, especially reconnaissance, base operations, patrol, technical and other sections and units and must be supplied with weapons, technical materials, rear service supplies, supplies required in their spirit and cultural lives and other items needed in border defense activities. Together with possessing knowledge of border defense work and the border defense profession, the cadres and soldiers at border defense posts must also be fully familiar with what is involved in a war to defend the fatherland under modern conditions, have a firm grasp of technical and tactical requirements, be skilled in their methods of fighting and be able to effectively coordinate in combat operations within the troop formation of the combat village or street, the combat base or the district military fortress as the forward position within the frontline defense system of the country in accordance with the responsibilities assigned by the combat, campaign or strategic levels. Every effort must be made to avoid changing the area of operation and mission of a border defense post. The responsibilities and tasks that are assigned to each post and each zone along the border, along the seacoast and on the islands must extend, in terms of territory, over a reasonable distance and to a reasonable depth and must insure full protection at places where the boundaries of the areas of operations of posts, the boundaries of provinces and the boundaries of military regions come together so that the border and the seacoast can be continuously managed and protected.

Every mobile unit of the border defense troops must be suitably deployed within each area of operation and be thoroughly prepared ideologically, organizationally and in terms of its operational plans so that it can rapidly support the various posts and key locations, primarily so that it can reinforce the professional forces for the purpose of making the most effective use possible of the various professional measures within the different border defense zones. When utilizing border defense troops, we should not only concentrate them in those directions or defense zones that primarily have the task of resisting a large-scale war of aggression, rather, importance must

also be attached to reinforcing important, key fronts and areas of operation that must deal with the multifaceted war of sabotage now being waged by the enemy.

The activities of the border defense posts as well as those of the border defense mobile forces must be conducted within the overall battle position established by localities to maintain security and defend the fatherland. This demands that the border defense posts maintain close relations with and have the coordination and support of main force troops, local troops, the self-defense militia, public security forces, area police, the work units of the locality and the people along the border. Therefore, the border defense posts must adopt plans for coordinating in combat operations with other forces, especially with local troops and the public security forces. This coordination must be based on a common understanding of the basic, primary and constant tasks involved in border defense work, of the objectives of border defense activities and of the need to make full use of the role and function of each force in border defense work; in addition, it must be based on the unity, efforts and initiative of each force in order to complete the task of maintaining security within border areas and protecting the fatherland. This coordination must be established from the highest level all the way down to the basic units of each sector and each force. Without this coordination, we frequently have the necessary strength but cannot utilize it fully or sometimes get in one another's way, thereby causing confusion and inefficiency.

With this coordination, it is possible to closely coordinate border defense posts with combat villages and combat bases within the district military fortress, employ the strength of the combat villages and bases in border defense operations and formulate plans for border defense posts and combat bases and villages for maintaining border security and protecting the seacoast and islands. There are some similarities in the organization, area of operation, tasks and mode of operation of border defense troops and local troops within border areas, consequently, border defense and local troops must be very closely coordinated. However, we must still insure that each force performs its basic function and tasks in the best possible manner by means of the professional methods and measures with which it is familiar. We should not give one force the function, tasks, methods and measures of another force. The border security posts and border security units must effectively coordinate with mobile main force and local troop units arriving to take up defensive positions and maintain combat readiness within areas of operation along the border and at sea so that they can share management responsibilities with them and protect the border in a manner that complies with the regulations of the upper level and fully complies with the lines, policies, laws and regulations of the party and state on each border, along the seacoast, on the islands and so forth.

The utilization of the role and function of border defense troops has been and is demanding that we continue to build and improve the command and guidance system and that we correctly comply with the policies, guidelines, regulations, professional principles and legal procedures involved in border defense work. This work must be under the unified leadership of the party committee echelons of the provinces, municipalities, districts and wards.

Under the unified guidance and command of the headquarters of the various military regions and the provincial military commands, border defense troops must be assigned responsibilities, deployed and utilized in accordance with their function and tasks so that they can perform border defense work in a manner consistent with the requirements of the struggle against the multifaceted war of sabotage now being waged by the Beijing expansionists and in a manner that coordinates with the overall defense posture and the utilization of all forces participating in border defense work.

The border defense headquarters as well as the border defense agencies of the military regions and provinces must be stable in terms of their organization, special duties and authority, must be supplied with additional equipment and means of operation and must have their skills improved so that they are fully capable of serving as the competent staff of the party organization and commander on their level with regard to organizing border defense work as well as building and utilizing border defense forces and capable of guiding the professional struggle on the various border defense lines. The key issue here is that the border defense chiefs of the provinces and municipalities must actively establish and strengthen the command system and command procedures in every respect, all the way down to the border defense posts and mobile units, and personally guide the effort to strengthen key installations and increase the fighting strength of the border defense posts so that they can firmly manage and protect their area of operation and that portion of the border assigned to them. This command and guidance system must truly employ the role and function of border defense troops and insure that this force is able to manage its area of operation, build a strong and solid battle position, wage the struggle within its locality and make the most efficient and timely use possible of mobile units in order to achieve high efficiency in border defense work.

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## MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

### ARMY UNITS COORDINATE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND MILITARY TRAINING

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[Article by Major General Nguyen Trong Xuyen: "Military Region 3 and the Organizing of Production Within Training and Combat Readiness Units"]

[Text] Over the past several years, in keeping with the policy and directive of the ministry, some units in Military Region 3 have had the task of providing training and maintaining combat readiness while other units have been engaged in economic work. To the units that special in economic work (and receive a certain amount of training time), having their cadres and soldiers participate in productive labor is both necessary and normal. What the military region found to be difficult and new was organizing the training and combat readiness units in productive labor and doing so in a manner that yielded true returns. This could not be productive labor organized merely on the scale of a company or battalion, but had to be productive labor on the scale of regiments and divisions. It could not be productive labor of a piecemeal, haphazard fashion, rather, it had to be planned, carried out on the basis of profit and loss and coordinate production around barracks and kitchens with production on a larger scale, on cropland borrowed from the locality or cleared, restored or reclaimed from the sea through our own efforts. It had to be truly efficient productive labor performed while still meeting the number one requirements of training well, conducting good maneuvers and maintaining combat readiness well.

It was in the face of these new developments and difficulties that a number of different attitudes arose within the various units, primarily among cadres, attitudes which led to different ways of approaching the problem. Some comrades maintained that training and combat readiness units should not consider participating in productive labor. They argued that performing productive labor, improving the meals of troops and supporting the material lives of troops are the work of all the people, of the upper level, of rear service personnel! A number of others maintained that training and combat readiness units, if they do participate in productive labor, should only do so in a perfunctory manner and be satisfied with whatever results they achieve. These attitudes led to a lack of support for the policy of having training and combat readiness units participate in productive labor. However, it must also be realized that there were many persons who supported this policy but feared



that actually participating in productive labor would make it impossible to meet the training and combat readiness requirements of the unit.

But, there was one fact that no one could deny, namely, the need to stabilize and gradually improve the material and spiritual lives of troops requires that productive labor be organized well. Everyone realizes that our army is built and supplied with everything by the people and state and that there are regulations and standards for food, clothing and so forth; however, if, in the face of the many economic difficulties now being encountered, we passively rely upon these standards, it is difficult to talk about improving the material lives of cadres and soldiers. Moreover, the material lives of cadres and soldiers, the effort to improve their meals, the effort to provide them with barracks, military gear and so forth must not only be organized in a way that meets routine requirements, but also in a way that meets new, unexpected requirements resulting from phases of military recruiting, cadre training, the exercises, drills and maneuvers held in the middle of the year, the maneuvers held at the end of the year and so forth. For this reason, the most convenient way for units engaged in training and the maintenance of combat readiness to actively contribute to stabilizing and gradually improving their material lives can only be to participate in productive labor. Participating in productive labor has always been an activity that reflects the nature and the tradition of our people's army. In the face of the requirements regarding the living conditions of troops and the present situation and capabilities of the economy, having the army participate in productive labor assumes even greater practical importance.

At the meetings held to discuss productive labor, the military region party committee and military region command patiently tried to teach and persuade cadres to adopt the attitude and viewpoint presented above, as this was the only way to successfully organize productive labor. While still teaching and persuading cadres, they organized implementation. The results achieved were used to further persuade and teach cadres. The educational effort and persuasion were intensified in order to broaden and improve the quality of the practical organizational work being performed. We were very clearly aware of the fact that if we only used pure principles or, conversely, only used orders to compel action, real results could not be achieved.

At present, it can be said that participating in productive labor has become a voluntary movement in all training and combat readiness units of Military Region 3, from large units to small units, from the agencies of the military region, divisions and regiments to the agencies of the provinces, municipalities, districts and wards. This movement has become an integral part of the "prosperity and victory" movement designed to carry out the two strategic tasks of the entire party, all the people and the entire army within the military region. The productive labor movement has developed in many areas: the cultivation of rice, subsidiary food crops, sugarcane, tobacco and rushes, the production of sugar and salt, the raising of hogs and ducks, fishing, the production of fish sauce and so forth. In 1982, the military region harvested more than 3,000 tons of grain, over 600 tons of meat of various types, 100 tons of beans, sesame and peanuts, 100 tons of sugar, 200 tons of salt and nearly 7,000 tons of vegetables. As regards grain production, more than 50 percent of the units within the military region



produced enough grain to meet their ration standards for 3 months or more and more than 50 percent of the district military agencies produced enough to meet their grain ration standards for 6 months or more. Units used the results of their crop and livestock production in the daily meals of troops, thereby raising their meat and fish ration compared to standards, and provide the necessary additional rations for training, maneuvers, strenuous labor, holidays and tet. One hundred percent of the units of the armed forces within the military region raised the eating standard of their troops for at least 15 days during the year and some units for as much as 1 month or several months. With the profits in their increased production funds, many units purchased sewing machines, haircutting implements and even televisions. One hundred percent of the units organized tailoring and haircutting services for troops free of charge. Also as a result of the labor and production of troops, the military region was able to provide material assistance to flood victims in Nghe-Tinh; the 5th Engineer Regiment provided 150,000 dong and 5 tons of rice, the 2nd Anti-Aircraft Regiment provided 50,000 dong, etc.

Of greater importance has been the fact that, in conjunction with the results of their labor and production, the various units have also achieved good results in their training, maneuvers, exercises and maintenance of combat readiness. At the end of 1982, the Inspection Group of the ministry evaluated the entire military region as above average in training and the maintenance of combat readiness and as having won victory over the multifaceted war of sabotage of the enemy within its locality. In the All-Army Competition in soldier physical conditioning, the three tests of military coordination and the obstacle course, the military region was rated best in the entire group in all three events and won the cup. In the Region 1 Competition of the National Military and Self-Defense Forces, the groups of the military region won eight of the nine cups, eight of the eight gold medals, seven of the eight silver medals, five of the eight bronze medals, 24 of the 27 banners and 43 of the 51 prizes that were awarded. The 5th Engineer Regiment is the leader of the military region in productive labor within training and combat readiness units and was also the best unit at the Technical and Tactical Skills Competition of the Branch.

Facts showed us that once it was correctly understood and well organized, productive labor, instead of impeding training and combat readiness, competently supports the effort to create local sources of rear service supplies, creates the material conditions and the health conditions needed for troops to conduct maneuvers and maintain combat readiness, stimulates training and the maintenance of combat readiness and causes training to be more efficient and of higher quality even though less time is spent in training. Within the military region, the units that perform productive labor well and maintain and improve the living conditions of their troops are units that maintain combat readiness well, train well, conduct maneuvers well and maintain discipline well; the lives of their cadres and soldiers are happy and wholesome lives; negative phenomena within these units are very rare or completely non-existent.

It must be said that every place has its own special production conditions. Military Region 3 must always display high vigilance, resist the multifaceted war of sabotage of the enemy and be ready to deal with a large-scale war

launched by them, especially along the nearly 200 kilometer stretch of seacoast within the region. However, Military Region 3 does not face the high, urgent and constant combat readiness demands that the military regions along the northern border face. This is a significant advantage, one that makes it possible for units engaged in training and the maintenance of combat readiness to still participate in productive labor well. However, this advantage cannot be developed upon if leaders and commanders do not have a firm grasp of the line and task of the party and do not organize their implementation in a resolute manner, if the will, the manual skills and the efforts of the mass of cadres and soldiers are not being mobilized. This conclusion has become a profound lesson to the armed forces of our military region, especially the forces of the standing army engaged in training and the maintenance of combat readiness who are participating in productive labor. Of course, in this field, not only are attitude, will and determination of very important significance, the skillful coordination of training and combat readiness with productive labor is very important as well. Concerning this coordination, the military region has begun to confirm the following several experiences:

1. Many Different Forms of Coordination Must Be Implemented for Units Depending upon Specific Conditions

Although the training and combat readiness units that organize productive labor are similar in some respects, every unit has its own special characteristics as a result of the nature and task of each branch and the fact that units are stationed in different areas, areas that have different land, soil, weather, climatic and other conditions. These special characteristics cause every unit to have specific training and combat readiness requirements and different requirements that must be adhered to in organizing productive labor, such as production guidelines, production seasons, the methods of organizing production, etc.

Therefore, the military region has implemented many different forms and types of coordination to insure that the task of providing training and maintaining combat readiness as well as the task of participating in productive labor are carried out smoothly and achieve good results.

The units within the military region have implemented this coordination in the following ways: establishing a training bloc and a productive labor bloc and then rotating personnel between these two blocs; assembling cadres for training and practical application first while the rest of the unit is engaged in production; using the very process of productive labor as an established training subject in the training plan; building a highly specialized force to serve as the production specialists of the unit and using each component of the unit in production at selected times and so forth. Depending upon its specific conditions and circumstances, a unit can employ one form of coordination at one time and another form at another time or employ many different forms at the same time.

In the process of organizing coordination between the two tasks, it is always necessary to consider the combat training and combat readiness task to be the task of central importance; at the same time, we must insure that both tasks

stimulate and create the conditions for each other or at least do not impede each other.

The command posts and combat alert sections of units are usually left intact in terms of their organizational structure and personnel and their weapons, equipment and vehicles are pre-deployed in the stipulated ratio and state of readiness so that, if the situation demands, these posts and components can move or go into combat immediately. The remaining forces of the unit can participate either entirely in productive labor or partially in productive labor and partially in training. Regardless of how this is arranged, it is necessary to insure that the component of the unit that is in training or the component that is engaged in productive labor can rapidly reassemble at the stipulated point with its regulation table of organization and equipment so that the entire unit can move to another place or go into combat as ordered by the upper echelon.

Some units have used an element of their productive labor plan or even a number of jobs performed in productive labor as a training lesson for cadres and soldiers. For example, infantry, artillery and anti-aircraft units can use marches to production sites as exercises in troop movements and combat mobility. Some engineer companies and battalions of the military region have undertaken the tasks of using explosives to clear project sites, build bridges, install drainage pipes or transport cargo along rivers under contracts from economic agencies and factories within the localities in which they are stationed. The process of implementing contracts is also the process of providing real-life training in the use of explosives, bridge construction and the use of boats and bulldozers. In this process, because the party paying to have the project constructed supplies the necessary materials, each soldier utilizes 100 times, sometimes even 1,000 times, as much explosives as used under ordinary training standards. The quantity of gasoline used and the number of hours spent operating vehicles as well as the amount of time and the number of times that soldiers perform actual work are dozens and hundreds of times greater. As a result, the quality of training has markedly increased, expenses and the consumption of materials in training are greatly reduced and the unit earns large amounts of money under these contracts to put into its public fund.

The various forms of coordination mentioned above have helped the military region to mobilize and widely organize large units as well as small units, combat units as well as agencies and schools and units on the outer perimeter as well as units on the inner perimeter in both the standing army and the militia and self-defense forces to participate in productive labor while still engaging in training and maintaining combat readiness. One conclusion that has become a useful lesson is that units, regardless of where they are stationed, must actively contribute to building a locality that is strong and solid in every respect. On this basis, the army and the people acquire a common will; the party organization, the government and the people of the locality wholeheartedly help the unit in its productive labor as well as in the buildup of the unit and the maintenance of combat readiness. Of course, in order to achieve true results and efficiency in productive labor, it is necessary to delve deeply into the work being performed.



## 2. On the Basis of Selecting the Correct Form of Coordination for Implementing the Two Tasks, It Is Necessary To Organize and Manage Productive Labor in a Scientific Manner

The organization and management of productive labor must fully comply with the line adopted by the 4th Congress and confirmed by the 5th Congress of the Party on building the socialist economy. In particular, we must fully comply with the policy that "during the 5 years from 1981 to 1985 and throughout the 1980's, efforts must be focused on strongly developing agriculture, considering agriculture to be the foremost front..." and, within agriculture, "grain and food are the most pressing and very basic issues..." In keeping with this policy, it is necessary, when organizing production, to determine which crops and which species of livestock will yield the greatest economic returns and which are best suited to the subjective and objective conditions of each unit.

In actuality, while one unit is raising rice and hogs, another unit is clearing land from the sea, raising ducks and planting rushes; still another unit is raising sugarcane, making sugar or planting beans, sesame and peanuts.

For example, the non-commissioned officers school, because it is located at a place that has very harsh land and natural conditions, incurred losses in the cultivation of rice, consequently, it shifted to the production of tobacco and has achieved increasingly good results. Some units located in the coal region have used their labor to mine coal. The military region's engineer group has not only achieved large returns in the cultivation of rice and the raising of hogs, but has also undertaken the construction of some projects for factories within the locality in order to provide more revenue for the unit's productive labor fund. Therefore, it can be said that in the productive labor movement of the military region, some units have moved forward on the basis of raising rice and hogs while other units have moved forward on the basis of mining coal, raising tobacco and so forth. This has permitted us to develop upon the strengths and correct the weaknesses in production of each unit and each locality in which troops are stationed, learn the production experiences of the local people in the fields of farming and livestock production in which units are working, avoid failures and rapidly achieve results.

In the process of developing and advancing the productive labor movement, it is inevitable that some units take the lead and move forward rapidly while other units lag behind and develop slowly. Although they have all displayed the same creativity and effort, it must be said that many units have been able to take the lead and advance rapidly because they have taken advantage of advantages afforded by the soil, natural conditions and climate as well as the characteristics of production within their locality. However, if these units did not engage in examination, observation and analysis, they would still harvest products but they could not be certain that the products they harvest would be commensurate with the effort expended. Therefore, it is even more important for those units that are lagging behind and advancing slowly to examine and consider their options. They must carefully examine and consider their options from the very outset, from the time that production guidelines are being established, in order to determine which crops or species of livestock the unit will raise and which jobs it will perform. And, if, after

the unit has begun its work, it sees places where inefficiencies exist, where products are not being produced, where true returns are not being achieved, where labor is being wasted or where training and combat readiness are being adversely affected, it must stop what it is doing and reorient its productive labor.

Productive labor within agriculture usually demands that work be performed in seasons. Planting crops a few days late or harvesting them a few days late can cause significant losses. Therefore, when organizing coordination, full attention must be given to establishing a division of labor and regulating the use of forces so that training and the maintenance of combat readiness are not neglected because efforts must be focused on seasonal production; conversely, we cannot allow a routine way of doing things to cause us to miss a season and incur losses. To correct these phenomena, the cadres and soldiers of each unit, especially cadres, must keep fully abreast of the political situation, always know the status of their unit's task and, in addition, possess the minimum amount of knowledge needed concerning production, primarily the field of production in which the unit is working. Only with knowledge of production, knowledge of the work task being performed can cadres have the basis needed to establish balance between requirements and capabilities, between the production season and the training plan and between the need to concentrate on completing a specific job and normal labor needs and, on this basis, mobilize and organize their unit in the most efficient manner possible.

In order to organize and mobilize cadres and soldiers in productive labor, training and the maintenance of combat readiness, the units within the military region have attached importance to establishing various types of appropriate spiritual and material awards for individuals and units who record achievements in the performance of their tasks in productive labor or in training and the maintenance of combat readiness.

Together with the various forms of recognition, letters of commendation, certificates of commendation and awards that have long been in use within the army, the use of material incentives is something to which all units organizing productive labor have become increasingly accustomed. The items given as awards are of many different types: pants, shirts, face cloths, blankets, mosquito nets, wash basins, hats, paper, pens and even meat, fish, etc. Some awards are worth 300 to 500 dong or more. The money spent on awards is taken from the productive labor fund of the unit. Awards are not only given to persons who record achievements in productive labor, but also to persons who record achievements in training, the maintenance of combat readiness, the fulfillment of their duties and productive labor. The units and individuals who win banners, ribbons and medals at the all-army competitions are given awards. The units and individuals who are rated as excellent in training and the maintenance of combat readiness receive awards. Skilled surgeons, skilled instructors and safe drivers receive awards. Collectives and individuals who record high achievements in the production of rice, the raising of hogs or the construction of housing receive awards. In the process of implementing the system of material awards, a tendency did develop to place heavy emphasis upon productive labor. However, this tendency was detected and promptly stopped. As a result of this tendency, all units within the military region have reached the same conclusion, namely, that the



central activities of foremost importance must continue to be training and the maintenance of combat readiness; when considering an individual or a unit for an award for achievements recorded in productive labor, it is at least necessary to first consider whether this individual or unit has completed their training or combat readiness task and fulfilled their duties.

Units share in the products of their productive labor depending upon how much work they perform and how many products they produce. The distribution and use of these products must be extremely fair and reasonable. It is universal practice within the military region for units to use the proceeds they receive in expenditures for the collective, such as increasing the daily food ration, purchasing sewing machines, haircutting implements, etc. Many units have also purchased mechanical plows, tractors, improved vehicles and so forth for use in production. On the basis of these expenditures, one principle of distribution has emerged by itself and been unconsciously implemented: units that do much, receive much; units that do little, receive little; units that do nothing, receive nothing; individuals who perform much good work receive large awards and individuals who perform only a small amount of good work receive a small award, regardless of whether they are on the upper or lower level, are a cadre or a soldier. However, there is one requirement that our military region always makes and tries to meet, namely, the need to be frugal, to make expenditures in a very reasonable and frugal manner and never be extravagant because significant results have been achieved in labor; in particular, the products of the productive labor of the entire collective or unit may not be given as gifts from one individual to another person or unit.

### 3. The Coordination of the Task of Training and Maintaining Combat Readiness and the Productive Labor Task Can Only Be Close and Effective When It is Based on a Unified, Comprehensive and Well Coordinated Plan

The military region, itself, has a plan. All units have plans. Plans are based on the training and combat readiness task for each year, the production situation and conditions within the locality and the characteristics and capabilities of the unit. Plans are established through detailed calculations of how much progress can be made in each 3 month and 6 month period in training, combat readiness and productive labor so that, by the end of the year, the training program, maneuvers, exercises, combat readiness inspections and the labor, livestock production, crop production and harvest programs have been completed and completed in an excellent manner. The very basic requirement of plans is the need to provide plan options so that every unit can be mobilized in every situation and go into combat very quickly when ordered by the upper echelon.

Through its plan, the military region is able to guide each unit, consequently, productive labor is organized in a manner coordinated with training and the maintenance of combat readiness. The military region applied the experiences of the 5th Engineer Regiment to the units of the standing forces and the experiences of Xuan Thuy District to the provincial and district military agencies and the militia and self-defense forces at places where they are participating in productive labor in order to coordinate it with combat training and combat readiness. There are some economic projects that cannot be undertaken by simply one unit. Mobilizing many units to

participate in such projects requires management on the part of the military region. Based on its observation and guidance, the military region adopts a plan to resolve the problems encountered with capital, seed, young livestock, arable land, production tools and technology for units.

The training and productive labor plans of each unit can begin at the same time as or later than those of the other units within the military region as required by the situation surrounding the utilization and deployment of forces, preparations for instructions and maneuvers as well as planting and harvesting operations at each place. Within the plan of the unit, appropriate attention must be given to those times during the year when exercises, maneuvers and inspections are held and the times when forces must be assembled so that labor and production can be carried out in accordance with the seasonal schedule and requirements.

Operating without a plan has led to instability and imbalance in both training and labor, the shift from one job to another in a haphazard fashion lacking preparations and the necessary equipment and the practice of performing whatever job is at hand, as a result of which troops must sometimes perform very strenuous labor but must, at other times, sit and wait for work, as a result of which both time and labor are wasted.

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## MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

### PEOPLE'S ROLE IN DEFENSIVE CAMPAIGNS DISCUSSED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 6, Jun 83 pp 28-33

[Article by Major Nguyen Minh Thien: "The Local People's War in a Defensive Campaign"]

[Text] The recent campaign maneuvers faced the campaign commander and staff with a problem that is in the nature of a line in the art of conducting campaigns, in particular, and the military art, in general, of a people's war to defend the fatherland in our country. This problem was: how to coordinate a local people's war with combat operations by main force military corps within the scope of a campaign.

This coordination must be expressed in everything from the contents of campaign training materials (such as those that define the objectives of campaigns, the forces participating in campaigns, the campaign formation, the methods of warfare employed in a campaign, the various support operations in a campaign and so forth) to the work methods and the order of priorities of the commander and his staff in campaign training and maneuvers.

This article only deals with a number of matters regarding the capabilities of the local people's war in defense campaigns (campaigns to defend the border and campaigns against enemy forces landing by sea) conducted by main force military corps.

Together with the other types of campaigns, a defensive campaign within a war to defend the fatherland can occur during the initial period of a war and on a number of main strategic fronts. Such a campaign must involve the coordination of the two modes of warfare and the three arms of the military that make up the strength of all the people fighting the enemy. A defensive campaign is usually organized and conducted on the basis of the people's war battle position prepared in advance in accordance with the overall defense plan of the entire country in the various localities. Within this battle position in view of the fact that the country is totally independent and reunified and is building socialism and on the basis of the work performed in the localities in peace time to build the national defense system, the fundamental factors of the local people's war have gradually been established in a basic, comprehensive manner and are constantly developing; on certain important strategic fronts, there is also a component of main force troops

positioned as a stationary defense force and supported by a relatively strong system of fortifications, battle positions and national defense projects.

As a result, the local people's war, which is constantly achieving a higher level of development and is stronger than in any preceding period, possesses new, very large capabilities that must be employed and strongly developed upon. The strength of the local people's war is the strength of the local armed forces and the local people, the strength of the battle position and forces within the locality; it is a combined political-moral, economic and military strength, the strength of close coordination with the combat operations conducted by the main force military corps. This strength also originates in each locality's revolutionary tradition and tradition of fighting the enemy. When utilized in the fullest possible manner, this strength has a direct impact upon all aspects of a campaign, from the preparations made for a campaign and the organizing of a campaign to the actual conduct of a campaign. For this reason, the local people's war plays an especially important role and possesses very large capabilities with regard to organizing and successfully conducting the various types of campaigns, in general, and defensive campaigns, in particular. The experience of maneuvers has shown that the local people's war can help to establish a strong battle position for a defensive campaign, help to create a new strength and superiority of forces on the main front of the campaign, help to create and maintain positions, help to create springboards from which the main force military corps can launch surprise counter-attacks, counter-attacks, victorious attacks and so forth. Consequently, the campaign commander and staff must be especially concerned with and adopt a specific plan for closely coordinating with the local people's war, with the local armed forces, for the purpose of creating a tremendous strength for the campaign.

In the realities of the defensive campaign maneuvers on a frontline and during the initial period of a war to defend the fatherland, the role and capabilities of the local people's war were manifested in the following primary activities:

To begin with, the local people and local armed forces are capable of contributing to promptly bringing their locality from a state of combat readiness and production to a high state of combat readiness, direct combat operations and continued production during war time in the manner best suited to the war situation and the position and tasks of the locality. This is work of especially important significance in seizing the strategic initiative, seizing campaign initiative, attacking aggressor forces within each locality and on each battlefield and insuring that a defensive campaign can be mounted and conducted on the basis of already prepared positions, under stable political and social conditions and at the time that the local army and people are ready to make large contributions to the fight to defend the fatherland, defend the locality.

In the recent maneuvers conducted in many localities, the various party committee echelons, the people's committees on the various levels and some related sectors truly concern themselves with this matter and truly participated in the formulation of plans as well as in organizing their implementation in order to gain experience. Following the maneuvers, many



localities made effective preparations for the task of shifting their localities from a state of combat readiness to a state of direct combat operations in a timely, planned, tightly organized and orderly fashion.

Taking prompt and precise action in accordance with the plan to shift the local armed forces to various states of combat readiness and combat in exact accordance with the situation and the signs of a war is extremely important in taking the initiative in carrying out national defense-security tasks in the stage preceding the outbreak of a war and preceding the effort to mount and conduct defensive campaigns. These are stationary forces that are widely predeployed in peace time within the various areas of operation of a campaign; a component of these forces is routinely and directly engaged in combat alert duty and the maintenance of combat readiness. This force must retaliate against the acts of sabotage and espionage of various types of enemies, from foreign aggressors to enemies at home, even before war breaks out. The deployment of the local armed forces, the stationary forces, in a prompt manner that complies precisely with the plan during this period directly contributes to the effective organizing of defensive campaigns and creates an effective campaign position from which to promptly attack the enemy and block their progress so that the main force military corps have the time needed to organize and conduct the campaigns that they intend to conduct.

Action taken by the provincial and municipal people's committees and the military commands to organize the prompt, precise and full implementation of the war time manpower and technical materiel mobilization plan of the locality in accordance with the war time mobilization order of the state play a very large role in preparing for and mounting defense campaigns. Assembling the correct amount of manpower at the right time and place guarantees that the reinforcement of units that must be enlarged and the establishment of new units can be accomplished quickly. The organizing of means of communications, information and public health together with the deployment of combat support facilities within the locality on schedule allow the processes of organizing forces, moving forces and deploying forces in defensive campaigns to be smoothly carried out as planned. The actions taken by the locality to provide for and protect the mobility of mechanized forces and technical equipment and transport large quantities of materiel and technology to support the campaign accelerate the process of preparing for and organizing a defensive campaign.

The above mentioned jobs must be concretized, must be incorporated in planning and must be the subject of well coordinated, serious plans of the state, the various sectors and the various party committee echelons, from the central to the basic level, for making preparations in peace time. They must be performed and closely managed by the various levels of government, with the various military agencies serving as the staff that makes proposals and organizes coordination. When properly organized to meet the requirements involved in preparing the country to resist a war of aggression, the strength of the local people's war is even greater and a tremendous combined strength is brought to defensive campaigns.

The local armed forces and local people are also capable of actively participating in organizing the building of the battle posture and battle position of a defensive campaign. On the basis of the intentions of the upper



level and the task assigned to them, the local people and local armed forces have gradually established this posture in peace time. Within it, the system of combat villages, factories, streets and worksites, combat clusters, district military fortresses, combat bases and rear service areas, the communications system, the material-technical support system, the deployment of combat forces, combat plans and so forth are established and gradually perfected. On the basis of the battle position that is prepared in advance, the campaign commander can rapidly make the necessary adjustments to the deployment of forces and perfect the battle positions at key places in order to mount and conduct defensive campaigns in the various directions and areas in exact accordance with the decisions that have been made and the established task of the defensive campaign. When adjusting and improving the campaign battle position and posture, the local armed forces can directly participate on the primary defense front, in important defense zones and on the basic defense line as well as the frontline. In this way, the defensive battle position and system of defensive positions are established in a rapid and stable manner and include the system of strongpoints, strongpoint clusters and the system of battle positions closely linked to the system of combat villages, combat worksites, agricultural sites and forestry sites, combat enterprises and the interconnected combat clusters within the district military fortresses.

On fronts where we must resist enemy forces landing by sea, the local people and local armed forces can directly contribute to the strengthening of the battle positions on the islands, strengthening the forces in vital areas and, in close coordination with the navy and air force, improving the interconnected battle positions at sea, improving the coordination between sea based and shore based positions and even improving the long-range detection and attack positions that are located in the waters close to the shore and the waterways and backwaters of the large, important river estuaries.

The local armed forces, which include the local army and the militia and self-defense forces, are also capable of actively participating in the organizing of an effective campaign formation. In accordance with the defense plan of each locality, the local armed forces are widely deployed and prepared for combat within the battle positions that have been prepared in the areas of operation with which they are familiar, battle positions that are closely linked to the political, economic and national defense bases as well as the targets that must be defended. This is an effective deployment from which to fight the enemy. This force deployment, which is adjusted to suit the intentions and strategy of the campaign, together with the military corps, branches and services of the main force troops create the overall defensive campaign formation. It is a strong and solid campaign formation encompassing stationary forces, mobile forces, forces deployed in all areas of operation, forces deployed at key points and so forth. This formation makes it possible to meet the requirements of the art of conducting a campaign, such as selecting opportunities and amassing superior forces for the campaign, main force military corps on certain fronts so that they can annihilate large forces of the enemy, pin down, divide and surround the enemy, attack the enemy everywhere and so forth.

During the stage in which preparations are being made for a defensive campaign, the local people's war can use its strength to make the preparations necessary for a campaign to be conducted in a smooth and urgent manner. A component of the local armed forces can participate in many combat activities for the purpose of creating favorable conditions for preparing for and conducting campaigns, such as detecting, surrounding and annihilating infiltrating groups of spies and commandos; effectively preventing and combating the multi-faceted acts of sabotage of the enemy; helping to annihilate and defeat attacks by infantry and artillery firepower of the enemy; combating the reconnaissance activities of the enemy (on land and in the water); and reconnoitering their activities. Another component of the local army, militia and self-defense forces can serve as campaign decoys, participate in attacks against enemy forces preparing for attacks and conducting combat operations to create and maintain a favorable position from which to prepare for and conduct a campaign.

In the recent maneuvers, everyone from campaign commanders to campaign command staffs began to reflect a rather full grasp of this matter. The campaign commander and command staff coordinated activities while organizing the campaign and guiding and commanding the local armed forces (and one component of main force troops) in combating enemy acts of sabotage, both within a defensive campaign on land and a campaign against an enemy seaborne landing.

The local people's war can make positive contributions to the creation of a large, combined fighting strength and the defeat of enemy attacks during the stage in which a campaign is actually being conducted. On the basis of the overall campaign strategy and plan, the task assigned to them and the plan for coordinating in combat with the main force military corps, the local army and people are capable of conducting independent combat operations or coordinating in combat operations with border defense troops and a component of main force troops (if any) in attacks against the enemy on the frontline in order to force the enemy to deploy their primary attack forces, impede and annihilate each small component of the enemy's forces and enable our main force troops and other forces of the locality to deploy their units and promptly attack the enemy along the basic defense line. In some campaigns against enemy seaborne landings, the local armed forces at sea and on the mainland can coordinate with the navy in the waters close to the shore, closely coordinate with shore based forces, observe and detect enemy forces at sea, annihilate spy and commandoe forces, protect the lines of underwater obstacles and mines and launch raids and harassing attacks to slow the rate of movement and deployment of landing formation of the enemy in the waters close to the shoreline. These forces can participate in releasing underwater mines and deploying obstacles throughout the course of a campaign and can continue to direct harassing attacks against the rear formation of the enemy; they can resupply and provide medical evacuation to the islands and so forth.

In those directions and areas in which defensive positions have been deployed by main force troops, the local armed forces can engage in combat operations within the overall defensive formation along with the various military corps and branches and in accordance with a unified combat plan under the sole command of the campaign commander. Within the general formation, the local armed forces can employ the strongpoints of their method of fighting within

the prepared battle positions of the locality and employ many different forms of combat: defensive combat, attacks, surprise attacks, ambushes and so forth, especially attacks, in order to help complete the overall mission of the campaign.

On the other fronts (where there are no main force troops), the army and people of the locality can, in accordance with a unified combat plan and the plans for coordination within the campaign, employ the fighting methods of the combat villages, combat clusters, district military fortresses and provincial and district local army units and, on the basis of their battle position, of firmly maintaining their area of operation, pin the enemy down, inflict heavy casualties upon and annihilate whole contingents of enemy forces and cause large forces of the enemy to become bogged down and weak. In particular, the activities of these forces must be designed to create the conditions for our main force troops to mount a strong defense on the important defense front, within key defense areas and coordinate with the forces of the upper level in destroying the forces of the enemy.

In the course of a defensive campaign, the local army and people within the villages, wards, state farms, worksites, factories and so forth can, in accordance with the plan, cling to their positions, fight the enemy at close range, attack their communications and transportation lines, their rear bases and storehouses and attack their command posts and firepower positions as well as the staging areas behind enemy lines.

On the basis of the intention, strategy and plan involving a surprise counter-attack or counter-attack in the campaign, the local army and people are capable of maintaining firm control of advantageous jump-off points, surrounding, dividing, controlling and blocking concerted enemy forces or moving enemy forces, blocking and impeding the progress of the next wave of enemy forces and attacking their resupply and rear service bases. The local army and people can also mobilize forces and material-technical means of the locality to promptly support the main force military corps in counter-attacks, surprise counter-attacks and attacks against the enemy within their local area of operation. These forces can coordinate by carrying out surprise counter-attacks, counter-attacks and attacks on other fronts.

In localities in which campaigns are launched, the local army and people must undertake the tasks of protecting the locality, preventing and combat enemy acts of sabotage, firmly protecting targets, protecting the people, protecting socialist property and production and participating in maintaining and protecting communications and transportation; at the same time, they must be ready to defeat attempts by the enemy to outflank our forces or stage deep penetrations (if any) by land, sea, air or river and participate in crushing reactionaries who attempt to foment rebellions, thereby creating an overall strong position for the main front to win victory and enabling the main force military corps to concentrate their forces in accordance with the requirements of strategy, of the campaign.

When liberating an area, as well as when concluding a defensive campaign, the local army and people can make positive contributions to the rapid strengthening of our battle posture, the strengthening of the defense line by

continuing to mop up remnant enemy forces, cleaning up the battlefield, overcoming the aftereffects of combat, maintaining political security, maintaining social order and safety and so forth. Depending upon the situation and in keeping with the directive from the upper level, the local armed forces can also join with the agencies of the government in resettling the population and restoring production in a thoroughly organized and planned manner while preparing staging areas and preparing the conditions needed for subsequent campaigns.

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## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

### NHAN DAN COMMENTS ON PRC 'THREAT' TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

OWU20741 Hanoi VNA in English 0705 GMT 2 Aug 83

["Chinese Threat Is Dangerous, Says Paper"--VNA headline]

[Text] Hanoi, 2 Aug (VNA)--"Chinese expansionism is an inveterate, deep-rooted danger and a grave threat to Southeast Asia," says the daily NHAN DAN in a commentary today.

The paper says: "In their radiating just cause, the three Indochinese peoples have enjoyed worldwide support and sympathy in building and defending their respective countries. The Chinese authorities have unsuccessfully pursued the policy of fostering remnants of the Pol Pot clique against the Kampuchean people's rebirth, inciting the ASEAN countries to oppose the Indochinese countries, conducting a multi-faceted war of sabotage, and resorting to military pressure, economic blockade and isolation against Vietnam.

"The annual partial withdrawal of Vietnamese army volunteers from Kampuchea demonstrates the growing strength of the Kampuchean Revolutionary Forces. It also reflects Vietnam's good faith in helping the Kampuchean people defend their country on the basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of the People's Republic of Kampuchea and of non-threat to any third country. The three Indochinese countries' good will has been welcomed. The trend of dialogue between the Indochinese and ASEAN countries is repulsing the trend of confrontation. The military pressure, economic blockade and psychological war conducted by the Chinese reactionaries can neither shake the three Indochinese countries nor reverse the Kampuchean situation."

Public opinion in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world has seen more clearly China as a serious threat to peace and stability in Kampuchea and the rest of Southeast Asia, and as a maker of war, tension, confrontation and disorder, NHAN DAN points out.

Denouncing China's denial of its becoming a threat to Southeast Asia aimed at putting the blame on Vietnam, the paper says: "Beijing cannot cover up its crimes and the cause of tension in the region resulting from its threat. Beijing has committed big crimes, namely backing and instigating the Pol Pot gang to make war on Vietnam's southwestern border, joining the Pol Pot clique



in slaughtering three million khmers, using Thai territory to nurture Pol Pot remnants against the Kampuchean people's revival in an attempt to reimpose the genocidal rule on Kampuchea, and launching a 600,000-strong war of aggression against Vietnam's northern border provinces. It has colluded with the U.S. imperialists in conducting a type of multiform sabotage war against the Vietnamese people. These crimes cannot be whitewashed before history, the Chinese and other peoples."

Recalling Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian's deceitful statements in Bangkok, NHAN DAN points out: "The Beijing expansionists are paying lip service to 'anti-hegemony' while practicing the worst hegemony. Over recent days, advertising the signboard of 'peace and justice,' they have flung mud at the Kampuchean, Lao and Vietnamese people's deep aspiration for living in peace, independence, freedom and friendship with their neighbors."

"They pretend to strengthen friendship with the three Indochinese countries, but in fact are pursuing a hostile policy towards them. They talk of peace, while continuing to threaten 'to teach Vietnam a second lesson.'"

"Vietnam and the other Indochinese countries are victims of China's expansionist policy. They have never threatened the ASEAN countries. On the contrary, Beijing and Washington are colluding with each other to put Thailand against the three Indochinese countries. Many politicians in the ASEAN are now fully aware that the threat is coming from China, not from Vietnam. Beijing is using more than 20 million Chinese residents in Southeast Asia as a fifth column and using Maoist organizations in this region to carry out its expansionist policy."

NHAN DAN continues: "Vietnam always set great store by its time-honoured solidarity and friendship with the Chinese people and strives to restore good neighbourly relations with it. The key to this problem is that China stops its threat and gives up its policy of hostility, confrontation and tension. Once this is realized, Vietnamese army volunteers will completely withdraw from Kampuchea, and the peaceful, friendly and cooperative relations between the three Indochinese countries and China will be reestablished."

"Peace and stability benefit the Vietnamese people and the other Indochinese nations, they will also benefit the Chinese people," the paper concludes.

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## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

### NHAN DAN EDITORIAL HAILS CUBAN 'REBELLION DAY'

OW262118 Hanoi VNA in English 1454 GMT 26 Jul 83

[Text] Hanoi, 26 Jul (VNA)--"Moncada is always an incarnation of the heroic Cuban people's spirit of revolutionary offensive," says NHAN DAN in an editorial today in celebration of the 30th anniversary of Cuba's national rebellion day.

"With the Moncada spirit," the paper says, "the Cuban people, under the leadership of the Communist Party of Cuba headed by esteemed Comrade Fidel Castro, have thwarted all plots and acts of sabotage by U.S. imperialism, and won the resounding Giron victory in April 1961.

They have worked with self-abnegation to overcome the heavy consequences left by the old regime, holding high the banner of national independence and socialism over the whole of Latin America. Today, Cuba is a socialist country with a developing economy, advanced culture and education, and mighty national defence."

"Cuba is standing firmly as an outpost of socialism on the Western Hemisphere, setting a bright example of genuine patriotism and pure internationalism. Today, besides Cuba, there have appeared free Nicaragua and Grenada, and a high tide of struggle against U.S. imperialism, for the fundamental national rights in Latin America, especially in Central America and the Caribbean. A new revolutionary situation has taken shape on the political map of Latin America."

"To extricate itself from a losing position," NHAN DAN says, "the Reagan administration is conducting a frenzied counterattack against Cuba, Nicaragua, Grenada and other revolutionary movements in Central America and the Caribbean. Washington is seeking to threaten Cuba, slanderously charging the latter with 'interference' so as to use it as a pretext to meddle in and infringe upon the national independence and sovereignty of the countries in the region."

The paper quotes President Fidel Castro as having declared that "the Cuban people are determined to defend at any cost and in whatever circumstance their revolutionary ideals, the socialist system, and the judicious and well-known principles."

"Close comrades-in-arms and brothers," NHAN DAN says, "the Vietnamese people avail themselves of this opportunity to express their sincere gratitude to the fraternal Cuban people for their valuable support and assistance. We would like to convey to the Cuban people our greetings of militant solidarity and reassure them of our full support for their cause of socialist construction and national defense."

CSO: 4200/758

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

VAN TIEN DUNG MESSAGE ON ANGOLAN ARMY DAY

OW041145 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2330 GMT 1 Aug 83

[Text] You will now hear the message of greetings from Senior General Van Tien Dung, SRV defense minister, to General Pedro Maria Tonha, defense minister of the People's Republic of Angola, on the occasion of the ninth anniversary of the founding of the Angolan People's Liberation Armed Forces. The message reads in full:

Dear and respected comrade minister,

On the occasion of the ninth anniversary of the founding of the Angolan People's Liberation Armed Forces, on behalf of the combatants, officers, and noncommissioned officers of the VPA and on my own behalf, I wish to extend my warmest greetings to you, comrade minister, and through you, to all the cadres and combatants of the Angolan People's Liberation Armed Forces.

Developing their nation's tradition of heroic struggle, the Angolan people and their liberation armed forces fought valiantly against the Portuguese colonialists' brutal domination, registered great victories and completely liberated [words indistinct].

Since liberation, under the correct leadership of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] Labor Party, the people's liberation armed forces and the entire people of Angola have bravely overcome all difficulties and trials and smashed every scheme and act of sabotage of the imperialists and their henchmen in defense of their national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, thus making an active contribution to the African and world people's struggle against old and new colonialism, racism, apartheid and other reactionary forces for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress.

With the sentiments of comrades and brothers, we are very happy and proud of the achievements registered by the Angolan people and their liberation armed forces over the past years. On this occasion, we wish to express our

sincere and deep gratitude to the Angolan party, government, people and liberation armed forces for the sympathy, resolute support and profound sentiments reserved for the Vietnamese people and their armed forces in their past struggle for national liberation as well as in their present socialist construction and national defense.

We wish the Angolan people and their liberation armed forces new and greater achievements in their socialist construction and national defense and wish that the militant solidarity and fraternal friendship between the peoples and armed forces of our two countries will be increasingly consolidated and developed.

May you, comrade minister, have good health and achieve many new successes in your heavy responsibility.

Please accept my respectful regards.

CSO: 4209/490



## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

### BRIEFS

SRV-ROMANIAN TRADE PROTOCOL--Hanoi, 6 Jul (VNA)--A protocol on goods exchange and payment for 1983 between Vietnam and Romania was signed in Bucharest on June 28. Signatories were Nguyen Manh Cam, Vietnamese vice-minister of foreign trade and head of a delegation now visiting Romania, and Ion Stoian, Romanian vice minister of foreign trade and international economic cooperation. While in Romania, the Vietnamese delegation was warmly received by Vasile Pungan, member of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and minister of foreign trade and international economic cooperation. The Romanian minister said he highly valued the Romanian-Vietnamese relations and wished the trade relations and economic cooperation between the two countries further development. [Text] [Hanoi VNA in English 1536 GMT 6 Jul 83 OW]

OUTGOING IRAQI AMBASSADOR--Hanoi, 4 Aug (VNA)--Natiq 'Abd al-Hamid al-Wadi, ambassador of the Republic of Iraq, today paid a farewell visit to Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers To Huu at the end of his term of office. Vice Chairman To Huu had a cordial talk with the outgoing Iraqi ambassador. [Text] [OWO42309 Hanoi VNA in English 1620 GMT 4 Aug 83]

VIETNAMESE AGRICULTURAL CADRES IN LAOS--Recently Ha Son Binh Province sent a group of agricultural technicians to help its sister province, Luang Prabang (Laos), with regard to a number of technical agricultural matters. The group carried out research and helped our friends successfully hatch two broods of grass carp at the Na Luong fish hatchery. Two days after the fish laid eggs the hatchery hatched about 100,000 fry. [Text] [Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 23 Jun 83 p 4] 5616

CSO: 4200/758

## PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

### HANOI HOLDS SECOND ROUND OF PARTY ORGANIZATION CONGRESS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 Jun 83 pp 3, 4

[Party Building column by Thép Mỏi: "The 9th Party Organization Congress of the Capital Hanoi (Round Two): a New Effectiveness, a New Dynamism"]

[Text] The first words spoken by General Secretary Le Duan at the Hanoi Party Organization Congress reflected his satisfaction with the contents of the reports of the municipal party committee which the congress, following 6 days of debate conducted in a high spirit of responsibility and in keeping with the spirit of the resolutions of the 5th Party Congress, the resolution of the 3rd Party Plenum, the resolution of the Political Bureau on the work of the capital and the directive sent personally by the general secretary to the congress, unanimously approved and adopted as resolutions of action of the entire party organization.

This initial but yet significant success marks a step forward in improving the party organization's ability to provide leadership, manage the economy and manage society. The entire party organization, the intelligence of which arose from the basic level and was truly concentrated within this congress, is clearly moving forward to overcome its lack of dynamism and effectiveness and is making major efforts to give concrete form to the policies and lines of the party and state within the actual situation of the capital. The congress learned an important lesson from the recent past, namely, the need to promptly and accurately give concrete form to the line of the party through stages, plans and a management mechanism that are suited to the actual situation and, on this basis, reorient all economic and administrative measures, tap the revolutionary-offensive spirit, combat conservatism and stagnation and be deeply aware of the weaknesses and deficiencies that exist in order to adopt corrective measures and, at the same time, correctly evaluate and more creatively apply the many large capabilities of our capital.

The congress assigned to the new executive committee (the 9th) the responsibility of organizing the successful implementation of the political and socio-economic tasks and objectives, with foremost importance attached to the tasks of urgently resolving the pressing problems regarding the standard of living; accelerating production and intensifying the practice of frugality; increasing our exports and imports; meeting the norms of the state plan;

strengthening and improving the socialist production relations; restoring economic and social order, especially in the field of distribution-circulation; continuing to accelerate the construction of the material-technical bases of the city in accordance with planning; strengthening national defense forces, heightening our vigilance and firmly maintaining political security and social order and safety; making every effort to mold the new man and build the new culture; and training and educating youths, teenagers and children. All of the matters mentioned above were dealt with in a thorough, alert and serious spirit, with a full awareness of difficulties and greater insight into the many abundant potentials that have not been developed and all were dealt with in a manner closely linked to actual activities.

Reflecting the unanimity of the entire party organization and acting in a manner consistent with the aspirations and determination of the working class and laboring people of the capital, the congress adopted several primary norms upon which efforts will be focused between now and 1985: providing an adequate supply of grain and essential goods in 1983 to meet ration standards; endeavoring by 1985 to develop the organized market to the point where it accounts for 70 to 75 percent of the retail market; raising industrial output value to 2.4 billion dong by 1985 while insuring product quality and maintaining the production of primary products; raising grain production to 500,000 tons by 1985 while recording an average yield of 7 tons per hectare and mobilizing 110,000 tons for the state; eliminating the between season vegetable shortage; selling to the state 16,000 tons of pork, 3,500 tons of fresh water fish and 4,500 tons of tobacco by 1985; building, during the 3 years from 1983 to 1985, 300,000 square meters of housing while attaching very much importance to housing repair; completing the upgrading of the electric power and water networks, with the capacity of the electric power network being upgraded to 250 megawatts; and reducing the natural rate of population growth to 1.5 percent, to 1 percent within the city itself, by 1985. Achieving these seemingly modest norms will involve a new revolutionary fight, a fight that must be waged every day during the next 3 years.

The Hanoi Party Organization Congress expressed deep awareness of "the ideological and organizational conservatism and stagnation that are creating tremendous inertia within the party organization" and, within its general resolution, the congress attached foremost importance to "the factor that will determine the successful implementation of the congress' resolution, namely, improving cadre work and party building."

While criticizing the lack of effectiveness, the bureaucracy and the serious conservatism that are a reason why the lines and policy of the party and state have not been thoroughly accepted or scrupulously implemented; why the creativity of the masses and the creativity of cadres and party members has been thwarted; why the effort to improve the management mechanism and revise outmoded policies and regulations has been thwarted; and why management has been lax in many areas. The congress harshly criticized the opportunistic and rightist thinking that has been seen in the implementation of the new economic policies and the use of loopholes in the present management mechanism for the purpose of operating on the free market and pursuing limited, personal interests, thereby harming the interests of the state and further complicating

the difficulties being encountered with prices and market management. In particular, the congress criticized the fact that many party organizations have not provided close leadership and have, instead of conducting inspections and uncovering problems, sympathized with mistakes being made in production and everyday life, even "considered them to be a model to follow"!

In order to strengthen the organizational work of the party and improve the quality of political leadership provided by it, the congress established as the basic task giving every party member and cadre a thorough understanding of the lines and policies of the party so that each person and each organization implements them correctly and, at the same time, upholding the tradition of the capital, cultivating the spirit of initiative and creativity and cultivating the spirit of not relying upon or waiting for others to act, with a view toward developing every existing potential and material base and establishing a planned and guided economic alliance in order to accelerate production and business. In view of the fact that the struggle between socialism and capitalism and the struggle against the multi-faceted war of sabotage of the enemy are still sharp struggles, the congress attached a high degree of importance to building strong and solid party chapters, heightening the will to fight, upholding the exemplary-vanguard role of party members, overcoming every manifestation of loose management in production, loose economic management or loose social management that violates policies or the law and combating every expression of skepticism, vacillation, a decline in the will to fight or a degeneration of qualities and lifestyle.

To increase the fighting strength and the leadership ability of the party, the congress emphasized the need to strengthen the basic party organizations and delve deeply into concretizing the fact that each type basic installation, primarily the production and business installations and the subwards, is a cell of the national economy and social life, is the place that directly organizes the implementation of the positions and policies of the party and state and the place that creates material wealth for society, builds the culture and develops life. Organizationally, it is necessary to tap the combined strength of the dictatorship of the proletariat system and overcome the slowness and stagnation of a serious nature that exist with regard to resolving the problems that pertain to organization, the apparatus, staffs, regulations and work methods and the problem of building the district level.

Fully aware of the pressing requirements regarding the methods of selecting and managing cadres and the pressing need to train and deploy cadres in a manner consistent with the new situation and tasks, the congress clearly established the need to inspect and re-examine the organizational system and apparatus, from the municipal to the basic levels, clearly define functions and the structure of the apparatus, with a determined effort to streamline it, clearly define cadre standards, use the results of work as the final measurement of cadres and, on this basis, assign and deploy cadres in a correct and well-coordinated manner. Steps must be taken to correct the situation in which because cadres are not fully evaluated, the cadre problem cannot be resolved in a timely or accurate manner, which is also a cause of the stagnation that exists.



Successfully formulating and implementing cadre planning from the basic to the municipal levels over the next 3 years are an especially important measure of a decisive nature in strengthening every aspect of cadre work, the essence of which involves building a corps of reserve cadres on each level, within each sector and on the municipal level from among the diverse sources of cadres within the locality while attaching importance to improving the social makeup of the party organization by increasing its working class component, especially direct production workers, and giving attention to attracting from within the young generation loyal persons who dare to struggle to defend the truth, defend common interests and training them in order to supplement the ranks of the party with new, inexhaustible forces.

To improve the quality of leadership of the party organization, the municipal party committee and the war, district and city party committees must strengthen their support agencies so that they are streamlined and of high quality and attach importance to reorganizing their overall information activities and the way that they report on the situation to insure fidelity and the exercise of discipline and be able to make correct proposals. The effectiveness of the state apparatus must be increased and the party must not take over jobs that lie within the jurisdiction of state agencies but neither should it relax its efforts with regard to the party organization's role of inspecting every aspect of the activities of agencies and units. In conjunction with taking positive steps to improve the quality of the activities of the people's council, the people's committee and the agencies that provide state management, manage production and business or provide social management, the congress also proposed the strengthening and reorganizing of the sectors of the city by boldly eliminating organizations and components that are not considered suitable, especially intermediary organizations.

In particular, the congress saw the need to establish closely coordinated relationships with the various party organizations within the bloc of agencies on the central level in order to effectively utilize the cadres and party members of the central agencies in building the capital.

One of the major concerns of the congress was the need to strengthen the close relationship between the party organization and people, truly improve the agitation of the masses and correct the situation pointed out in the resolution of the Political Bureau: "In many respects, the mass movement in Hanoi is still weak." This is because the party organization has not known how to fully develop the large spiritual potentials that exist. Correctly evaluating the basic aspects of the situation, this party organization congress recognized that overriding everything are the facts that the revolutionary will to fight of the masses and their confidence in the party are undergoing positive changes and the fact that a mass movement has begun and new factors have emerged in some areas.

In its general resolution, the congress wholeheartedly praised the working class, collective farmers, socialist intellectuals, cadres, party members, Youth Union members, people's armed forces, people's public security forces and the various strata of laboring people in the capital who, in the face of acute difficulties in their daily lives and complex changes in the socio-



economic situation, have firmly maintained their revolutionary character, resolutely struggled to overcome their difficulties and actively complied with the positions and policies of the party and state.

The party defined agitation among the masses as the daily job of the entire party organization, as a very important part of the program to debate and criticize every phenomena that reflects remoteness from the masses, each manifestation of the still rather widespread violations of the right of collective ownership within some agencies of government, especially on the basic level, and the old fashioned style of operation of the mass organizations, which places heavy emphasis upon holding conferences and meetings, studying, issuing declarations and operating in an administrative manner without delving into mobilizing or educating individual persons or making every effort to develop useful activities or adopt suitable forms of activities. Recently, attention has been given to economic returns in the mobilization of mass movements; however, little concern has been given to educational returns, to building the organization and rallying the masses; attention has been given to the interests of the masses but there has also been a lack of concern for the interests of the collective, the interests of society as a whole...

The party organization expressed deep concern over the negative situation that exists within a component of the working class, cadres and personnel and over the manifestations of a slowness to make progress on the part of some youths and teenagers; at the same time, it analyzed a situation that must be quickly corrected, namely, the excessive and ever widening gap in income, a gap that violates the principle of distribution in accordance with labor, among the various segments of the masses, a gap that has caused worry and indignation on the part of the majority of the people. Various forms of exploitation have emerged within private commerce and private handicraft production. The effort to mold the new man is experiencing a sharp and complex struggle.

In keeping with the Political Bureau resolution on the work of the capital, the congress established the major political task of the party organization and people of the capital as building Hanoi "into a city that symbolizes the socialist system" and implementing the important directive of the general secretary: "Hanoi must launch a truly intense movement of the masses to exercise collective ownership. This revolutionary movement must become a festival of the masses within each subward, each village, each enterprise, each agency and unit." Fully mindful of "the strategic significance of mobilizing and organizing the masses in revolutionary activities in all stages of the revolution," the congress set forth the general guidelines and tasks in civilian proselyting as: "Strengthening the leadership provided by the party, closely coordinating with the organizations of government and making full use of the function of each organization in mobilizing the masses, raising the level of political awareness of the masses through education, molding the new, socialist man, respecting and upholding the right of collective ownership of the laboring people, gaining the participating of the majority of the masses in suitable organizations, improving their mode of operation, intensifying the revolutionary movement of the masses and simultaneously carrying out the three revolutions, the key one being the scientific-technological revolution, with a view toward carrying out the immediate political tasks of the capital,

accelerating production, stabilizing the standard of living of the people, continuing to carry out socialist transformation and protecting and gradually building the capital into a socialist city that symbolizes the entire country."

One thing that stands out in the resolution that was adopted with a high degree of unanimity at the congress is the need to strongly improve work procedures so that the leadership provided by the various party committee echelons is dynamic, effective, close to reality and effective. As the report of the municipal party committee on party building observed, the most obvious shortcomings of the party organization in the recent past have not only been its lack of dynamism and effectiveness in giving concrete form to the policies and line of the party and state, but also its failure to perform thorough organizational work in order to turn existing resolutions into concrete actions. In keeping with a major requirement established by the 5th Congress regarding party building, the Hanoi Party Organization Congress expressed its determination to improve the work methods of party committees and cultivate the Leninist workstyle of the party, which is a matter of major importance in our party's leadership work and is a factor of special importance in insuring the accuracy of the decisions that are made and that these decisions become reality.

The resolution of the party organization congress emphasizes: every activity of the party organization must comply with the principle of democratic centralism and the Party Statutes. Information activities must be reorganized so that they provide specific, full, accurate and timely information. However, the adoption of a correct decision only lays the foundation for guidelines for action. The key factor is the organizing of implementation. The new step taken by the 9th Congress of the Hanoi party Organization was to establish a clear and detailed agenda for implementing the entire resolution of the congress, an agenda to which was appended a program for inspecting the implementation of the resolution. The congress requested that the party committee echelons determine what the main "links" are during each period of time in order to mobilize the combined strength of the dictatorship of the proletariat, provide concerted guidance, perform one job at a time and successfully complete each specific job, thereby creating new conditions for stimulating and broadening the revolutionary movement of the masses. This is an effort of major significance, one designed to enhance the art of leadership and management and learn how to concentrate our efforts and attention in one area and on one decisive job while attaching importance to conducting inspections, which is one of the primary functions of the party, thereby insuring that the implementation of the resolution is effectively organized and guided.

The initial victory that was won in providing concerted guidance of the implementation of the new law concerning industrial and commercial taxes, the fight against profiteers, smugglers and persons who earn their livings illegally and the inspection and prosecution of persons who have constructed expensive houses using illegally gained money proves the effectiveness of the new style of work, a style that reflects a new effectiveness, a new dynamism.

On the basis of the positive factors that are being developed and are becoming a trend leading toward the restoration of order and discipline in the life of the capital and on the basis of the success recorded by the party organization congress by promptly setting specific targets for developing the tremendous potentials that exist, bringing about uniform, well coordinated changes in thinking and organization from deep within the party and truly upholding the right of collective ownership of the people, it is hoped very much that we will launch a widespread mass movement to accelerate the production and economization movement in an effort to complete the 1983 state plan ahead of schedule, widely and strongly mobilize the masses to participate in the movement to restore socialist order in all fields, especially within distribution-circulation, continue to try to reach a new level in the movement of the four forces performing security and national defense work, maintaining order and security and protecting socialist property and intensify the movement to establish the new lifestyle, build families of the new culture and cultivate the style of the capital, the civilization of the capital, which, in the final analysis, will mold the socialist man of Hanoi who will illuminate the capital and cause light to emanate from it.

On the basis of the many areas in which this congress displayed dynamism and effectiveness, it can be confirmed that a new spirit, a new confidence exists.

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CSO: 4209/461

## PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

### TO HUU ADDRESSES HAI HUNG PROVINCE CONFERENCE

BK281505 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 27 Jul 83

[Text] The party and people's committees of Hai Hung Province recently held a conference to launch an emulation movement for producing and contributing large amounts of grain to the state. Comrade To Huu, member of the CPV Central Committee Political Bureau and vice chairman of the Council of Ministers, attended and addressed the conference.

In his address, Vice Chairman To Huu warmly commended the party organization and people of Hai Hung for achieving great success in their 5th-month spring crop production and contributing grain to the state. He said: Having fulfilled the general grain procurement quotas assigned by the central echelon, the entire province resolved to produce more to attain the 1983 grain output target of 200,000 metric tons. This was a very great achievement and effort of the party organization and people of Hai Hung Province. It also constituted a highly valuable lesson for other localities. Hai Hung has thus proven itself worthy of being one of the country's model provinces credited with producing and procuring large amounts of grain.

In carrying out the task of grain procurement, Hai Hung has purchased and collected through two-way contracts, thereby cutting down cash payments. This is a correct method which the province should review to gain more experience so as to apply it more effectively in the next crop.

At a time when the country is still facing difficulties regarding grain supplies, all echelons and sectors in Hai Hung should bring into play their potentials and talents and strive to make their province the pacesetter of other northern provinces and the rest of the country in agricultural production. To attain this goal, Hai Hung should satisfactorily carry out the task of seed production, determine the quality of various varieties, and increase the fertility of each type of soil in areas with different climates in the province. Aside from paying attention to seed production, Hai Hung should attach importance to planting schedule, density of the rice sown and transplanted, the quantity and quality of fertilizers, and the appropriate amounts of fertilizers to be used in different stages of the crop season.

In managerial work, Hai Hung should apply the new contract system in strict accordance with Directive No 100 of the party Central Committee Secretariat. Satisfactory managerial work and implementation of contracts in cooperatives will exert a direct impact on productivity and the people's life as well as the size of their contributions to the state. Hai Hung should promptly complete the formulation of general plans for its districts in accordance with the agroindustrial economic structure. It should satisfactorily carry out the decentralization of managerial responsibilities in favor of the districts and build more material and technical bases for the districts to achieve comprehensive economic development by promoting crop planting, livestock raising, and various trades.

Hai Hung should gradually send more people to build new economic zones and reduce the population growth rate at the grassroots level. It should arrange for the training of district [phrase indistinct], economically, culturally, and militarily strong.

CSO: 4209/490



## PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

### DISTRICT, LOWER LEVEL PARTY BUILDING DISCUSSED

BK031542 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 2 Aug 83

[Text] From 25 to 29 July, in Long Xuyen City, An Giang Province, more than 400 delegates from party committee echelons of provinces, cities, special zones and many districts in the south attended a conference to exchange experiences in building district and lower-level party organizations. The conference, which was organized by the CPV Central Committee Organization Department, was chaired by Comrade Le Duc Binh, member of the CPV Central Committee and deputy head of the CPV Central Committee Organization Department; and Comrade Nguyen Van Chi, member of the CPV Central Committee and deputy head of the control commission of the CPV Central Committee.

The conferees heard reports by five districts: Phu Tan, An Giang Province; Long Phu, Hau Giang Province; Thong Nhat, Dong Nai Province; Gia Rai, Minh Hai Province; and Cai Be, Tien Giang Province, and nine model villages. The reports dealt with the building of party organizations in conjunction with developing production and transforming socialism in agriculture.

The reports also stressed the role and responsibilities of district and lower-level party organizations, and leadership guidelines and measures for party organizations to develop districts comprehensively, especially in the technical and national defense domains.

CSO: 4209/490

## PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

### BRIEFS

NHA TRANG CONFERENCE--Recently, the VCP Central Committee Organization Department held a conference in Nha Trang, Phu Khanh, to exchange experiences in building party organizations at district and grassroots levels in the central Vietnam region. Representatives of party committee echelons of provinces, districts, and villages from Binh Tri Thien to Thuan Hai attended the conference. Comrade Tran Kien, secretary of the party Central Committee and chairman of the party Central Committee Control Commission, attended and addressed the conference. The conference heard reports by representatives of stable and strong district party organizations such as Dien Ban, Quang Nam-Danang; Tuy Hoa, Phu Khanh; Dac To, Gia Lai, Kon Tum; and A Luoi, Binh Tri Thien. They introduced their experiences in teaching and building up a contingent of cadres and transforming the relations of production. The conference exchanged experiences in building stable and strong district party organizations on the basis of building up a contingent of exemplary, united, and singleminded cadres and party members, who incessantly raise their leadership capability and their economic, cultural and professional managerial knowledge on the basis of assessing the qualities and capabilities of cadres and party members through their revolutionary activities. [Text] [OW041500 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1100 GMT 2 Aug 83]

CSO: 4209/490

## ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

### INCREASE IN HO CHI MINH CITY RICE PRICES DEcriED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 23 Jun 83 pp 1,4

[Article by Le Huyen Thong: "Why Have Prices Increased in Ho Chi Minh City Although There Is No Shortage of Rice?"]

[Text] Since the beginning of the second quarter of 1983 the prices of many goods have increased in Ho Chi Minh City, and the prices of some have increased rapidly. During that time, the price of rice, an essential product, remained stable over a long period of time, especially between the end of 1982 and the beginning of June of this year. That represented a great effort on the part of the municipal grain sector, with the effective support of the surrounding provinces, in the process of carrying out economic cooperation under the close guidance of the central echelon. But why, since mid-June, has the price of that strategic commodity suddenly increased, and why have many people gone to buy rice for hoarding? What is the truth?

The city's grain needs are very great. During the past several years the grain sector has had sufficient rice to sell to more than 1 million people at supply prices and guidance prices, in accordance with economic contracts with the state. The city has also concentrated its forces to purchase a rather large quantity of grain, enough to serve about 1.7 million people, including all categories. The Municipal Grain Commerce Corporation has been responsible for purchasing additional rice in other provinces to sell at commercial prices to people who are not qualified to buy it at supply prices. Rice is sold at commercial prices to two categories: it is sold to the families in the neighborhood teams and is sold on the market and the wholesale and retail markets.

During the past month the amount of rice sent to the city from the provinces has declined on some days or many reasons. But in general the amount of rice sold at supply prices, including the rice sold to the families in the neighborhood teams, has been maintained at the normal level. Every month the precincts and districts have regularly received sufficient rice and the retail network has been expanded. Even at times when the market has undergone complicated fluctuations the Municipal Grain Commerce Corporation has not increased the price of the rice it sells to the people.

Struggles Between the Two Paths and Between the Enemy and Ourselves

The prices of many goods in the city have fluctuated for many reasons. Sometimes they are affected by the law of supply and demand, and sometimes by psychological factors. But they have especially been affected by dishonest merchants and enemy sabotage. They have taken advantage of our shortcomings in commercial management and organization. They have spread many false rumors and invented sensational details. The custom of many people in the city is to buy only a few kilos of rice to use for a few days, then buy more rice. There is no need for cadres, workers, and the people to buy rice for hoarding. Recently, in order to guard against rice falling into the hands of private merchants, and to ensure that rice reaches the people, the city has sent rice in many shipments to agencies in the precincts and districts. Therefore, rice has not been sold on a continuous basis in the neighborhood teams, and many places have not ensured the designated quantities. When they see that the state retail stores and the agencies have not received sufficient rice to sell in the subwards, the dishonest merchants and the lackeys of the enemy spread rumors that "The state is out of rice," "There's about to be a currency exchange," and "There's about to be an increase in the price of rice." In addition to spreading rumors, they seek all ways to buy up all the rice at the agencies and at the state retail stores (in many places they hire children to stand in line to buy rice). A number of families, especially those of low-income workers, and even those of cadres and workers, fearing that the price of rice will increase, rush to buy rice for hoarding. Many people who cannot buy rice from the state must buy it from the private merchants at higher prices. The rice market in the city undergoes an artificial crisis.

#### Initial Results

The struggle against the speculators and enemies who increase rice prices in the city has recently provided many valuable lessons. The Municipal Rice Commerce Corporation has made many all-out efforts and has taken the initiative in controlling the sources of goods and preparing sufficient rice to cope with the adverse trend on the market. The retail network has been expanded. Many precincts and districts have closely guided the agencies and the state retail stores so that rice can be taken to the families under the supervision of the women's association and the Youth Union. The grain sector has promptly withdrawn the operating licences of or warned agencies which have increased rice prices and slipped goods to the private merchants, while also resolutely disciplining grain store personnel who collude with dishonest merchants. Precincts 10 and 1, and many other precincts, have coordinated with the women's association and the Youth Union in creating favorable conditions for selling rice to the correct categories of people. When the market has undergone upheavals the precincts and districts have set good examples with regard to the attitude of serving the people. During the past 13 days the market management forces, the mass organizations, and the public security police, along with the grain sector, have carried out inspections and promptly dealt with people who speculate, hoard, and increase rice prices. A number of people who have stolen and hoarded rather large amounts of rice have been arrested and are awaiting trial.

Thanks to the all-round coordination of the sectors, the specific guidance of the precincts, districts, and subwards, and the response of the working people, the "rice fever" has been pushed back a step. Beginning on 20 June the price of

rice stabilized in some places and declined in others. On 21 June and in the morning of 22 June the price of rice at some markets, especially the wholesale markets, fell by between 1 and 2.5 dong per kilo. Those were initial results. The organization and distribution of grain in the city must be further improved. The retail network has recently been expanded but is not yet sufficient and in many places is too small in comparison to the population of the subward. The organization of retail rice selling is intended not only to maintain prices but, even more important, to ensure that the people have enough rice to eat and to make it easy for them to purchase it. That task is not the sole responsibility of the grain sector, but requires the cooperation of the sectors, especially the precinct, district, and subward echelons. At present, the retail network is generally operating very well. But negative phenomena in the agencies, and even in the state grain stores, are still serious. Widespread phenomena are the slipping of grain to private merchants and dishonest weighing and measuring. People who serve as agents must be carefully selected and be under the close supervision of the mass organizations and neighborhood teams. There must be a policy of appropriate rewards and punishments. It is necessary to actively and resolutely punish the dishonest merchants who speculate in and hoard rice in order to raise prices, as well as people who spread false rumors with the goal of upsetting the market. At the large rice markets, such as the Tran Chanh Chieu and An Lac markets, they still operate surreptitiously with many very sophisticated schemes. They disperse their rice among many families and send their lackeys to buy up the rice in many places. The city realizes the urgent need to concentrate on completely transforming and reorganizing the rice sector, rapidly stabilizing the control of goods on the market at the source, and transforming and reorganizing the large markets in the city.

In the course of the struggle to pull down the price of rice, the cadres and people of the city have gained clearer understanding of the complicated, fierce nature of the struggle between our people and the Chinese expansionists, in league with the U.S. imperialists, insidious enemies who are waging a many-sided war of destruction against our people, and of the class struggle and the struggle between the two paths on the distribution-circulation front. In order to win victory in those struggles, it is necessary to firmly grasp the proletarian dictatorship, bring into play the collective mastership right of the working people, promote the socialist transformation of the nonsocialist economic components, establish socialist production relations in all economic activities of the city, be on guard against the plots and schemes of the enemy, and resolutely punish the speculators, blackmarketeers, and enemy lackeys.

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## ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

### HAIPHONG SENDS AID TO PHA LAI CONSTRUCTION SITE

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 Jun 83 p 1

[VNA News Release: "Haiphong Sends Aid to the Construction Site Building the Pha Lai Thermoelectric Power Plant"]

[Text] The enterprises and economic and cultural sectors in Haiphong are coordinating their support of the construction site building the Pha Lai Thermoelectric Power Plant in order to help it quickly put generator number 1 into operation.

The Haiphong port has given the site priority in terms of cargo handling and transportation equipment and organized the direct, rapid and safe transportation to the Pha Lai construction site of all equipment received from the Soviet Union. The Forestry Products Processing Enterprise is endeavoring to quickly complete the production of 1,630 cubic meters of milled lumber for the construction site. The Area 3 Supply Federation is supplying to the site 3,000 lightbulbs and thousands of meters of electric wire in accordance with its plan. The stone excavation units in Thuy Nguyen District are closely coordinating with the transport units of the central level and locality and trying to quickly complete the transportation of 3,000 cubic meters of construction stone to the site.

Each of the six districts in the outskirts of the city are mobilizing 3 quintals of good rice for supply to the construction site. The island district of Cat Hai and the wards within the city have adopted plans for supplying to the construction site some food products, such as MSG, salted shrimp and dried fish.

The municipal Federation of Trade Unions has set aside 50 beds at the Do Son Rest Home so that outstanding cadres and manual workers of the construction site can rest there each week from Saturday until the end of Sunday.

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## ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

### BRIEFS

**LAN DONG COOPERATIVIZATION**--Lan Dong Province has thus far established 55 cooperatives and 601 production collectives involving 78 percent of peasants households and 51 percent of the province's cultivated area. Deriving from the realistic past experience, the province has expanded its cooperativization movement to all the specialized crops cultivation and resettlement areas. [Summary] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 7 Jul 83 BK]

**TAX COLLECTION**--Substantial progress was reported in July in collection of industrial and trade taxes. Since the second quarter, the entire country has begun implementing a new industrial and trade taxes collection policy. The party committee echelons and administrations in various localities have strictly guided and uniformly and firmly carried out this task to maintain prices, stabilize the market, and contribute to restoring order on the distribution-circulation front. Economic, educational, administrative, and organizational measures have been applied at the right time, in the right place, and against the right targets in implementing the new tax regulations. Thousands of tax-evader business households have been exposed, including more than 1,000 households in Hanoi, 1,500 in Quang Nam-Danang, and 1,721 in Binh Tri Thien. Millions of dong in delinquent taxes for last year have been collected and added to the state budget. The illegal circulation of state-controlled goods and supplies by private individuals has been initially curtailed. Various localities have firmly meted out due punishment to people who were engaged in unlawful businesses or who evaded the new tax policy. [Text] [BK010341 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 31 Jul 83]

CSO: 4209/490

## AGRICULTURE

### SOUTHERN PROVINCES BUILD PARTY WHILE TRANSFORMING AGRICULTURE

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 25 Jun 83 p

[VNA News Release: "Southern Provinces Build Party While Transforming Agriculture"]

[Text] During recent months, the party committee echelons in the southern provinces have promoted the propagandizing and educating of cadres and party members with regard to the policy of transforming agriculture, so that they can be exemplary in manifesting a sense of responsibility and in adjusting land, collectivizing the means of production, and setting up production solidarity teams and production collectives. An Giang Province has trained key cadres and party members with regard to the Party's line toward the transformation of agriculture and the principles regarding cooperativization and the contracting out of production in agriculture. The provinces of Dong Nai, Tien Giang, Long An, etc., have sent cadres to help the villages carry out the task of transforming agriculture. Van Co District has assigned members of the standing committee and the district party committee responsibility for a village or an economic-technical cluster.

The provinces have paid attention to the supplementary training of key cadres for the villages, cooperatives, and production collectives. During the first 4 months of the year Cuu Long Province held many short-term classes and trained more than 2,700 management and accounting cadres for the production collectives. During the first 4 months of the year Minh Hai Province trained 3,500 cadres for the cooperatives and production collectives, including nearly 2,800 management cadres and 718 technical cadres and personnel. During the first quarter Hau Giang Province trained nearly 1,500 management cadres and 50 accountants for the cooperatives and production collectives. The party schools of the province and the districts in Kien Giang Province have trained 4,000 management cadres and more than 2,000 technical personnel for the production collectives.

The provinces have paid attention to perfecting their organization and to guiding the task of transforming agriculture.

Many provincial party organizations have, via the agricultural transformation task, promoted the consolidation of party bases and strengthened the management and education of cadres and party members. Ben Tre has held a specialized conference on party building to discuss the consolidation of party bases, the development of the corps of party members, and the building of loyal forces.

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## AGRICULTURE

### NORTH HAS SUCCESSFUL FIFTH MONTH-SPRING HARVEST

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 25 Jun 83 p 1

[Distributed article: "North Has Successful Fifth Month-Spring Harvest: Six Districts Expected To Attain More Than 40 Quintals of Paddy Per Hectare"]

[Text] The north is harvesting its fifth month-spring rice. The first planting of rice was rather good, the middle planting was even better, and the late-planted planting is being monitored. It is noteworthy that in all localities there is rice which has just headed. But in general, there has been a successful harvest all over the north. To date, according to initial reports, all provinces in the north have attained fifth month-spring rice yields from one to five quintals per hectare greater than last year. Thai Binh has attained 37-38 quintals, Hai Hung and Hai Phong have attained 35-39 quintals, Thanh Hoa and Ha Son Binh have attained about 25 quintals, and Vinh Phu, Ha Bac, and Nghe Tinh have attained 22-24 quintals per hectare. The mountain provinces have attained yields of about 20 quintals per hectare. Grain output in the north may increase by more than 150,000 tons of paddy over last year. Ha Nam Ninh and Hai Phong have both increased their rice output and increased their output of subsidiary food crops.

According to initial calculations, many districts, such as Hai Hau and Xuan Thuy in Ha Nam Ninh Province, Dong Hung and Hung Ha in Thai Binh Province, and Tu Loc and My Yen in Hai Hung Province, have attained yields of more than 40 quintals per hectare. Many districts, such as Hung Nguyen in Nghe Tinh Province, Lam Son in Ha Nam Ninh Province, Phu Xuyen in Ha Son Binh Province, and Phu Tien in Hai Hung Province, have encountered difficulties during this season but are endeavoring to attain rice yields of between 35 and 37 quintals per hectare. Many cooperatives, such as Chau Giang in Ha Nam Ninh, Vu Thang, Nguyen Xa, and Nam Chau in Thai Binh Province, Quang Vinh, Phuong Hung, and Duc Hop in Hai Hung Province, etc., have attained rice yields of from 50 to more than 60 quintals per hectare.

The factor determining the victory of this year's fifth month-spring season was the efforts of the sectors and localities to correctly and creatively apply the resolution of the Fifth Party Congress and the resolution of the Third Plenum of the VCP Central Committee, which emphasized the spirit of self-reliance, and the greatest possible effort and concentration of strength on an important spearhead: grain production. The sectors serving agriculture have made all-out efforts. Electricity has been supplied on a regular basis and concentrated during the decisive periods. The supply of chemical fertilizer was 50 percent greater than in 1982 and was on schedule.

[illegible]

4/1980, for the concentration on the rapid and efficient development of the  
"Soviet Union", fulfilling their 1982 grain obligation, and  
1983-1984, 1985-1986, 1987-1988, 1989-1990, 1991-1992, 1993-1994, 1995-1996, 1997-1998, 1999-2000, 2001-2002, 2003-2004, 2005-2006, 2007-2008, 2009-2010, 2011-2012, 2013-2014, 2015-2016, 2017-2018, 2019-2020, 2021-2022, 2023-2024, 2025-2026, 2027-2028, 2029-2030, 2031-2032, 2033-2034, 2035-2036, 2037-2038, 2039-2040, 2041-2042, 2043-2044, 2045-2046, 2047-2048, 2049-2050, 2051-2052, 2053-2054, 2055-2056, 2057-2058, 2059-2060, 2061-2062, 2063-2064, 2065-2066, 2067-2068, 2069-2070, 2071-2072, 2073-2074, 2075-2076, 2077-2078, 2079-2080, 2081-2082, 2083-2084, 2085-2086, 2087-2088, 2089-2090, 2091-2092, 2093-2094, 2095-2096, 2097-2098, 2099-2100, 2101-2102, 2103-2104, 2105-2106, 2107-2108, 2109-2110, 2111-2112, 2113-2114, 2115-2116, 2117-2118, 2119-2120, 2121-2122, 2123-2124, 2125-2126, 2127-2128, 2129-2130, 2131-2132, 2133-2134, 2135-2136, 2137-2138, 2139-2140, 2141-2142, 2143-2144, 2145-2146, 2147-2148, 2149-2150, 2151-2152, 2153-2154, 2155-2156, 2157-2158, 2159-2160, 2161-2162, 2163-2164, 2165-2166, 2167-2168, 2169-2170, 2171-2172, 2173-2174, 2175-2176, 2177-2178, 2179-2180, 2181-2182, 2183-2184, 2185-2186, 2187-2188, 2189-2190, 2191-2192, 2193-2194, 2195-2196, 2197-2198, 2199-2200, 2201-2202, 2203-2204, 2205-2206, 2207-2208, 2209-2210, 2211-2212, 2213-2214, 2215-2216, 2217-2218, 2219-2220, 2221-2222, 2223-2224, 2225-2226, 2227-2228, 2229-2230, 2231-2232, 2233-2234, 2235-2236, 2237-2238, 2239-2240, 2241-2242, 2243-2244, 2245-2246, 2247-2248, 2249-2250, 2251-2252, 2253-2254, 2255-2256, 2257-2258, 2259-2260, 2261-2262, 2263-2264, 2265-2266, 2267-2268, 2269-2270, 2271-2272, 2273-2274, 2275-2276, 2277-2278, 2279-2280, 2281-2282, 2283-2284, 2285-2286, 2287-2288, 2289-2290, 2291-2292, 2293-2294, 2295-2296, 2297-2298, 2299-2300, 2301-2302, 2303-2304, 2305-2306, 2307-2308, 2309-2310, 2311-2312, 2313-2314, 2315-2316, 2317-2318, 2319-2320, 2321-2322, 2323-2324, 2325-2326, 2327-2328, 2329-2330, 2331-2332, 2333-2334, 2335-2336, 2337-2338, 2339-2340, 2341-2342, 2343-2344, 2345-2346, 2347-2348, 2349-2350, 2351-2352, 2353-2354, 2355-2356, 2357-2358, 2359-2360, 2361-2362, 2363-2364, 2365-2366, 2367-2368, 2369-2370, 2371-2372, 2373-2374, 2375-2376, 2377-2378, 2379-2380, 2381-2382, 2383-2384, 2385-2386, 2387-2388, 2389-2390, 2391-2392, 2393-2394, 2395-2396, 2397-2398, 2399-2400, 2401-2402, 2403-2404, 2405-2406, 2407-2408, 2409-2410, 2411-2412, 2413-2414, 2415-2416, 2417-2418, 2419-2420, 2421-2422, 2423-2424, 2425-2426, 2427-2428, 2429-2430, 2431-2432, 2433-2434, 2435-2436, 2437-2438, 2439-2440, 2441-2442, 2443-2444, 2445-2446, 2447-2448, 2449-2450, 2451-2452, 2453-2454, 2455-2456, 2457-2458, 2459-2460, 2461-2462, 2463-2464, 2465-2466, 2467-2468, 2469-2470, 2471-2472, 2473-2474, 2475-2476, 2477-2478, 2479-2480, 2481-2482, 2483-2484, 2485-2486, 2487-2488, 2489-2490, 2491-2492, 2493-2494, 2495-2496, 2497-2498, 2499-2500, 2501-2502, 2503-2504, 2505-2506, 2507-2508, 2509-2510, 2511-2512, 2513-2514, 2515-2516, 2517-2518, 2519-2520, 2521-2522, 2523-2524, 2525-2526, 2527-2528, 2529-2530, 2531-2532, 2533-2534, 2535-2536, 2537-2538, 2539-2540, 2541-2542, 2543-2544, 2545-2546, 2547-2548, 2549-2550, 2551-2552, 2553-2554, 2555-2556, 2557-2558, 2559-2560, 2561-2562, 2563-2564, 2565-2566, 2567-2568, 2569-2570, 2571-2572, 2573-2574, 2575-2576, 2577-2578, 2579-2580, 2581-2582, 2583-2584, 2585-2586, 2587-2588, 2589-2590, 2591-2592, 2593-2594, 2595-2596, 2597-2598, 2599-2600, 2601-2602, 2603-2604, 2605-2606, 2607-2608, 2609-2610, 2611-2612, 2613-2614, 2615-2616, 2617-2618, 2619-2620, 2621-2622, 2623-2624, 2625-2626, 2627-2628, 2629-2630, 2631-2632, 2633-2634, 2635-2636, 2637-2638, 2639-2640, 2641-2642, 2643-2644, 2645-2646, 2647-2648, 2649-2650, 2651-2652, 2653-2654, 2655-2656, 2657-2658, 2659-2660, 2661-2662, 2663-2664, 2665-2666, 2667-2668, 2669-2670, 2671-2672, 2673-2674, 2675-2676, 2677-2678, 2679-2680, 2681-2682, 2683-2684, 2685-2686, 2687-2688, 2689-2690, 2691-2692, 2693-2694, 2695-2696, 2697-2698, 2699-2700, 2701-2702, 2703-2704, 2705-2706, 2707-2708, 2709-2710, 2711-2712, 2713-2714, 2715-2716, 2717-2718, 2719-27



## AGRICULTURE

### NGHE TINH OVERFULFILLS GRAIN OBLIGATION TO STATE

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 26 Jun 83 pp 1, 4

[ Article: "Nghe Tinh: First Province Having Overfulfilled Grain Obligation in 1983 Fifth-month and Spring Season" ]

[Text] In spite of the prolonged cold weather in the beginning, strong whirlwinds in the middle and a serious drought in the end of the season; late ripening of the fifth-month and spring rice; and the harvest being 10-15 days later than in the same period last year, Nghe Tinh Province was upholding its determination to overcome difficulties in production and the responsibility for making contributions to fulfill its obligation and, in 20 days (from the beginning to the 26th of June), delivered to the state granary 80,500 tons of grain, or 100.6 percent of the goal set for the fifth-month and spring season, including 102.5 percent in the case of agricultural tax collection and 104.8 percent, two-way contracts. Fourteen districts and cities, including Thach Ha, Huong Son, Can Loc, Thanh Chuong, Hung Nguyen, Cam Xuyen, Duc Tho, Ky Anh, Do Luong, Nam Dan, Nghi Loc and Nghi Xuan Districts, the City of Ha Tinh and the Municipality of Vinh, and 220 agricultural cooperatives fulfilled their total obligation in the fifth-month and spring season. Thach Ha District delivered 5,500 tons in 5 days; Can Loc, 6,700 tons in 15 days. Khanh Loc Cooperative delivered 300 tons in 2 days; Ba To Cooperative, 560 tons in 4 days.

The province is concentrating its efforts on quickly sending materials and goods to local areas for the purchase of 10,000 additional tons of paddy. This is the first fifth-month and spring season in which Nghe Tinh delivered the largest volume of grain. With the volume of grain that had been obtained in the tenth-month season plus the grain in this fifth-month and spring season, the province as a whole has brilliantly fulfilled its grain obligation in the entire year of 1983. The rate of overfulfillment compared to the assigned goal of 140,000 tons, which was set at the beginning, is 102.6 percent and, compared to the goal that has been adjusted because of the natural disasters, 119.7 percent.

## AGRICULTURE

### PEOPLE CONTRIBUTE TO WATER CONSERVANCY PROJECT CONSTRUCTION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 Jun 83 p 1

[Article: "During the First 6 Months of the Year, the People of the Various Localities Contributed Nearly 88 Million Dong and 18 Million Mandays to the Construction of Medium and Small-Scale Water Conservancy Projects"]

[Text] Over the past 2 years, the movement of the people to build medium and small-scale water conservancy projects has developed strongly on a nationwide scale and achieved significant results, thereby contributing to the effort to clear land and expand the amount of area under cultivation while creating favorable conditions for intensive cultivation to raise crop yields.

During the first 6 months of this year, according to initial reports by 30 provinces and municipalities, the total capital invested in the construction of medium and small-scale water conservancy projects was nearly 154 million dong, nearly 32 million dong of which were provided to the localities in the form of subsidies from the state, nearly 34 million dong of which were borrowed from the bank by the people and nearly 88 million dong of which were contributed by the people to build and repair thousands of medium and small-scale water conservancy projects, thereby promptly supporting winter-spring and 10th month crop production. The people of the various localities contributed 18 million mandays, dug and spread more than 30 million cubic meters of dirt, laid more than 47,214 cubic meters of stone, poured more than 4,000 cubic meters of concrete and completed many small-scale water conservancy projects. The amount of area irrigated has been increased by 16,000 hectares, the amount of area drained has been increased by 11,000 hectares and the inundation of salt water has been stopped on 2,000 additional hectares.

The provinces and municipalities of Haiphong, Ha Nam Ninh, Lang Son, Son La, Bac Thai, Thanh Hoa, Nghe Tinh, Binh Tri Thien, Quang Nam-Da Nang, Nghia Binh, Thuan Hai, Hau Giang, Minh Hai and others, which have strong movements of the people to build water conservancy projects, have rapidly and systematically constructed numerous projects and promptly put them to work supporting agricultural production. In the central provinces, the movement of "the state and the people working together" to build water conservancy projects has brought about new changes in the construction of material-technical bases for

agricultural production. The provinces of Nam Bo have actively constructed medium and small-scale water conservancy projects, along the lines of area embankments, drainage pipes, projects to prevent the flow of salt water or leach sulfates from fields and fresh water irrigation canals; as a result, rice yields there were still high during this year's winter-spring season and were higher at many places than during last year's winter-spring season despite this year's drought.

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CSO: 4209/461

## AGRICULTURE

### FORESTRY MINISTER DISCUSSES COVERING BARE HILLS, LAND

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 27 Jun 83 pp 3, 4

[ Article by Forestry Minister Phan Xuan Dot: "How To Quickly Cover Bare Land, Hills and Mountains With Vegetation" ]

[Text] According to preliminary statistics, our country as a whole presently has up to 13.3 million hectares of bare land and hills which are not covered by vegetation, or 40 percent of the natural land area, with about 6-7 million hectares of bare hills being considered "forest land," and up to 5-6 million hectares of bare land and hills within the agricultural realm that have not yet been cultivated. Many areas in Tay Bac and Viet Bac (the northern part of North Vietnam), which used to have very many forests, now have just few forests left. In Tay Bac, there are millions of hectares of bare hills and mountains, with its forests now accounting for only 9 percent of their past area. In the Central Highlands, there presently are 2 million hectares of bare land that is not covered by vegetation. Eastern Nam Bo has up to 1.6 million hectares. There also are millions of hectares of bare hills and mountains and sandbanks in the central coastal provinces. Thuan Hai Province alone has up to 600,000 hectares of bare hills and land. In the Mekong River delta, hundreds of thousands of hectares of empty land and swampy areas that remain uncultivated. In the Bac Bo delta provinces, although the movement to plant trees was vigorously spreading in many years, presently a lot of land still remains unused. What deserves attention is the fact that many vital watershed areas, which are the sources of water for the northern provinces and Truong Son, and many red-basalt areas in the Central Highlands have become bare. In these areas, the ethnic minorities are encountering water shortages. That is the real situation that has become obvious to everybody.

The fact that forests are decreasing and bare hills and land are increasing at a fast rate points to two urgent tasks that must be resolved simultaneously: one, we must use every means to manage and protect better the existing forests and to maintain their areas; and two, we must quickly cover with vegetation a larger part of the idle and bare land, including the land that is included

in our agricultural production planning, but in the coming years when we do not as yet have guidelines for their use, we also need to organize afforestation and planting of industrial crops and grass for animal raising, to quickly raise the percentage of land covered with vegetation, to create favorable conditions for developing forests as a capital and to contribute to making more products that serve the social life.

However, under the present conditions, how do we "quickly cover the bare hills and coastal sandbanks with vegetation" as the resolution of the 3rd Plenum of the VCP Central Committee (5th term) has suggested? This is an extremely urgent but also very great and difficult task. We still have millions of hectares of bare hills and land which we can transform into economic or protective forests, or use to plant special-product crops, industrial crops and long-term fruit trees; in some localities, they can be used to grow grain and food crops, such as rice, corn, beans and farinaceous crops. In the saline water-covered areas along the western Nam Bo coast, where mangrove has a strong ability to revive, it is not difficult to plant new forests as trees will grow quickly and provide firewood at the rate of 10-20 cubic meters per hectare per year. In the strongly alkaline soil of Dong Thap's half million hectares, cajuput grows quite quickly and does not die even after months of being submerged; this is a crop that has economic values of many kinds, for in addition to its wood and leaves, it can be used to produce essential oil. In Moc Hoa District, Long An Province, the people are experienced in growing cajuput by directly seeding the bare plots and within 6-7 years getting timber from it to make stakes and earning an average of from 400,000 to 500,000 dong per hectare. In the case of the strongly alkaline soil, if the "len liep" technique is used to reduce alkalinity and white eucalyptus is planted along with pineapple and peach in the mode of combining agriculture and forestry, the economic results to be obtained will be even greater. As to the quantity of timber from the eucalyptus crop, the average yield per year can be 15-20 cubic meters per hectare in a cycle of 8-10 years. In the bare hill zones with drought-stricken basalt soil, the lon hot peach crop as the E Sup Forestry-Industry Union in Dac Lac Province has grown could be harvested in only 18 months. In Thuan Hai Province, this same crop is being widely used to cover the bare hills in Duc Linh, Ham Tan, Bac Binh, Ninh Hai and Phan Rang Districts. This is the kind of tree that can tolerate drought and poor soil and has good economic values as its seeds can be pressed to get oil, the inner parts of these seeds are a kind of precious food and the fruits, when ripe, can be used to make alcohol, vinegar and beverage. Lon hot peach is one of the industrial crops that are drawing attention as it is being widely planted and multiplied to create a source of valuable export goods. The bare hills that have become laterite can be covered with pine of different kinds; if manpower is invested in improving the soil, as Can Kiem Cooperative (in rural Hanoi) has done, we still can grow in the bone-dry laterite-rich soil such crops as



jackfruit, pineapple, lychee and timber trees, which within a few years can make up for production expenses. In the bare hill zone of Tam Duong (Vinh Phu Province), many cooperatives plant cay mang tang [ *Litsea citrata* ] to provide pineapple with shade. Doan Hung District uses the bare hills in the direction of fully and correctly combining agriculture with forestry, with models showing appropriate land-use conditions -- ricefields and fish-raising ponds at the low level; gardens and industrial crops at the foot of the hills and forests at the high level. The experience of Doan Hung District in using hilly land in the above-mentioned manner is a very correct one and must be widely adopted. And so, in various forms and with many positive measures, we are fully capable of again covering the bare hills with vegetation.

In order to quickly cover the bare hills with vegetation, we must uphold and correctly implement the motto, "The state and the people work together" or "The central and local levels work together," and use forests to develop forests. The land to be covered with vegetation consists of all kinds: flooded land near the coast, swampy acid and saline soil, sandbanks and sand bars, bare hills and mountains, and other kinds of unused land that presently is not covered with any vegetation. In addition, we should find some ways to use ponds and lakes and any expanses of water to grow marine products, for they are a big source of income. All localities must review and reassess the potential value of different kinds of land in order to make plans for covering part of their land with vegetation, moving forward step by step and fully finishing one part at a time. They should do work first in the closer areas and where it is easy to do and then in the farther areas and where it is difficult to do work; start with the types of crops that are easy to plant, with the existing sources of seeds, and the ones that the people like to plant and have some experience in planting; and adopt the principle of planting crops by the "take a short one to feed a long one" method, to ensure having a harvest to look forward to for our livelihood and to continue to extend the scope of covering with vegetation, without necessarily planting only timber trees of different kinds, which will take a long time to harvest. The formula of combining agriculture with forestry is the most appropriate one for covering the bare hills with vegetation by the above-mentioned "take a short one to feed a long one" method and must be popularized and widely applied to all zones.

As to the goals of covering the bare hills with vegetation, we must always fully understand and correctly resolve the relationship between the economic goal and the protective goal, i.e., we must satisfy the needs to cover them with vegetation, to fight erosion, to protect the soil and to improve the environment while harvesting what has been planted for our livelihood.

As to the organization and distribution of responsibilities for the areas to be covered with vegetation, the forestry-industry unions, state forests, state

farms and economic units must directly organize planting and covering with vegetation and combine it with the production needs as required by the units under the same managerial authority from agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, water conservancy and fishery. The parts of bare land, hills and mountains that belong to a locality must be within the jurisdiction of the party committee echelons and people's committee of the same locality to organize covering them with vegetation, with the districts being the principal ground for combining the latter with the plan for socioeconomic development. Depending on the natural geographical conditions, area of the existing bare hills, on-the-spot labor capacity and sources of capital, both supplied by the state and obtained in the locality, plus the new possibilities brought about by joining with other localities and units in doing business, every district must take appropriate measures to organize and mobilize its forces in order to fulfill the task of covering them with vegetation within the shortest time possible. The localities that have many bare hills and difficult conditions must strive to finish the job within a few 5-year plans; the ones that have few bare hills and little bare land, plenty of labor and convenient communications can concentrate on definitely finishing the job within a few years.

In order to quickly cover the bare hills and land with vegetation, a decisively significant measure is to step up the job of assigning land to cooperatives, army units and schools for tree planting and to families for building gardens and farms where the hills are low and the soil is still quite good. Where such land is plentiful, each family can be assigned 2,000-2,500 square meters; where there is not much land, we can assign a few sao, for them to combine the tree-planting plan to cover the bare hills with vegetation with the plan for economic development to serve the people's life, and encourage them to plant any kinds of trees or crops that they find profitable, including the timber trees like sa moc [ *Cunninghamia Lanceolata* ], pine, mo, white eucalyptus, xoan [ *Brucea javanica* ] and bamboo; industrial crops like son [ *Toxicodendron verniciflua* ], tea, tung tree, camellia, coffee, rubber, cacao and pepper; and pineapple, etc. Naturally, on the basis of the production direction that has been taken, we must guide the people toward going in the right direction in order to obtain large volume of products suitable for purchases, processing and consumption. In the remote zones where the bare hills are far from the people and it is rather inconvenient for cooperatives and families to do productive work, we can organize shock youth forces, encourage socialist labor contributions or assign the nearest army units the job of planting trees and covering the bare hills with vegetation while combining it with their national defense need. In the zones that are particularly remote and hard to reach, while we lack the ability to plant crops in the coming years, we can proceed with zoning the highlands for afforestation and combining natural reproduction with supplemental seeding, including experimental seeding by aircraft, for the purpose of increasing the rate of "turn the bare hills green."

About the crop cultivation pattern applicable to areas of bare hills and sandbanks, we must exploit the sources of seeds available and the people's rich experience on the basis of the soil quality and environmental conditions in individual areas and combine them with applying the results of scientific and technical research as obtained by sectors, institutes and colleges so as to ensure good results from covering the bare hills with vegetation.

As to selecting the right crops, for the flooded zone along the coast, most suitable are mangrove, vet mam [ *Brugulera caryophylloides* ] and dua nuoc [ *Nipa fruticans* ], combined with raising shrimp, fish and marine products of various kinds. Then for the acid and alkaline soil zones, we combine growing cajuput with raising bees. Along the sandbanks we grow beefwood (Filao) in closely spaced and dense rows to get firewood, rattan as a source of raw materials for making woven articles and export, coconut and pineapple, the latter to get fiber, and create rows of trees to protect from winds and sand erosion, to improve the soil and to serve agricultural production, fishery and animal husbandry. In Tay Ninh Province, the people grow trees to get oil along with lon hot peach in depleted slash-burn upland fields, in the first 3 years grow such companion crops as beans, peanut, sesame and fruit trees like jackfruit. When the peach trees are big enough to provide a thick canopy, they grow pineapple underneath it. In the old slash-burn upland fields in Bac Thai, Hoang Lien Son and Ha Son Binh Provinces, the experienced people plant xoan, cay lat, sa moc [ *Cunninghamia Lanceolata* ], thong ba la (a kind of pine) and tong qua su, which will cover them and become forests within only 3-5 years. On the bare hills and mountains around municipalities, cities and towns with large populations, zoning should be achieved for planting such drought-resistant trees as white popinac and yellow-flowered cajuput in order to provide firewood and to improve the soil first and to grow the industrial crops of higher economic values later. For the steep bare hills we must apply special farming technique, mostly pay attention to the technique of fighting erosion with biological and mechanical measures, attach importance to the role of groups of trees in retaining water and fighting drought and make appropriate investment in intensive cultivation in order to ensure good results as the work progresses. An urgent job ahead is to get enough seeds and small plants for propagation. In this year of 1983, in addition to making preparations for sowing and producing small plants needed to exceed the goal of having 55,000 hectares of forests and planting 350-400 million trees in scattered areas, the districts must actively build nurseries -- central nurseries of their own and nurseries of individual cooperatives, units and schools -- and encourage every family to extend the areas used for plant propagation; the forestry installations and state forests must actively help the districts to draw up projects and plans, give technical guidance and supply the necessary quantities of seeds; the districts must use part of the budget taken from the afforestation funds to produce plants and to distribute them to units, collectives and people for replanting on a widespread basis.



- About policies, the Council of Ministers has issued Decision 184 on stepping up the assigning of forests and forest land to the people and collectives for planting trees and protecting forests; the Ministry of Forestry has issued a circular to provide guidelines for implementation of the above-mentioned decision. About the zones of bare land, hills and mountains, there must be special policies to encourage cooperatives, families of cooperative members, cadres, workers and civil servants to do their best to till the land that is being left unused and to turn it into gardens and farms, with exemption of agricultural taxes for them for a number of years, and in the case of afforestation for the period of the first growth cycle. Wherever the people do not have any tree-planting movement yet, the state should give them assistance in the form of young plants and seeds. As to the cooperatives that plant trees to create forests and do business involving forests in the land of depleted forests and woods, as well as on bare hills, they are permitted to fully use their products to build up their self-provided capital and encouraged to borrow capital, to get capital support or to cooperate and do joint business with state forests for jointly investing and sharing profit. About the land assigned to cooperatives and families for such uses as tree planting to build forest gardens and farms, digging of ponds, dam construction, fish raising, etc., they have the right to use it on a lasting basis and continuously or to lease to relatives for continued earning of income, with the products obtained being used to satisfy the family needs first and the remaining ones being purchased at appropriate prices by the state, which really wants to encourage people to plant trees. In addition, as to the timber and special export products the cooperatives are able to produce, the state will purchase them at appropriate prices, enough to compensate for the tree-planting expenses and to provide appropriate profit, and at same time sell them on an exchange basis the precious and scarce goods necessary in everyday life.

In order to have additional sources of capital to increase the scope and pace of covering bare hills and mountains with vegetation, the Ministry of Forestry will study along with the responsible central sectors the ways to improve and supplement the management mechanism and the use of the forest maintenance fund; to raise the percentage of contributions from provincial and district budgets to this need; and at the same time to improve early the calculation of forest product costs in the direction of using forests to develop forests, encouraging afforestation and building up the existing forests and creating favorable conditions for the forestry sector and localities to actively draft economic development plans for agriculture and forestry in the zones of bare land, hills and mountains.

- We must strongly launch a widespread emulation movement to strive to finish covering with vegetation the bare land, hills and mountains throughout the country and in individual localities, with districts being the unit for registration in the emulation to finish the job of getting rid of bare hills and other

zones having similar conditions being used for registration, as well as consideration for reasonable commendation and reward. Any district that wipes out 70-80 percent of the areas of bare land and hills, a criterion for basic completion of the job of covering them with vegetation, will be awarded by the state the title of outstanding emulator in having completed such a job. Let all provinces compete with one another and districts, villages, state farms, state forests, organs, units, schools, hamlets and villages emulate one another in "turning bare hills green" and letting every inch of land and every plot be fully covered with trees and crops and used in business. By doing so we will be turning millions of hectares of bare hills and mountains and uncultivated land quickly into good and growing forests.

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## AGRICULTURE

### BRIEFS

**PHU KHANH RICE**--Due to prolonged drought, by mid-June Phu Khanh Province was able to plant summer-fall rice on only 18,000 hectares or 55 percent of the planned acreage. To date, cooperatives in the province have prepared more than 71,000 metric tons of animal manure for the fertilization of this rice. [Summary] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 20 Jun 83 BK]

**BINH TRI THIEN GRAIN**--As of late June, Binh Tri Thien Province had delivered to state granaries 51,580 metric tons of grain, overfulfilling the plan norm for the 5th-month spring rice by 0.1 percent, or 10,000 metric tons more than the corresponding period of last year. This was the crop that the province fulfilled its plan norm earlier and was second only to Nghe Tinh Province which has already fulfilled its target. [Summary] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 4 Jul 83 BK]

**HA SON BINH RICE DELIVERY**--As of 5 July 1983, Ha Son Binh Province has delivered 47,034 metric tons of 5th-month spring rice to the state, fulfilling 101.7 percent of the crop plan norm. This is an increase of nearly 6,000 tons over the same period last year. The province has thus fulfilled 107 percent of its grain procurement target for 1983. This year's 5th-month spring rice in the province yielded well, with an increase of 300 kg per hectare over that of the same period last year. [Summary] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 6 Jul 83 BK]

**PHU KHANH GRAIN DELIVERY**--As of 4 July, Phu Khanh Province has delivered 45,000 metric tons of winter-spring grain, fulfilling its train obligation norm for the crop. Despite great difficulties caused by drought, the province still succeeded in overfulfilling its grain obligation norm, owing to the effort of the grain procurement sector to get more goods for barter with peasants. [Summary] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 6 Jul 83 BK]

**NORTHERN PROVINCES' GRAIN DELIVERY**--As of 25 July, northern provinces and cities had fulfilled 103 percent of the original general grain delivery quotas for the 1983 5th-month spring crop season. The amount of grain already delivered to the state granaries included 551,000 metric tons of paddy obtained through obligatory purchases and 294,617 metric tons through nonobligatory purchases.

A total of 13 provinces and cities--Bac Thai, Hoang Lien Son, Quang Ninh, Vinh Phu, Ha Bac, Ha Son Binh, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Haiphong, Hanoi, Thanh Hoa, Nghe Tinh, and Binh Tri Thien--have fulfilled the general grain delivery quotas for the 1983 5th-month spring crop season. Nghe Tinh Province, despite the heavy losses in production caused by a whirlwind in May, has to date delivered to the state granaries 95,210 metric tons of grain, exceeding the original quotas by 15,210 metric tons, and leading all other northern provinces and cities in the rate of grain delivery. At present, various northern provinces and cities are actively guiding cooperatives and cooperative members in continuing to harvest the 5th-month rice, planting the 10th-month rice, and urgently discharging their grain obligation to the state. Those provinces and cities which have fulfilled the original grain delivery quotas are continuing to motivate the peasantry to consume grain sparingly and sell the surplus to the state, resolutely striving to fulfill the additional quotas assigned recently by the state. [Text] [BK021526 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 1 Aug 83]

NORTHERN GRAIN DELIVERY--As of 30 June, the northern provinces and cities had fulfilled 49 percent of the grain collection target for the 1983 5th month-spring crop season. Provinces which have delivered a large volume of grain to state granaries are Nghe Tinh, 85,000 metric tons; Binh Tri Thien, 51,800 metric tons; Hai Hung, 75,700 metric tons; Vinh Phu, 25,700 metric tons, Ha Nam Ninh, 32,000 metric tons; and Ha Son Binh, 26,800 metric tons. [Summary] [BK031555 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 2 Jul 83 BK]

HA SON BINH RICE--Ha Son Binh Province is expected to plant more than 80,000 hectares of rice in this year's 10th-month crop season. However, due to the late harvest of the 5th month-spring rice and the presence of drought, as of 24 June the province was able to sow rice seedlings on only 53 percent of the planned area. [Summary] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 1 Jul 83 BK]

THANH HOA PADDY COLLECTION--As of 28 June, Thanh Hoa Province had delivered 50,204 metric tons of paddy to state granaries. This figure, which represents 54.8 percent of the grain collection target for this year's 5th month-spring crop season, includes 40,228 metric tons collected in the forms of tax and obligation. [Summary] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 1 Jul 83 BK]

NGHE TINH GRAIN COLLECTION--By 22 June, Nghe Tinh Province had fulfilled 100.6 percent of the grain collection norm for the 1983 5th month-spring crop season. On 2 July, the chairman of the Council of Ministers sent a message warmly commending the people and cadres of this province for taking the lead among other northern provinces in the collection of grain produced in the recent 5th month-spring crop season. [Summary] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 2 Jul 83 BK]

QUANG NAM-DANANG COLLECTION--To date, Quang Nam-Danang Province has collected 30,000 metric tons of grain. This figure shows an increase of 6,600 metric tons compared to the volume collected in the previous 5th month-spring crop season. As many as 63 cooperatives in the province have exceeded their grain collection targets. [Summary] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 1 Jul 83 BK]

LONG AN RICE--Long An Province plans to plant 43,000 hectares of summer-fall rice this year, of which 36,700 hectares are high-yield rice or fourfold more than the previous crop. The province is sending more fertilizer and rice varieties to various districts to fulfill the aforementioned targets. [Summary] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 23 Jun 83 BK]

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## HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

### PROGRESS REPORTED IN RESTORING HYDROELECTRIC INSTALLATIONS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 23 Jun 83 p 2

[Article by Nguyen Thanh Long of the Ministry of Power: "Two Years of Restoring and Building Small Hydroelectric Installations"]

[Text]After the Fifth Party Congress, the movement to restore and build small hydroelectric installations surged in many localities.

According to incomplete data, in 1981 and 1982, and the first 6 months of 1983, the localities and sectors restored or built more than 60 stations with a total designed capacity of more than 3,000 kilowatts. It is estimated that during the last 6 months of 1983 several dozen additional stations may be brought into operation.

A large number of stations have been restored or built in accordance with the slogan "The state and the people work together and the central level and the local level work together." That task is proceeding more favorably than in the past because of the existence of foreign-made equipment that had been kept in warehouses for years and, especially, because we researched and manufactured a number of hydroelectric turbines with capacities of between 20 and 1,000 kilowatts, and are advancing to the manufacture of even larger turbines. There are no shortages of generators, parts, or electricity control panels because many sectors and localities still have diesel generators that were provided them during the war years. Most of them have broken down because their internal combustion motors are inoperative, and need only to be restored and improved a little. After we have put into operation all such generators, we can manufacture new generators.

The first hydroelectricity generators we produced by that method were installed at Song Cung in Quang Nam-Da Nang Province. Our generators were then installed at Ban Hoang and Thong Giot in Cao Bang Province and additional ones are being installed in Quang Nam-Da Nang, at the Duy Son and Dai Quang cooperatives. Noteworthy is the fact that the famous Phu Ninh small hydroelectricity installation in that province has just completed the installation of turbine No. 1, which has a capacity of 1,000 kilowatts. That turbine was designed and produced by Machine Tool Manufacturing Factory No. 1 and a number of other units. The Phu Ninh station has installed the first velocity control mechanism produced by that factory. With velocity control mechanisms, it will be easier to technically equip the small hydroelectricity stations. A number of stations which are smaller than those mentioned above, such as the 110-kilowatt Khuoi Sao

station and the 50-kilowatt Binh Chuong station in Lang Son Province, the 30-kilowatt Tan Duong station, the 20-kilowatt Tan Thanh station, and the 15-kilowatt Cho Chu station in Dinh Hoa District, Bac Thai Province, have promptly and stably supplied electricity to the industrial installations in the area, to the water pumping and agricultural product processing installations, and for electric lights in the hamlets and villages, in order to improve the cultural living conditions and morale of the ethnic minority cadres and people in the northern mountain region.

The provinces with strongly developed small hydroelectricity movements are Quang Nam-Da Nang, Cao Bang, and Hoang Lien Son. The most outstanding districts with regard to mobilizing the masses to build small hydroelectric projects are Dinh Hoa in Bac Thai Province, Nguyen Binh in Cao Bang Province, and Duy Xuyen and Dai Loc in Quang Nam-Da Nang Province. Many military units have also enthusiastically participated in installing hydroelectricity machinery for the people in the areas in which they are stationed, or have installed small hydroelectricity generators in their camps.

The localities have been concerned not only with building hydroelectricity installations but also with the organization and management of those stations. During the past several years, a weakness has been that although a considerable number of installations have been built, a large number have broken down. During their war of aggression along our country's border in 1979, the Chinese troops destroyed a number of our hydroelectricity stations.

Much of the machinery has broken down because of a lack of knowledge about how to manage it, or because the machinery has been managed along the lines of supply-as-needed management and depending on and waiting on assistance by the central echelon. There have been no rules and regulations regarding the operation of machinery, machinery operators have not been trained, and there are no facilities for repairing the broken-down machinery.

Many localities and sectors intend to build many additional small hydroelectric installations. If those intentions are to be transformed into reality, it is necessary to carefully and meticulously carry out the investigation and planning tasks, and, on the basis of the capability for mobilizing capital among the people, draft appropriate plans. Plans for restoring or building small hydroelectric stations must give priority to the stations which are easily built, which can be built quickly, and which will bring about real benefit. The researching, designing, and manufacturing of the various kinds of turbines and velocity regulators must also be further promoted, and attention must be paid to both the manufacture of new components and the full utilization of old components. The local machinery enterprises must invest in technical equipment in order to manufacture small turbines for use in the district, village, and cooperative stations. Advances in the application of science and technology to the building of machinery and equipment is creating great capabilities for the movement to build small hydroelectricity stations to stably advance.



LABOR

BRIEFS

DONG THAP PRODUCTION COLLECTIVE--Dong Thap Province to date has established 1,005 production collectives and organized 40 percent of the peasant families into collective farming. The province has delivered to state granaries almost 120,000 metric tons of grain, achieving 70 percent of its plan norm for the year. The province is urging peasants to accelerate their summer-fall rice planting and prepare seedlings for the 10th-month crop. [Summary] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 21 Jun 83 BK]

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